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Surviving the Arab Spring: 
The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Case Study of Kuwait 
(2011–2012) 
"… Gulf cooperation is a structure created by the will of Gulf peoples. It is a sincere 
response to the facts of life in this part of the world … it is our gift to our sons, and sons 
of Arabism. Our decisions, liabilities, future steps, vision of our hopes, and the test of our 
will are the trust of our peoples …”1  
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This research analyses the reactions of the Gulf monarchies to the mass demonstrations 
that took place during the Arab Spring, arguing that the Arab Spring motivated Gulf 
ruling elites to intensify cooperation efforts under their regional alliance, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). It hypothesises that the Gulf monarchies utilised the GCC 
as a vehicle to preserve their regimes during the Arab Spring as its members engaged in 
collaborative efforts in three areas to sustain and prolong their rule: enhancing regime 
legitimacy; heightening internal security; and collaborating in a defence scheme. The 
strengthening of Gulf unity through the GCC organisation proved to be a primary and 
ongoing strategy employed by all six Gulf governments during and after the Arab Spring 
and, despite the fact that a closer union compromised the sovereignty of the individual 
monarchies, this was accepted by all six member states. As such, the case study of 
Kuwait and its government response to the unrest during the Arab Spring presents an 
analysis of how one member state restructured its domestic policies to allow the regional 
alliance greater influence over its foreign and domestic affairs in order to preserve its 
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The Arab Spring represents a challenging period in the contemporary history of the 
Middle East region, where the relationship between rulers and ruled is challenged and the 
legitimacy of state institutions is questioned. The seeds of the Arab Spring were planted 
in the winter of 2010, when a municipal inspector in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid 
confiscated the vegetable cart of vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, because he did not have a 
proper vending licence. The young merchant might have needed either a stronger 
connection to an influential person or enough money for a bribe in order to obtain a 
licence. It appears that a combination of humiliation and powerlessness drove him to an 
act of public self-immolation in front of a local government building. In the following 
days, solidarity rallies sprouted across the country, at which there was violent 
confrontation between security forces and protestors. The deaths of protestors provoked a 
series of mass demonstrations against the Tunisian regime of Zine El Abidine ben Ali. 
Within months, further uprisings occurred in neighbouring Arab countries, and the 
autocratic leaderships of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya were removed from power. 2 
Interestingly, the ousting of four Arab dictators stands in contrast to the survival of 
eight monarchs in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, producing a striking 
dichotomy between regime structures in the region: the monarchies and the republics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rosiny, S. (2012). The Arab Spring: Triggers, Dynamics and Prospects. German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies, (1). 
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Thus, despite the widespread demonstrations across the Arab world, the Arab Spring in 
fact embodies two broad spectrums of relatively different uprisings: one in the republican 
states that highlighted a deep-rooted anger at economic and political failures by the ruling 
elites, and having the aim of complete regime change; the other within the monarchies, 
where a segment of the population also began to demand social, economic and political 
rights from their ruling monarchs, but without the demand for regime change (Bahrain 
excepted). The different experiences of the two spectrums are based on the 
characteristically distinct foundations of political legitimacy, economic opportunities, 
cultural identities and state capacities offered within each regime type.3 There is, it would 
appear, a dichotomy – almost a polarity – in the source, scope, and intensity between the 
two mutually exclusive methods of governance. This research does not intend to explore 
the structural differences between monarchical and republican regimes, nor does it imply 
that the resilience of the monarchical regimes is exclusively based on certain monarchical 
attributes. A prominent scholar specialising in the monarchical exceptionalism of the 
Gulf monarchies, Gregory Gause, asserts: “Monarchy in and of itself does not dictate a 
particular path to regime survival”.4 Rather, this research argues that the reason behind 
the survival of the Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring is the utilisation of certain 
tactics by the Gulf ruling elites. It aims to focus on the survival of the six Gulf 
monarchies that constitute the members of the regional organisation, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) during the Arab Spring. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gray, M. (2013). A Tale of Two Middle Easts: Change and Stasis in the Arab World. Griffith Asia 
Quarterly, 1(2/3), 51–76. 
4 Gause, G. (2013). Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring. 
Brookings Doha Center. Analysis Paper, 8. 
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The central question this research addresses in its analysis of the survival of the Gulf 
monarchies during the Arab Spring is this: what is the relationship between the Gulf 
monarchies and their regional organisation, the GCC, and how have the Gulf monarchies 
utilised the GCC as a vehicle to preserve their regimes during the Arab Spring? In 
addressing this question, the research seeks to provide an analysis of how the Gulf 
monarchies utilised certain tactics under a broad GCC strategy for regime preservation 
during the Arab Spring. This strategy consists of three main tactics employed by the 
monarchies to prevent organised demonstrations and suppress government opposition: 
enhancing monarchical legitimacy, heightening internal security, and collaborating in a 
defence scheme. This research also provides an analysis of the emergence of the GCC as 
a regional organisation and examines the changing internal and external circumstances 
that dictated the role of the GCC in the domestic affairs of the Gulf monarchies. 
The GCC was established on May 25, 1981, by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The GCC officially bound the six Gulf 
countries into a union of mutual interests in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and the Iran–Iraq war in 1980. The objectives of the GCC include the development 
of closer relations between member countries in the economic, military, and political 
spheres. At its inception, scholars and political observers viewed the GCC as an 
organisation doomed to failure due to its fragility in the face of others’ aspirations to 
regional hegemony (Iran and Iraq). However, the GCC has shown itself to be remarkably 
robust and is proving to be one of the few cases in the Arab world where regional 
cooperation is achievable. Indeed, the importance of examining this organisation lies in 
the rare durability of its members’ unity within the region, as well as the eminent value of 
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its members in the global economic sphere, where the six GCC countries hold more than 
one third of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and 22% of the world’s proven natural 
gas reserves.5 
This research highlights the importance of the role of the GCC in the Gulf 
monarchies’ ability to survive the Arab Spring. It defines the Arab Spring in the Gulf 
monarchies as a series of mass demonstrations by citizens and non-citizens calling for 
political, economic and social reforms from their respective Gulf governments. These 
demands mainly revolved around government accountability, corruption, social justice, 
and political and economic reforms. Throughout the research, the Arab Spring is 
characterised variously as involving street demonstrations, sit-ins, violent clashes 
between protestors and police, mass arrests, military assistance from neighbouring 
countries, and government violations of the constitutional rights of citizens. Of the six 
monarchies within the GCC, the four most affected by the Arab Spring were Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The two monarchies that did not experience mass 
demonstrations were Qatar and the UAE; the reasons for this anomaly perhaps revolving 
the low percentage of citizens within their respective populations.6 This low percentage 
enabled the governments to provide their citizens with a variety of economic and 
financial benefits that may have discouraged organised street demonstrations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Koerner, K.M.O. (2014). The GCC going East Economic Ties with Developing Asia on the Rise. 
Deutsche Bank Research.  
6 “The UAE citizen population consisted of 11.5% of the population in 2011.”  In Chilton, J. (2011). 
Emiratis are 11.5% of population. The Emirates Economist. “The Qatari citizen population consisted of 
12% of the total population as of 2013.” In Snoj, J. (2013). Qatar's population - by nationality. BQ 
Magazine.  
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The demonstrations that occurred in the Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring were 
not as large or consistent as those in the Arab republics; the demonstrations in Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait involved approximately 1% of the total indigenous 
population. Meanwhile, in Bahrain, protestors constituted around 40% of citizens.7 
Regardless of the low percentage turnout in the Gulf monarchies, the fact that citizens 
took to the streets at all to demand reforms and justice from their respective governments 
is a tremendous development in the relationship between the ruling elite and the citizen 
population. In Saudi Arabia and Oman, political and economic discontent is not openly 
discussed among citizens, nor do governments encourage political participation by 
citizens. Street demonstrations are a rare occurrence. In Bahrain and Kuwait, on the other 
hand, discontent at government actions is discussed in the media and among citizens 
regularly, and street demonstrations had occurred in the past. However, the leaderships’ 
responses to the Arab Spring in these four Gulf monarchies were unprecedented in terms 
of the intensity of violence and the strengthening of unity among GCC member states. 
More importantly, the Arab Spring prompted the GCC organisation to become an 
engaged participant in the domestic affairs of the Gulf monarchies, strengthening unity 
and fostering collective preservation of their regimes. 
Each Gulf monarchy faced demonstrations with varying demands, and each Gulf 
leadership responded differently due to its particular political structures and governance. 
Bahrain was exceptional among the Gulf monarchies in terms of both the threat it 
represented and the magnitude of its demonstrations. At first, the Bahraini 
demonstrations that occurred in February 2011 were peaceful – young activists calling for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Zunes, S. (2011). America Blows it on Bahrain. Foreign Policy in Focus. 
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limited political and socio-economic reforms. The demonstrations were non-sectarian8 in 
nature, and large relative to the size of the country; during the following weeks, they 
would involve around one fifth of Bahrain’s half-million population.9 Political reforms 
focused on the constitution and the removal of the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin 
Salman Al-Khalifa, who had held his position since 1971.10 The Bahraini leadership had 
had experience in dealing with citizens’ demands for reform before the Arab Spring, and 
had been uncompromising in face of these bottom-up pressures. The crackdown that was 
launched by the Bahraini ruling elite in mid-February 2011 against the overwhelmingly 
non-violent protestors was brutal: over 50 people were killed by security forces and pro-
government mobs11, more than 1,600 people were arrested, and many of those detainees 
were tortured to point of death while in custody.12 Furthermore, more than 4,400 people 
were dismissed from their jobs due to their support for the demonstrators13 and over 40 
Shi’a mosques and religious sites were destroyed.14 
On March 14, 2011, the Arab Spring in Bahrain reached a critical point when, at the 
request of the Bahraini leadership, the GCC sent its combined military force, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Aslan, R. (2013). Bahrain’s Fake Sectarian War. Foreign Affairs. 
9 Wehrey, F. (2013). Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent. Journal of Democracy, 24(3), 116–126. 116. 
10 Kinninmont, J. (2012). Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse. Middle East and North Africa Programme, 
Chatham House. 3. 
11 Bahrain Center For Human Rights. (2011). Individuals Killed By Government's Excessive Use of Force 
Since 14 February 2011; Davis, C. (2013). Bahrain Unrest: 2nd Anniversary Of Arab Spring As Shiite 
Protesters Clash With Security Forces. The Huffington Post. 
12 Zunes, S. (2013). Bahrain's Arrested Revolution. Arab Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 149–164. 
13	  Amnesty International USA. (n.d.). Bahrain.  
14 Bassiouni, M.C. et al. (2011). Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission Of Inquiry. Bahrain 
Independent Commission Of Inquiry. 
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Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), to help quell the demonstrations. The PSF consisted of 
mostly Saudi troops; an estimated 1,200 Saudi troops accompanied by an estimated 500 
Emirati police, along with a few Qatari troops.15 The GCC Council of Ministers had 
responded to the call for help from its member in accordance with the GCC Joint Defense 
Agreement that asserts: “any harm done to the security of a member state is considered a 
harm done to the security of all members.”16 The state-run Bahrain News Agency further 
announced that the PSF has been deployed in line with the principle of common destiny 
bonding, and that the reason behind the mission was “the common responsibility of the 
GCC countries in maintaining security and stability”.17 
The demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait were on a small scale in 
comparison to Bahrain; however, equally alarming to the Gulf ruling elite. Saudi Arabia 
experienced its first demonstrations in late January 2011, influenced by the uprising in 
Tunis and triggered by a devastating flood in its second-largest city, Jeddah. 
Demonstrators in Jeddah staged a rally protesting against the city’s poor infrastructure; 
after dozens were arrested, the Saudi government vowed to improve the city’s 
infrastructure.18 Nevertheless, in February and early March 2011, the Kingdom faced 
further protests in the cities of Jeddah, Dammam, and Riyadh; protestors were calling for 
the release of political prisoners, labour rights and suffrage for women. The highest 
number of demonstrations took place in the Eastern Province, instigated by the Shi’a 
minority living there. The Saudi Shi’a population had long faced discrimination and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Arab Times. (2012). Kuwait Naval Units Join Bahrain Mission ... Plot Foiled.  
16 Asharq Al-Awsat. (2011). Peninsula Shield Enters Bahrain to Maintain Order.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Alsharif, A. (2011). Saudi plans Jeddah projects after floods, protests. Reuters. 
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marginalisation by the Saudi ruling family.19 The Saudi Shi’a protestors demanded the 
release of political prisoners, freedom of expression and assembly and an end to 
economic and religious discrimination against the Eastern region.20 They further objected 
to the interference of the GCC force in Bahrain, and demanded its withdrawal. The Saudi 
government reacted to these demonstrations with an array of violent measures, ranging 
from mass arrests to lethal force against protestors and torture in prison.21 Amnesty 
International accused Saudi Arabia in a report22 of reacting to the Arab Spring by 
launching a wave of repression, claiming that hundreds of people were arrested, many of 
them without charge or trial.23 It further accused Saudi Arabia of drafting specific laws 
after the Arab Spring protests to target any form of dissent under the guise of fighting 
terrorism; Saudi authorities have since decried the report as inaccurate.24 
The Sultanate of Oman also experienced a set of early demonstrations in the port city 
of Sohar, northwest of its capital, Muscat. On January 17, 2011, a small-scale 
demonstration of an estimated of 200 Omanis protested against the rising prices of basic 
goods, government corruption, and low wages. Sporadic protests quickly spread across 
the country, where Omani activists began calling for social, economic and political 
reform; and were basically prompting the Sultan to restart a neglected political reform 
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process. 25 Demands included an elected prime minister and parliament, the end to 
corruption, new cabinet ministers, and more economic opportunities for college graduates 
and the youth.26 Oman had rarely experienced internal pressures for reform on a mass 
level; the Omani leadership thus responded to its Arab Spring protests with a mix of 
violence and political concessions. 27 It accelerated the pace and content of its political 
reforms, while at the same time allowing police violence to occur, leading to the death of 
at least two protestors.28 
In Kuwait, the Bidoon (stateless Arabs) initiated the first set of demonstrations on 
February 19, 2011, where they demanded their right to Kuwaiti citizenship from the 
government. This was followed by a series of political demonstrations organised by 
Kuwaiti youth, political activists and the opposition within the Kuwaiti Parliament. On 
June 3, 2011 an estimated 500 Kuwaiti citizens gathered in front of Kuwait’s parliament 
building in Erada Square calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser 
Mohammed Al-Sabah, on grounds of corruption and an end to the political stagnation29 
that had hindered the country’s economy for a decade. Kuwait had built a record budget 
surplus of KD 13.2 billion while key decisions on infrastructure and government 
spending had been sidelined due to continual struggles between the elected parliament 
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26 Spinner, J. (2011). Oman's Days of Rage: A sleepy little sultanate erupts in unexpected anger. Foreign 
Policy. 
27 Ehteshami, A. (2013). Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution. 
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 18 
and the government.30 Opposition members demanded answers from the prime minister 
and other government ministers on allegations of corruption, allegations which had 
become the catalyst for public demands for political reform and the curbing of the ruling 
family’s authoritative powers. Echoing the chants from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the 
crowds’ slogans included the phrase, “The people want to overthrow the head of 
government”, referring to the Prime Minister.31 The Kuwaiti government’s response to 
the demonstrations mirrored those of fellow GCC governments in the use of violent 
measures against protestors, such as police brutality and initiating new laws that would 
suppress dissent after the Arab Spring. There were no deaths reported in consequence of 
police violence in Kuwait during the Arab Spring; however, the government further 
reacted to the demonstrations by repressing freedom of expression and revoking the 
citizenship of those who voiced their dissent against the government and the Emir. 
Whilst Qatar and the UAE did not experience mass demonstrations, the two countries 
were impacted by the Arab Spring in other Gulf monarchies. All six Gulf monarchies had 
relied on certain sources of legitimacy that enabled them to preserve their regimes; and 
since these sources were similar and closely linked, it was acknowledged by all the 
leaderships that if one Gulf regime fell, the rest would follow. The two leaderships of 
Qatar and the UAE thus actively supported their neighbouring monarchies’ response to 
the Arab Spring, and joined collaborative GCC efforts to quell the demonstrations in 
Bahrain and Oman. Both Qatar and the UAE sent troops with the PSF to Bahrain in 
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31 Laessing, U. (2011). Kuwaitis protest, demand prime minister resign. Reuters.  
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March 2011. 32 Furthermore, both monarchies contributed to the GCC financial assistance 
package to Bahrain and Oman that was announced at the GCC ministerial meeting in 
Riyadh on March 10, 2011. GCC member states collectively pledged $20 billion to both 
countries.33 The financial package was designed to support the Bahraini and Omani 
populations by improving economic and social conditions, creating job opportunities for 
the unemployed, and raising the standard of living overall.34 
The research aims to focus on the reactions of the Gulf monarchies to the mass 
demonstrations of the Arab Spring, and argues that the Arab Spring motivated the Gulf 
leaderships to intensify cooperation efforts under their regional alliance, the GCC. It 
hypothesises that the Gulf monarchies utilised the GCC as a vehicle in preserving their 
regimes during the Arab Spring. GCC member states engaged in collaborative efforts to 
sustain their regimes, and applied similar tactics within their own borders under a broad 
GCC strategy for regime preservation. However, any closer GCC union would 
compromise the sovereignty of the individual monarchies, and thus has yet to be accepted 
by all six member states. As such, the research’s case study focuses on Kuwait and its 
leadership’s response to the Arab Spring and examines how an independent nation was 
able to restructure its domestic policies to accommodate the interference of a regional 
alliance in order to preserve its regime and ultimately to survive the Arab Spring. 
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I. Research Summary 
a. Hypothesis 
The Arab Spring brought a degree of concern to the Gulf leaderships, leading the most 
politically liberal among the six GCC members, Kuwait, to engage in a strategy to 
preserve its regime that was shared by its fellow member states. The hypothesis of this 
research is that the Gulf monarchies utilised their regional alliance, the GCC, as a vehicle 
to preserve their regimes during the Arab Spring.  It further deduces that as the Arab 
Spring continued the Gulf monarchies began to consolidate their responses to the street 
demonstrations and engage their regional alliance, the GCC, as a vital participant in 
securing their regimes against internal threats. The threat of regime change in the region 
reinforced an existing logic of unity among the members of the GCC. The survival of the 
Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring is thus illuminated in this research by an 
examination of the coordination and mutual emulation of policies among the GCC 
member states. 
This research builds its hypothesis on the notion of a broad GCC strategy for regime 
preservation, arguing that the Gulf leaderships used the GCC as a vehicle to preserve 
their regimes. Such a strategy is not documented GCC policy; nevertheless this research 
identifies a ‘strategy’ which is very real, arguing that the Gulf monarchies utilised similar 
tactics involving the GCC in surviving the Arab Spring. It highlights three main tactics of 
regime preservation employed by the Gulf monarchies: enhancing their monarchical 
legitimacy, heightening their internal security, and collaborating in a defence scheme. 
The research derives these tactics from the Riyadh Declaration; a document introduced 
by the Saudi monarchy during the GCC’s 32nd summit in Riyadh in December 2011. 
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The Gulf leaderships used these tactics to suppress organised dissent and maintain 
their hold on power; and the involvement of the GCC alliance is clear in each case. The 
first tactic, of enhancing the leadership’s legitimacy, involved providing financial 
incentives for citizens in return for their support for the respective regimes. The second, 
of heightened internal security, revolved around the various restrictions applied by the 
ruling elites during the demonstrations, ranging from police violence to media censorship 
and the arrest of opposition members for disrupting national security. The third tactic of a 
collaborative defence scheme involved the signing of the GCC Internal Security 
Agreement and further plans for joint GCC police and navy forces. 
 
Figure 1: GCC strategy for regime preservation during the Arab Spring (2011) 
 
 
The GCC strategy for regime preservation was led by Saudi Arabia and followed by 
the remaining five Gulf monarchies within the organisation. The strategy was developed 
during the 32nd GCC Summit (annual summits were attended by all six Gulf leaderships), 
on December 21, 2011, when the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, presented a proposal to 
























explore the transformation of the basis of the organisation from cooperation to union.35 
He proposed that they “move from a phase of cooperation to a phase of union within a 
single entity”.36 The Riyadh Declaration marked the beginning of the adoption of a broad 
strategy for regime preservation by all six members of the GCC. The Declaration 
represented a plan of action for “tighter financial cooperation, military integration, and 
foreign policy assimilation”.37 The summit took place in the context of a year of mass 
street demonstrations and government crackdowns on protestors. In the opening speech 
of the summit, King Abdulla stated: “Our summit opens in the shadow of challenges that 
require vigilance and a united stance.” 38 The Riyadh Declaration was issued at the end of 
the two-day summit, outlining what had been agreed upon by the GCC leaders during 
discussions and closed-door meetings. It highlights the types of action that the GCC 
leaderships proposed to take towards the objective of a closer GCC union. The following 
is from the actual text of the Declaration:39 
 
1. “Adoption of the initiative of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to move 
beyond the stage of cooperation to the stage of union so that the GCC countries form 
a single entity to achieve good and repel evil in response to the aspirations of the 
citizens of GCC countries and the challenges they face.” 
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2. “Speeding up the process of development and comprehensive reform inside their 
countries so as to achieve greater participation of all citizens, men and women, and 
open wide future prospects while maintaining security, stability, national cohesion 
and social welfare. 
3. “Improving the domestic front, consolidating the national unity based on equality of 
all citizens, men and women, before the law and in rights and duties and confronting 
foreign attempts by troubled entities trying to export its internal crises through 
sedition, division and sectarian inciting.” 
4. “Development of defense and security cooperation to ensure quickly and effectively 
and in a collective and unified manner confronting any danger or emergency.” 
5. “Deepening the common belonging of the GCC youths, improving their identity and 
protecting their gains by intensifying communication, cooperation and convergence 
among them and employing educational, media, cultural, sports and scout activities 
for the service of this goal.” 
 
The statements above represent five out of the eight points listed in the Declaration 
and are the most crucial to this research. Further commitments were made on attaining 
the highest degree of economic integration among GCC countries and on activation of a 
unified foreign policy.40 The three tactics are expressed within the text of the Declaration; 
the GCC strategy for regime preservation is thus based on the policies introduced in the 
Riyadh Declaration by the Saudi leadership in December 2011. This research proves that 
the Gulf monarchies engaged with their fellow GCC members in applying this strategy 
within their domestic policies during the Arab Spring. 
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The call for collective efforts in “improving the domestic front” and “consolidating the 
national unity based on equality of all citizens”41 (point three above) by the Gulf 
monarchies is remarkable given the GCC’s past record on organisational cooperation. As 
this research will demonstrate in the literature review, political, economic and defence 
cooperation among GCC member states was more by necessity than choice. In the 
economic sphere, the GCC monarchies all share primarily single-sector economies – oil 
and natural gas resources are the most important sources of income. Due to this resource 
overlap the GCC monarchies must cooperate in economic development or risk the 
prospect of harmful competition. Similarly, in the defence and security spheres the 
collective military resources of the GCC member states counteract other regional actors, 
namely Iran and Iraq, that have larger populations, more balanced economies, and 
stronger militaries.42 Hence, in order to protect the sovereignties of the Gulf monarchies, 
a more cooperative GCC organisation is essential. However, GCC cooperation efforts 
never attained complete unity, where in the realm of defence, cooperation and 
coordination were limited, and in the realm of economic cooperation, institutional efforts 
yielded modest results.43  
Nevertheless, the Arab Spring provided an opening for the GCC organisation, and for 
Saudi Arabia as a long-time aspiring leader of the Arab world to attempt to consolidate 
its regional influence and global profile. Saudi Arabia has been identified as the leader of 	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a “counter-revolution of the Arab Spring”44, whereby it sought to reassert its position of 
prominence and leadership within the GCC, and in addition, to “contain the Arab 
Spring.”45 This research explores the Saudi leadership’s motivation behind the proposal 
for a closer GCC union, and analyses the extent of Saudi Arabia’s role in the application 
of  the tactics under the GCC strategy of regime preservation within other GCC countries. 
The hypothesis argues that the fear of regime change during the Arab Spring prompted 
the six GCC monarchies to increase cooperation under their regional organisation and 
apply similar tactics to preserve their regimes. The case study on Kuwait during the Arab 
Spring sets out to present the evidence that supports the hypothesis. However, an 
alternative explanation to the evidence provided in the case study is that the Gulf 
countries are subject to Saudi dominance and were influenced by Saudi Arabia’s 
determination to exercise repression and to oppose democratic reforms within the 
subregion. As these tactics were derived from the Riyadh Declaration presented at the 
GCC summit, one may argue that they are in fact Saudi Arabia’s strategy of regime 
preservation’, rather than the GCC’s. This thesis proves in the chapters following that the 
GCC strategy has been utilised to the advantage of all six GCC monarchies. In exploring 
the reasons behind the emergence of the GCC in 1981 and its main objectives as a 
regional organisation, this thesis reaches a conclusion where it describes the GCC as an 
interdependent arrangement that attains the main goal of preserving the regimes of the six 
Gulf monarchies. The balance of power within this group is reliant on the shared 
challenges of internal and external security, and the knowledge that if one monarchy 
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falls, the rest will follow. Saudi Arabia’s dominance within the group is mostly evident in 
its larger landmass and population demographics and its advanced military technology; 
however, its political legitimacy and survival is aligned with the other five GCC 
countries. This thesis thus labels the strategy as a ‘GCC’ strategy because it was agreed 
upon by all six members and applied by those individual monarchies in respect of their 
own populations with the end result of the preservation of each regime.   
 Madawi Al-Rashid, a Saudi professor of social anthropology at King’s College 
London, supports this research’s hypothesis in her argument that the real motivation 
behind the proposed union in December 2011 is that of dictators rallying together to 
protect themselves from demands for democracy from their own populations. She claims: 
“[T]he union is an ad hoc response to deep problems that the ruling families are not 
willing to resolve: giving more power to their citizens, increasing political participation 
and improving their human rights records.”46 That said, the reaction of the GCC citizen 
populations to the announcement of the new GCC union lends an interesting perspective 
to Saudi Arabia’s perceived dominance within the GCC alliance. 
In March 2012, the Saudi Foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, offered a few details on 
the new GCC union that was proposed in the Riyadh Declaration: first, he insisted that 
the proposed union must include all six GCC members. He further emphasised a more 
practical angle, implying that the union was not about political control, but rather about 
“re-invigorating the GCC”. 47 He indicated that the alliance would allow the GCC to 
become more efficient and would strengthen cooperation in all fields, including political, 	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security, military and economic affairs. More importantly, he stressed that the proposal 
would not infringe on the sovereignty of any member country, stating: “the union … will 
not be used as a medium to interfere in their internal affairs. It aims at formulating 
effective bodies enjoying flexibility and speed and the ability to execute policies and 
programmes.” 48  
Regardless of the Saudi leadership’s stated intentions, the plan for a closer union has 
been delayed due to the objections of Gulf citizens concerned that their unique social and 
political systems would be steamrolled by their dominant Saudi neighbour. One such 
objection came from the former speaker of the Kuwaiti Parliament, Ahmed Al Saadoun, 
rebuffing Saudi Arabia’s plan to unify the GCC countries: 
It is very difficult for a country like Kuwait that grants freedom of speech, and 
where people are represented in parliament, to form a union with countries 
whose prisons are full of thousands who are guilty [only] of speaking their 
minds. We will be fooling ourselves if we think that any kind of union can be 
reached if governments do not offer compromises and start granting their people 
more rights.49 
Such doubts and fears of Saudi dominance expressed by concerned Kuwaiti citizens 
indicate that the proposal of the new GCC union would not be accepted or moved 
forward if the Saudi monarchy monopolised it.  This research thus discredits the 
alternative hypothesis that associates Saudi dominance with the survival of the GCC 




monarchies during the Arab Spring by indicating that such dominance would only work 
to the disadvantage of the GCC monarchies’ political survival.  
b. Justification of Case Study 
This research presents its case study on Kuwait, the GCC, and the Arab Spring. It will 
highlight the extent of the role of the GCC in the Kuwaiti leadership’s response to its 
demonstrations and the reinforced GCC union that dominated Kuwaiti domestic policies. 
It aims to answer why and how the Kuwaiti leadership was able to overcome the political 
turbulence generated by the Arab Spring, focusing on the reasons why, and the ways 
through which, the GCC alliance influenced its mechanism to consolidate political 
power. The case study examines the Kuwaiti Arab Spring between early 2011 and late 
2012, the research focusing on this period on the basis of the beginning and end of the 
timeline for street demonstrations and the government response. The last set of 
demonstrations took place towards the end of 2012; this was followed by a period of 
stability and, according to this research, marks the end of the Arab Spring in Kuwait. 
Kuwait was selected as the case study from among the six GCC member states for two 
main reasons: first, Kuwait has an active and elected legislative assembly, as well as a 
lively media that enjoys considerable freedom of speech. Its freedom of speech and 
dynamic assembly provides an interesting setting when investigating the role of the GCC 
in its domestic affairs. The Kuwaiti media has the freedom to present various 
perspectives on domestic affairs and political incidents; privately owned newspapers and 
television outlets are constantly seeking the participation of pro-government and pro-
opposition analysts and politicians. The ability to have lively debate in the media is a rare 
occurrence among the Gulf monarchies. Analysis of such debate is a crucial part of the 
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case study, where access to an array of secondary sources (such as journalists, bloggers, 
and political analysts) is available. 
The second reason why Kuwait was selected for the case study is its significant 
resistance to the GCC Internal Security Agreement introduced by Saudi Arabia in 1982. 
Kuwait was the only GCC country that refused to sign the agreement. Article 12 of the 
agreement authorises the intrusion of other GCC states’ security forces into Kuwaiti 
territory to pursue suspected criminals;50 the involvement of other GCC states in Kuwait’s 
domestic affairs raised concerns within Kuwait’s assembly, and the Kuwaiti leadership 
was not willing to risk an increase in tension between its government and its people. 
Furthermore, unlike any other constitution in the Gulf region, the Kuwaiti Constitution 
declares that the “the system of government shall be democratic, under which sovereignty 
resides in the people, the source of all powers”.51 Allowing a foreign entity within its 
borders would certainly threaten Kuwait’s democratic tradition. Thus, the Kuwaiti 
leadership declared that its government would not sign the security pact unless it was 
amended to take account of the nation’s constitution. The key element to Kuwait’s refusal 
to sign the GCC Internal Security Agreement was the fact that Kuwait resisted the 
interference of other GCC monarchies in its domestic affairs. However, the threats arising 
from the Arab Spring contrived to alter the Kuwaiti government’s independent domestic 
policy, and the Kuwaiti leadership unexpectedly decided to sign the GCC Internal 
Security Agreement in November 2012. Kuwait’s decision to sign the GCC agreement 
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corroborates this research’s hypothesis by indicating that the Gulf monarchies began to 
consolidate their responses to the Arab Spring in a collaborative manner. 
In its initial response to the Arab Spring, the Kuwaiti leadership utilised the first tactic 
mentioned above, of enhancing its legitimacy by providing financial incentives to its 
citizens and reinforcing government-sponsored youth programmes to engage Kuwaiti 
youth. The involvement of the GCC in this tactic is demonstrated by increasing efforts to 
integrate with GCC youth programmes and Kuwait’s commitment to interaction with the 
political, economic, social and security changes and challenges of each member state as 
declared in the Riyadh Declaration and reiterated in the Sakhir Declaration in December 
2012.52 The second tactic, heightening internal security, is highlighted by the various 
restrictions applied by the Kuwaiti leadership during the Arab Spring, ranging from 
police violence to media censorship and the arrest of key opposition members. The third 
tactic, of collaborating in a defence scheme, revolves around the signing of the GCC 
Internal Security Agreement by all six member states in November 2012. A month later, 
the GCC Supreme Council also announced its intention to create a joint military 
command and police force,53 further altering Kuwait’s current internal security strategy 
and ultimately raises the prospect of curbing Kuwait’s liberal policies. 
Overall, the case study on Kuwait during the Arab Spring highlights the relationship 
between the Gulf monarchies and their regional alliance, the GCC. It showcases the unity 
and support of GCC member states at times of crisis, yet also depicts the suspicious 
nature of the relationships between them, especially with regard to the fear of Saudi 	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53 SUSRIS. (2013). 34th GCC Summit Concludes.  
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domination shared by the smaller member states. The research lays out the details of 
domestic politics in Kuwait, from presenting the historical political background to 
evaluating Kuwait’s active parliamentary politics, analysing the constitution and 
examining the economic and political atmosphere before the Arab Spring. It proceeds to 
outline each demonstration that occurred during the Arab Spring and the Kuwaiti 
leadership’s responses and reactions in the face of demonstrations. It provides details on 
the demands of the demonstrators and their ethnic/religious/social backgrounds. More 
importantly, the case study proves that by utilising tactics under the broad GCC strategy 
for regime preservation, the Kuwaiti leadership allowed unprecedented GCC interference 
in its domestic affairs and thus engaged the GCC organisation as a vital participant in 
securing its regime during the Arab Spring. 
c. Methodology 
The main research question this research addresses revolves around the role of the GCC 
in the survival of the Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring. The Gulf regional 
structure emerged due to various security, political and economic challenges and 
opportunities, resulting in closer relations among the six Gulf monarchies. The Arab 
Spring provides the opportunity to discuss how the Gulf leaderships utilised their regional 
organisation, the GCC, as a vehicle to preserve their regimes; the interdependent 
relationship between the GCC and the Gulf leaderships; and the influence of the GCC in 
the domestic affairs of the Gulf monarchies. According to these considerations, the 
research question is as follows: 
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What is the relationship between the Gulf monarchies and their regional 
alliance, the GCC, and how have Gulf leaders utilised the GCC as a vehicle to 
preserve their regimes? 
 
This research follows the qualitative research method, using a mix of primary and 
secondary sources. I take an analytical, rather than theoretical, approach to comparative 
politics in order to make a political and historical analysis of the domestic and foreign 
policies of the Gulf monarchies. My fieldwork was based in Kuwait from October 2011 
to December 2013, where I had access to government officials and academics who 
specialise in Gulf politics. I consulted a number of key officials and diplomats at the 
highest level of the GCC and the Kuwaiti government. The secondary sources are 
government documents, newspaper reports, media interviews, blogs and academic 
research. 
On December 10–11, 2013 I attended the 34th GCC summit in Kuwait. The summit 
was under the chairmanship of the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, 
and was attended by the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Salman ibn Abdulaziz Al-Saud 
(the current Saudi king); the newly appointed Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani 
accompanied by his father, Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani; the Bahraini Emir, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Issa Al-Khalifa; the Omani Deputy Prime Minister, Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmoud Al 
Said; and the UAE representative Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice President and 
Ruler of Dubai. The GCC Secretary-General, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, gave the 
opening speech. He stated that the main issues to be discussed were GCC nationalisation, 
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security, stability, and economic integration.54 For the first time in GCC summit history, 
the speaker of the Kuwait National Assembly, Marzoug Al-Ghanim, was invited to give a 
speech at the opening. The inclusion of the Kuwaiti legislature represents a crucial 
element in this research where it presents the GCC leaders as sending a message to their 
population that they are willing to engage and listen to public demands. Another crucial 
element of the 34th GCC summit was the attendance of the newly appointed Emir of 
Qatar, Sheikh Tamim; he gave a speech at the closing session, welcoming the GCC 
leaders to hold the next summit in Doha. At thirty-four, he is the youngest reigning 
monarch among the GCC states, and his appointment as Emir is evidence that the Gulf 
monarchies are open to change if it means that they can continue their dynastic hold on 
power. 
The summit was held against the backdrop of highly tense relations among the six 
Gulf monarchies. Days before the GCC summit, the Omani Foreign Minister, Yousef Bin 
Alawi, stated in a security conference in Manama, Bahrain that while Oman would not 
stand in the way of member states turning the GCC into a confederation, it was opposed 
to the idea and would “simply withdraw from the new body”.55 The statement was 
perceived as “blunt” by the Saudis, who were already resentful towards Oman due to a 
secret dialogue facilitated by Sultan Qaboos bin Said (Oman’s ruler) between the United 
States and Iran that culminated in the Geneva agreement.56 I was seated next to the Omani 
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delegation that included a member of the Omani Ministry of Justice. When asked about 
the incident, he replied in a respectful yet suspicious manner that the issue was blown out 
of proportion in the press. Overall, the atmosphere at the summit was friendly. 
During my fieldwork in Kuwait, I attended a huge opposition rally that attracted 
around 50,000 participants on November 11, 2012 in the Erada Square opposite the 
Kuwaiti parliament building. The participants were a mix of Islamist supporters, tribal 
groups, youth activists, and former parliament opposition members. The rally 
commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Kuwaiti Constitution, and most of the 
speeches delivered by opposition members highlighted the glory of the constitution and 
citizens’ right to protect it. It was a peaceful protest that took place less than a month 
after the March of Dignity protest, which had involved 100,000 and started as peaceful 
but ended in police violence. The March of Dignity protest was mainly about an Emiri 
(royal) decree to amend the electoral law in October 2012; however, the protestors’ 
demands also included issues such as corruption, government accountability, and a lack 
of infrastructure development due to legislative deadlock.57 
On March 21, 2012 I had access to the first Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdulla 
Bishara, who held the post from its establishment in 1981 until 1993. I visited him at his 
office in Kuwait City, which the 78-year-old attends almost every morning as his daily 
routine. His tone on the GCC was full of pride, inasmuch as he believes that the GCC 
was hugely successful in its security achievements. He highlighted that the GCC states 
survived three wars58 and kept their borders safe. He said: “the power of the GCC is in its 	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ability to protect and keep intact the territory and system of the states.” I asked him about 
the peculiarity of Article 4 of the GCC Charter – why it failed to mention the aspect of 
security as a main goal of cooperation. He answered that the GCC had “the shadows of 
Iraq, the radical Arabs, and Iran on its shoulders”; which represented the threatening 
regional circumstances at the time. Hence, the authors of the Charter wanted to omit any 
military pact in order to avoid the criticism of pan-Arabists or risk antagonising their 
neighbours. Other meetings were held with current key GCC officials within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Kuwait, and several prominent academics in Kuwait, including the 
dean of social sciences at Kuwait University and author of a book on Kuwait and the 
Gulf, Dr. Abdulredha Assiri.59 I also met with a leading human rights activist and 
professor at Kuwait University, Dr. Ghanem Al-Najjar, and political analyst Dr. Shafeeq 
Al-Ghabra on more than one occasion. I was thus able to accumulate key analyses of the 
Kuwaiti political scene and the official and unofficial opinions of the GCC regarding the 
Arab Spring. 
My participation in several conferences on the Gulf region also helped my analysis of 
the Arab Spring in the Gulf. In July 2013, I attended the Gulf Research Meeting at 
Cambridge, UK which highlighted issues of importance in the Gulf region and provided 
an academic environment to foster Gulf studies and encourage scholarly exchange. It 
gathered together hundreds of key academics, researchers, policy makers and diplomats. I 
met leading academics specialising in Gulf politics such as Dr John Duke Anthony, the 
founding president of the National Council on US–Arab Relations in Washington, DC. 
He is the only American to have been invited to each of the GCC’s Ministerial and Heads 	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of State summits since the GCC’s inception in 1981. He is also a regular lecturer on the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf for the U.S. Department of Defense and State. I had the 
opportunity to have a lunch meeting with him discussing my research and, more 
importantly, listening to his views on the GCC and the Gulf monarchies. During the 
conference, I participated in a workshop headed by Paul Arts and Saud Al Tamamy, and 
attended lectures by academics such as Luciani Zaccara, James Dorsey, Sean Foley, and 
Sylvia Colombo. I also met the current GCC Secretary-General, Dr Abdullatif Al-Zayani, 
who attended the opening session of the conference at Cambridge. 
The information gathered in this research is thus derived from a wide variety of 
official and informal sources and relies on key academic figures who specialise in the 
Gulf region. The important work of Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Mehran Kamrava, R.K. 
Ramazani, Gregory Gause, Sean Yom, Eric Peterson, Jill Crystal, Mary-Ann Tetreault, 
Abdulkhaleg Abdulla and many more provided valuable sources covering the political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects of the Gulf monarchies. They constitute an 
important component of Middle Eastern literature, and this research based the foundation 
of its hypothesis and case study on their notable research. Building on their contribution 
to knowledge, this research expanded on the crucial work of three main scholarly 
contributions by Jill Crystal, Mehran Kamrava, Sean Yom and Gregory Gause.   
Jill Crystal provided crucial information on the political histories of the Gulf 
monarchies and the development of their political structures, specifically on the 
development of parliamentary politics in Kuwait.60 Crystal outlined the gradual 
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transformation and historical events that led to the emergence of the Kuwaiti political 
system today. From the pre-oil relationship between Kuwaiti society and leadership, to 
the promulgation of the first Kuwaiti constitution and the establishment of the welfare 
system, Crystal provided this research with key facts surrounding the survival strategy of 
the Kuwaiti monarchy throughout history. The instalment of an ‘inclusive’ political 
system by the Kuwaiti monarchy came hand in hand with engaging with various social 
coalitions and distributing economic benefits in order to keep control of parliamentary 
politics. This research was able to build on Crystal’s key historical findings by tracing the 
issues surrounding the Kuwaiti Arab Spring back to the orignis of the Kuwaiti political 
system. In its case study, this research outlines the tactics utilised by the Kuwaiti 
leadership in response to the street demonstrations that occurred, and goes further to 
include the dynamics of the Gulf regional alliance, the GCC, in the survival strategy of 
the Kuwaiti monarchy. 
Another important scholarly work by Mehran Kamrava also provides this research 
with a foundation on which to build its hypothesis claims. Kamrava was one of the key 
scholars to outline the main sources of legitimacy amongst the Gulf monarchies; he 
argues that the Gulf monarchies have relied on certain sources of legitimacy that have 
enabled them to establish and maintain their political dynasties. The historical tradition of 
tribalism and Islam, the British influence and colonial legacy, and the vast amount of oil 
wealth represent these key sources.61 This research utilises Kamrava’s sources of 
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legitimacy to provide a historical background to the Gulf monarchies and the 
development of their political structures. 
A third scholarly contribution made by Sean Yom and Gregory Gause provided this 
research with key insights, and was a more relevant source in that it also discussed the 
Gulf monarchies’ reactions to the Arab Spring in 2011.  In their research,62 Gause and 
Yom highlight the new theory of monarchical exceptionalism, and attribute three 
overlapping factors to the Gulf monarchies’ survival of the Arab Spring: cross-cutting 
coalitions, hydrocarbon rents (oil wealth revenues), and foreign patrons. Their 
contribution to the explanation of the monarchical exceptionalism theory provides a 
foundation for this research’s hypothesis, where it argues a fourth reason for the Gulf 
monarchs’ ability to stay in power during the chaotic events of the Arab Spring: the 
interdependence of the Gulf monarchies under their regional organisation, the GCC. This 
research argues that with the support of fellow Gulf monarchs, the Gulf ruling elites were 
able to preserve their autocratic rule through the support of their regional alliance, the 
GCC. 
Overall, there is a vast amount of academic research about the Gulf monarchies and 
the GCC; however, there is a gap in the literature concerning the role of the GCC in the 
domestic affairs of the Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring, which this research aims 
to fill. The significance of examining the role of the GCC in the survival of the Gulf 
monarchies during the Arab Spring lies in illustrating the increasing influence of the 
GCC alliance in the domestic affairs of the Gulf monarchies. The consequences of the 
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Arab Spring accentuate the GCC as a complex and pragmatic regional organisation that 
acts as a ‘safety net’ for its member states. This research thus adds an original 
contribution to current knowledge by illuminating the role of the GCC in the survival of 
the Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring. In presenting its case study on the Kuwaiti 
Arab Spring, this research offers a distinctive study on the relationship between the GCC 
alliance and its member states.  Its dimension of emphasising the role of a regional 
alliance in the survival of a regime may be used in other studies that focus on regional 
organisations and regime durability.63 
Another key contribution to literature by this research is its analysis on the survival 
strategies developed by the monarchical regimes while facing internal challenges.  This 
research presents the three tactics of regime preservation utilised by the monarchies under 
the umbrella of their regional alliance, the GCC as a unique comparative tool within the 
case study. The case study on Kuwait examines the recent and politically significant 
events that occurred in Kuwait during the Arab Spring in 2011-2012. After presenting the 
origins of Kuwaiti politics and the background of political legitimacies within the Gulf 
region, the case study begins with an analysis of the build-up of political events that 
occurred in Kuwait before the Arab Spring in 2011, and further examines the Arab 
Spring demonstrations that occurred in the aftermath of these events.  It proceeds to 
analyse the coordination of policies among the GCC monarchies during 2011-2012, and 
underlines the shared tactics that were utilised by the Kuwaiti government in reaction to 
its domestic demonstrations. The strategy of regime preservation outlines the tactics of 
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enhancing legitimacy, heightening internal security and collaborating in a defence 
scheme and hence may be applied to other authoritarian regimes around the world as a 
comparative study and utilised in an analysis on the sustainability and durability of 
dictatorships.  This research advances previous research on the Gulf region by 
illuminating the role of a regional alliance in the durability of the monarchical regimes 
and also by highlighting three key tactics that were utilised by these monarchies during 
the recent events of the Arab Spring.  
d. Chapter Structure 
Chapter one provides an important component in this research because it examines the 
regional structure of the GCC and past reactions of GCC monarchies to internal and 
external threats. It first presents an analysis of the main objectives of the GCC, its charter 
and its cooperation efforts in the political, economic and defence realms during the Iran–
Iraq war. It then analyses the cooperation efforts among the GCC monarchies in the Post-
Cold War era, highlighting three main events that highly impacted the Gulf region: the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the initiation of the U.S. war of terror in 2001, and the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. It seeks to examine the cooperation efforts among the GCC 
monarchies in response to these events and thus provides a comparative analysis of their 
collective response to the Arab Spring in 2011. The chapter goes on to present a summary 
of the Arab Spring in the Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, and 
explores how they responded to the Arab Spring in the context of the GCC strategy for 
regime preservation. The main purpose of this chapter is to prepare for the case study by 
providing a general account of other Gulf countries’ experience during the Arab Spring, 
before presenting the Kuwaiti case study. 
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Chapters two and three present the background to the case study on Kuwait, providing 
the historical foundation of Kuwait’s political history. Chapter two begins by presenting 
the origins of Kuwaiti politics dating back to the 1800s, and delves into the development 
of its political system. It touches on Kuwait’s first political crisis in 1938, the British 
Protectorate relationship with the Al Sabah rulers and the effects of oil on the domestic 
politics of the Al Sabah regime. It goes on to present the social divisions within Kuwaiti 
society and the significance of the institution of citizenship in Kuwaiti politics. It ends 
with an analysis of the Kuwaiti Constitution and electoral process. Chapter three also 
offers a foundation for the case study, where it explores the three phases of parliamentary 
politics in Kuwait, from 1962–2002. It provides the history of the Kuwaiti National 
Assembly, the main events that led to its establishment, and the achievements and 
failures of the first parliaments. It then presents an analysis of the advancement of 
parliamentary politics in Kuwait and identifies the main political groupings within the 
Kuwaiti National Assembly. It continues with a description of the series of events that 
occurred on the Kuwaiti political scene from 2002 until the Arab Spring in 2011. 
Chapter four presents the case study and ties together all aspects of the research, 
‘Kuwait, the GCC and the Arab Spring’. It provides the details of the Kuwaiti experience 
during the Arab Spring; it describes the types of demonstrations that occurred, the 
demands made by the protestors and the Kuwaiti government’s response to the 
demonstrations. This chapter is the final link of the research, where it connects Kuwait’s 
turbulent political history with the impacts of the Arab Spring and the role of the GCC in 
its government’s response. It continues to present the three tactics under the GCC 
strategy for regime preservation; utilisation of these tactics indicates that the Kuwaiti 
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government felt threatened by the Arab Spring and feared the complete destruction of its 
regime structure. The case study corroborates the hypothesis that there is a strong 
correlation between the unity and support of the GCC alliance and the Kuwaiti 
leadership’s capacity to maintain its regime status during the Arab Spring. Its place 
within the GCC has influenced its domestic policies, especially through the heightening 
of its internal security precautions. The Kuwaiti interior ministry began a series of mass 
arrests of a number of Twitter and social media participants who had criticised the 
monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE.  Kuwait further began to allow the 
GCC member states to intrude into its domestic politics through an increase of 
coordination and emulation of policies among GCC member states, such as a GCC 
unified youth strategy and a GCC unified police and navy force. The case study proves 
that by utilising tactics under the broad GCC strategy for regime preservation, the 
Kuwaiti leadership allowed unprecedented GCC interference in its domestic affairs, and 
thus engaged the GCC organisation as a vital participant in securing its regime during the 
Arab Spring. 
II. Literature Review 
A literature review on the Gulf monarchies and their regional alliance, the GCC, is key in 
providing this thesis with a backbone. This research thus divides the literature review into 
two main sections: the first section presents the historical foundation of the Gulf 
monarchies by highlighting the three sources of legitimacy based on the research of 
Mehran Kamrava. The second section highlights brief summaries of the various academic 
contributions to the analysis of the GCC organisation. 
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a. Sources of Legitimacy 
Several scholars have already established the main sources of legitimacy amongst the 
Gulf monarchies, and this research highlights the work of Mehran Kamrava in his book, 
The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War , where he 
establishes that the historical tradition of tribalism and Islam, the British influence and 
colonial legacy, and the vast amount of oil wealth, all represent the primary sources of 
legitimacy that have enabled the Gulf monarchies to establish and maintain their unique 
political structures up to the present day.64 The main objective in examining the sources of 
legitimacy in this research is to answer one question: have the building blocks of the Gulf 
political structures enhanced the monarchical resilience of the Gulf ruling elites? This 
research concludes that these building blocks represent a combination of internal and 
external factors: external factors involve British influence, while internal factors are the 
political practices of traditional tribalism. Meanwhile, the discovery of oil and the 
utilisation of its wealth represent both internal and external factors. These factors have 
evolved into sources and levers of legitimacy for the Gulf monarchies, influential in 
enabling the Gulf leaderships to not only create modern bureaucratic governmental 
systems that buttress their predominant interests, but also transition (and in many cases, 
strengthen) their traditional political structures into modern nation-states. Their ability to 
develop systems of government using a combination of old and new methods defines 
Gulf political systems. 
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The British role in the process of state formation among the Gulf monarchies is 
overarching in its significance and represents a key source of legitimacy for the Gulf 
ruling families. This research highlights British support as a crucial element in the 
transformation of the ruling tribes into the current Gulf regimes. In fact, up until the 
1950s and 1960s, most of the Gulf ruling families governed through a combination of 
British diplomatic and material protection, traditional and tribal legitimacy and a 
reservoir of tribal recruits who could be relied upon if a domestic military challenge 
arose. Emerging as the most influential foreign power in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the British Empire radically altered the development and formation 
of the political and economic dynamics of the Gulf region. Since Britain perceived the 
Persian Gulf as a critical passageway to India, its crown jewel, it entered into protectorate 
agreements with local Gulf leaders in order to ensure the safety of the passageway. 
Gradually throughout the twentieth century, the British found increasing reason to depend 
on local leaders to exercise more control over their territories and people, thus granting 
them international legitimacy and, eventually, the resources and support necessary for 
ascent to kingship.65 
Between 1820 and 1920, the British strategically introduced political residencies 
reinforced by a strong naval presence throughout the Gulf region.66 The first, preliminary 
British–Gulf treaty was signed on January 6, 1820, the ruler of Sharjah signing on behalf 
of the rulers of Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwan, representing three of the present-day 	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emirates that constitute the UAE.67 Further treaties were established between the British 
and the rulers of Ras Al-Khaimah, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain, leading to a General 
Treaty of Peace signed towards the end of January 1820 by nine Gulf rulers.68 These 
treaties outlawed piracy and made subtle allusion to the British acting as the policeman of 
the Gulf. The British faced rivalries with other European powers (mainly the French) 
over India, and the Gulf region was perceived as an extension of their Indian interests. 
The General Treaty of Peace forbade any foreign contacts by the emirates, except with 
the British, preventing the Gulf rulers from signing or abrogating any agreement with 
foreign nations without British consent. Nor were they to grant concessions for the 
exploration of oil or other minerals to any foreign country or company without prior 
consultation with the British government. In return, Britain undertook the defence of the 
Emirates against any internal or external threats and proposed to dictate their foreign 
policies on their behalf. Similar agreements were made with the rulers of Kuwait in 1913, 
Bahrain in 1914, and the emirates of the lower Gulf and Oman in the 1920s. These 
agreements provided the British with exclusive rights to be the sole beneficiary of oil 
concessions in the region.69 
To maintain their influence in the Gulf region, the British utilised a ‘carrot and stick’ 
strategy that applied both soft and hard pressure on the local rulers. Even though the 
British generally avoided involving themselves in the internal politics of the Gulf states, 
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they capitalised on the fact that most of the Gulf rulers were weak and constantly 
challenged by internal and external rivalries.70 The British used three main methods of 
control in the Gulf region: applying a divide-and-rule policy within Gulf society and 
among the Gulf rulers; isolating the Gulf states from the political developments of the 
greater Middle East region by aligning their foreign policies with Western interests; and 
providing financial and military support to squash any internal rivalry to the standing 
Gulf ruler (a good example was British military support to Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in 
quelling the Ikhwan rebellion in 1927).71 In examining these British methods of control, 
one may draw pertinent conclusions on the extent of British influence on present-day 
Gulf political structures. Overall, this research asserts that the British role in the process 
of state formation within the Gulf region was instrumental. The British not only 
demarcated territorial boundaries within the region, but also sanctioned (and in some 
cases endorsed) the political legitimacy of the sheikhs, emirs, sultans and kings of the 
Gulf emirates. In applying their methods of control, the British were able to establish a 
relationship of mutual gain with the Gulf rulers and enhance the position of the rulers’ 
domestically and internationally.  
This research highlights the second source of legitimacy utilised by the Gulf 
monarchies as the historical concepts of tribalism and Islam. The concepts of tribalism 
are central to an understanding of the historical foundation of the Gulf political systems. 
The establishment of all six of the Gulf states depended very heavily on the ability of the 
Gulf ruling families to mobilise military and political support from surrounding Arab 
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tribes. Rulers deliberately made use of tribal and Islamic practices in order to build their 
legitimacy and instruments of control, one reason being that they knew of no other 
method than the ancestrally traditional practices. The practice of consultation, for 
example, was derived from the Najdi Bedouin cultural tradition where the Arab tribal 
sheikh was characterised as first among equals, and bound to consult his tribesmen before 
taking action on any matter, thus preventing the political pitfalls of autocratic leadership. 
With traditional values still prevalent, indeed dominant, in Gulf society, the rulers were 
able to capitalise on the tribal importance of religious and social status, personal 
connections, and attitudes towards kinship that include respect for leading families.72 
A key tribal concept that has been used by the Gulf rulers in order to build their 
legitimacy and instruments of control is the system of power sharing, or the time-
honoured method of consultation and access between the ruler and the people. There are 
three forms of tribal power-sharing: the forming of strategic alliances through 
partnerships and intermarriage, the practice of the majlis, and the system of patronage 
through placing family members and friends in strategically influential positions. These 
tribal methods remain important as vehicles of control and legitimacy among the Gulf 
ruling families, where the retention and re-invention of their traditional forms represent 
the main social contract between the ruler and the people. The ruling families made use 
of these tribal concepts in order to secure and maintain political leverage throughout the 
years of their establishment, manage their political system and safeguard their dynastic 
security. At the same time, the use of tribal traditions also explains the survival of the 
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historic elements of civil society (an example is the case of Kuwait and its active tradition 
of ‘diwaniyas’).73 
Prior to the discovery of oil, within a tribal community the leader of the tribe 
essentially served as a spokesperson rather than a ruler, consulting tribal, religious, and 
notable people of wealth and influence, usually merchants within the community, before 
making a decision. A ruling coalition usually occurred between the ruler and a strong 
alliance of families (either a group of business elites or a dominant religious sect) that 
profited both sides in terms of political and economic power. A strategic alliance between 
the ruler and an influential social, economic, or political class formed the classical model 
for a tribal form of power sharing, a common practice throughout the Arabian Peninsula.74 
Their principal instrument of power was the threat of secession, where if they found 
themselves in dispute with the ruler, they would leave the settlement and take their 
wealth with them, most likely to form alliances elsewhere. Since the ruler financially 
depended on the merchants, this created the incentive to take decisions based on a 
‘balance of power’. Until the discovery of oil, this threat was a powerful check on the 
rulers, enabling the merchants to ‘use their voice’ and become active in political and 
economic decision making.75 
Another form of tribal power sharing or popular participation is found in the concept 
of consultation by society members through the practice of a majlis, or open meeting 
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between citizens and members of the ruling families.76 The majlis opens the door to 
members of society, especially to the religious community, but also to tribal factions and 
the merchant classes. The ruler would come to a decision on the basis of consensus after 
hearing a variety of opinions on various matters. The concept of the majlis is surrounded 
by misconceptions, however, where several political researchers have romanticised the 
availability of the ruler to his people through the practice. In reality, accessibility to the 
ruler varied as between various groups in Gulf societies. Besides women being excluded 
from the majlis, the rulers were selective in allowing particular social, ethnic, 
professional, and tribal groups to attend. In broad terms, rulers for the most part consulted 
with three main groups: merchants, tribal allies, and religious authorities. Indeed, this 
pattern is still prevalent, and with the exclusion of migrants and expatriate workers living 
in the Gulf, a large percentage of society is thus politically marginalised.77 
A third tribal concept of power sharing is seen in the system of patronage – placing 
family members and friends in strategically influential positions.78 Most Gulf rulers install 
family members and non-family trusted individuals in key governmental positions, such 
as within the realms of internal security and defence, and the Ministry of Petroleum.79 
Such controlled placements ensure loyalty and further enhance the ruler’s position within 
the ruling family dynamic. However, the practice of placing allies in key positions has 
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triggered a negative reaction among the more enlightened and well-travelled Gulf 
population, who see the political pitfalls of presenting the ruling family as being 
apparently above the law, and having limitless power to change or reverse policies 
underwritten by their parliaments.  
Overall, the historical tradition of power sharing can be seen as an important source of 
legitimacy for these Gulf monarchs, where they continue to capitalise on the authority 
achieved by their ancestors in order to preserve their regimes. These tribal methods were 
common throughout the Gulf region, and each modern-day Gulf government adopted 
different ways to institutionalise them. Some Gulf rulers, such as in Kuwait and Bahrain, 
established national assemblies elected by the public, while the ruling elites of the UAE, 
Qatar and Oman instituted elected and semi-elected consultative councils.80 Aware of the 
value of each of these three tribal traditions, the Gulf rulers installed them within the 
political culture of their countries.  
A third and final source of legitimacy highlighted by this research is the Gulf 
monarchies’ newfound oil wealth. The importance of oil to Gulf socio-economic and 
political development is paramount. In fact, “oil is the tool that in a short period of time 
transformed these countries into modern politics with sophisticated national 
economies.”81 After World War II, oil represented an external commodity to the Gulf 
population, where Western oil companies controlled the oil wells of the region, and sold 
it to Western consumers, pocketing the bulk of the profits. It was not until the 1950s that 
oil became a national asset to the Gulf monarchies; a change brought about by the fifty-	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fifty oil profit arrangement.82 The Gulf leaderships increased their stake in oil profits and 
began the drive towards economic development and state modernisation. From the late 
1950s to the eve of the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, the Gulf monarchies were beginning to 
rely on the oil sector as the foundation of their new economies, and investing their oil 
revenues in the development of their nations’ welfare systems and infrastructure. In 1966, 
the Gulf monarchies were earning approximately $2.5 billion in oil income.83 
In 1973, a dramatic change occurred in the oil profit arrangement, further increasing 
national ownership of hydrocarbon resources in the region. The switch of control in terms 
of participation and nationalisation came between 1972 and 1976; by contrast, for 
decades the major oil companies had been the ones who set the oil prices, with no voice 
for the Gulf producer countries’ governments. This position was addressed by the local 
governments through their participation in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), and eventually turned to their advantage when they were able to take 
over the control of production levels. 
By virtue of the growing strength of the OPEC cartel, the concessions that had 
previously been extended to international oil companies by oil-exporting states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 After learning that the company, renamed Aramco (Arab-American Oil Company), in 1944 paid more in 
U.S. taxes than in royalties, the Saudi government demanded renegotiation of the division of royalties. 
The resulting agreement between Aramco and the Saudi government, also known as the “50/50 
Agreement”, set the precedent of equal sharing of income from petroleum in the Middle East, and paved 
the way to nationalisation of petroleum reserves. In Anon. The Saudi-Aramco "50/50" Agreement, 
December 30, 1950. Longman World History. 
83 Ehteshami (2013), 52. 
 52 
were revised such that control and then exclusive ownership of oil operations 
were assumed by the respective governments.84 
The nationalisation of the oil industry and the rush to secure economic development 
presented a notable shift in terms of the strengthening of the internal ruling forces in the 
Gulf and the weakening of the external forces (i.e. the oil companies). As the oil-
producing Gulf governments began expanding their knowledge base in terms of 
technology and general management skills, the Western oil companies lost their access to 
equity crude oil.85 The distribution of oil wealth changed Gulf political dynamics 
dramatically, resulting in a steady bureaucratisation of the monarchies and the 
development of modern civil services. The Gulf rulers used their newfound oil wealth to 
consolidate internal and external alliances, and effectively applied it as a crucial source of 
legitimacy. Modern armed forces were created instantly, providing for an official 
institution through which tribal support could be channelled and maintained. A pyramidal 
power structure emerged, with the royal family at the top, supported by the civil service 
and the armed forces.86 This structure would continue to increase the power of the royal 
families and diminish the influence of the tribal families and any other significant 
elements of rule that existed prior to the emergence of the oil wealth.87 “Oil income has 
allowed the ruling families of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to engineer a 
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relatively soft, rent-and-patronage-based authoritarianism characterized by multiple 
centers of power and huge institutional redundancies.”88 
It is important to stress that it was not the mere existence of oil wealth that was a 
critical component of state formation; rather, it was how the Gulf ruling families 
responded and utilised the influx of oil revenues in the consolidation of their regimes. 
The rise of oil revenues enabled the Gulf rulers to construct their modern states at 
lightning speed; however, existing political arrangements prior to oil (the role of the 
British and the use of traditional politics) had already placed the ruling families in a 
privileged position from which they could dominate the newly formed oil-rich states.89 
 
Table 1: Income from Oil, 1957–66 ($million)  90 
 1957 1959 1961 1963 1966 
Iran 213 263 301 398 607 
Iraq 137 243 266 308 394 
Kuwait 338 405 464 555 680 
Saudi Arabia 323 315 396 489 805 
Others (Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar) 57 69 70 83 208 
 
The role of oil in the process of state formation has a distinct political aspect, where 
the Gulf governments had acquired enormous wealth without the need to tax their 	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citizens, providing them with immense political leverage. Oil revenues were directly 
forwarded to state treasuries from the international economy, thus allowing the 
government to control its distribution and signally affect the whole domestic economy 
with unique mechanisms of political control. In the West, the concept of government 
comes hand in hand with the concept of taxation; the need to tax has led to an awareness 
that taxpayers should have a voice in how their governments are run. In the Gulf 
monarchies, however, the oil boom in the 1970s provided a different model of 
state/society relations. The necessity to extract money from society in order to govern 
was overturned; the Gulf governments were faced with the question of how to spend the 
wealth, rather than how to extract it from their societies. 91 This model has given rise to a 
new term to describe these states within the political science realm: the distributive, or 
rentier, state: 
The rentier state is one in which government relies for the lion’s share of its 
revenues on direct transfers from the international economy, in the form of oil 
revenues, investment income, foreign aid, or other kinds of direct payments.92 
The rentier nature of the Gulf monarchical structure brought several political 
consequences during the process of state building. The first was derived from the 
dominant role of government in local economies; the private sector was dependent on the 
government for access to capital – controlled by the government – and obtaining licences 
and permissions to conduct business. With such a pivotal role in the economy, the 
government had the ability to reward its allies and punish its opponents. The second 	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political consequence was the ability to provide expansive welfare packages directly to 
citizens, including free education, health care, housing, consumer goods and services. As 
discussed in the section above, the aim of these benefits was to replace the tribe with the 
state, and gain political loyalty.93 Hence, the rentier economy greatly weakened traditional 
groups and perhaps by implication, the social infrastructures which originally bound them 
together.94 Lastly, vast oil income allowed the Gulf ruling families to install large 
bureaucratic apparatuses in the civil and military arenas. With trusted family members 
and friends in key positions, these apparatuses were built to serve the monarchs’ best 
interests. Providing government jobs for citizens is another form of patronage, and also 
equips the government with more power to direct citizens in overseeing the functions of 
the bureaucracy. Overall, use of the oil wealth by the Gulf monarchies has cemented the 
political authority of the royal families to an extent unknown in previous generations. 
While it is true that the Gulf ruling families had already established methods of control 
and consolidation before oil, it was the advent of oil revenues that secured their position 
and reduced their vulnerability to the rise of domestic opposition, quite simply because 
wealth remained in the hands of the ruling classes rather than the technocrats. 
b. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
This research addresses the arguments made by Stephen Walt and Scott Cooper on the 
emergence of the GCC; it presents the reasoning of Eric Peterson on the ideology of the 
GCC; and it highlights the analysis of Michael Barnett, Gregory Gause and Matteo 	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Legrenzi on GCC cooperation efforts. The main arguments surrounding the emergence of 
the GCC revolve around external and internal security threats, with regard to which this 
research highlights internal security as the impetus for regional cooperation among the 
GCC member states. Meanwhile, the ideology behind the creation of the GCC 
organisation is apparent in the text of the GCC Charter, where it explicitly refers to the 
notions of Arabism and Islam as key indicators of their intentions in terms of 
coordination and integration. Finally, an analysis of GCC cooperation efforts in the 
political, economic and social realms is instrumental in understanding the essence and 
function of the organisation.  
The approach that this research regards as key in understanding the emergence of the 
GCC is that of Stephen Walt. In his book, The Origins of Alliances,95 Walt lays out his 
influential theory of alliances, the balance-of-threat theory, which is based on the 
‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ concepts presented in the earlier work of Kenneth 
Waltz.96 Waltz defines ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ as opposites; the former indicates 
alliance with a state to offset power(s), while the latter is defined as joining with the most 
powerful state or coalition. Waltz relies on classical neorealism to explain the formation 
of alliances by referring to the concept of a balance of power, indicating it as the driving 
force that compels states to form alliances. Walt modifies Waltz’s perspective by 
substituting the idea of a balance of power with the notion of a balance of threats, where 
he argues that states form alliances based on the collective threats they face, rather than 
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merely the total amount of power they confront. Walt calls his approach to alliance 
formation a “refinement of balance of power theory”.97 
Walt further asserts that alliances “are most commonly viewed as a response to 
threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what the response will be”.98 There are two 
strategic options that states possess when threatened by another state; the first option is 
balancing, which is explained as the states’ response by forming or “joining alliances to 
protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a 
threat.”99 The second option is described as bandwagoning, which is explained as states 
being attracted to strength, and most likely to align with the stronger and threatening 
state, rather than with its weaker opponents. Walt refers to the nature of the threat that 
states are facing in order to assess whether states show balancing or bandwagoning 
behaviour. He identifies four factors that influence the level of threat: aggregate power, 
geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. In examining the 
alliance patterns in the Middle East, Walt concludes that in the Arab world, “balancing is 
far more common than bandwagoning”; and further highlights the GCC as one of the 
prominent examples of balancing in reaction to a foreign threat.100 This research, 
therefore, selects his approach in the analysis of the emergence of the GCC due to its 
emphasis on the alignment of the GCC states in response to threat, rather than their 
alignment as a result of common features and characteristics. 
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Overall, Walt’s balance-of-threat theory surrounding the two strategic responses of 
balancing and bandwagoning is a key concept in the analysis of the emergence of the 
GCC. It signifies that the six Gulf leaderships established the GCC as a balancing 
reaction to common internal and external security threats. In an attempt to further develop 
Walt’s theory, scholar Gregory Gause examines the intentions aspect of Walt’s four 
elements of threats.101 Gause argues that the Gulf states overwhelmingly identified 
ideological and political threats, emanating from abroad, to the internal stability of their 
ruling regimes as more salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic 
proximity or offensive capabilities. Without disregarding the military threat implicit in 
the Gulf states’ decision to unite, Gause asserts that the Gulf states tend to balance 
threats. They decide whether the potential threat of military attack from one neighbour in 
the future is more or less serious than the immediate threat to internal regime security as 
presented by another opponent that is seeking to destabilise and delegitimise the ruling 
elite. He thus indicates that the rise of internal threats is more alarming to the Gulf 
leaderships than a military attack from the outside.102 This research uses this argument in 
its hypothesis, asserting that the GCC alliance resembles an interdependent arrangement 
by the Gulf leaderships with the main objective of preserving their regimes. It thus 
indicates a strong correlation in terms of their capacity for regime preservation among the 
Gulf monarchs during the Arab Spring, and their ability to manipulate their regional 
alliance, the GCC. 
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Another influential perspective on the emergence of the GCC is that of Scott 
Cooper.103 Cooper regards the GCC as a hybrid organisation that integrates both 
economic and security perspectives. He describes the GCC as a complicated regional 
endeavour involving cooperation in external and internal security, foreign policy, trade, 
and finance. Based on Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory, Cooper further develops 
the concept of balancing behaviour in an interpretative case study of the GCC. He begins 
by focusing on the role of the state in each country as the intermediary between domestic 
society and the international system. He indicates that realists have long emphasised 
external security threats to the state, while he argues that, especially in the Third World, 
internal or domestic security threats are as serious as external threats to the state, and may 
be more serious in some circumstances. Hence, in modification of Walt’s theory, Cooper 
argues that by focusing on the state, alliance behaviour should reflect both external and 
internal threats; he calls his theory the state-centric balance-of-power theory. His theory 
distinguishes his argument from other approaches that focus on nation states as unitary 
actors, and allows the examination of state–society relations in addition to interstate 
relations. 
Alliances and internal mobilization are well-known outcomes of increasing 
threats to the state, but we should remember that threatened states might also 
respond with domestic political reforms, domestic repression, new foreign policy 
initiatives,…or a host of other creative measures to protect the state’s political 
integrity.104 	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This research builds on Cooper’s perspective on alliance behaviour by identifying the 
response of threatened states with tactics such as using police force and heightening 
internal security. 
Applying the state-centric balance-of-threat theory to the GCC, Cooper reinforces 
earlier scholarly work that identifies the GCC as a function of rising internal threat posed 
by Shi’a minorities to the GCC ruling Sunni monarchies. Other scholars have provided 
the corroboration that this threat dramatically intensified between the start of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and the establishment of the GCC in 1981, as the Iranian Republic 
specifically targeted the Shi’a population in the Gulf monarchies. Cooper bases his 
assumption on these past evaluations that the dual economic/political nature of the GCC 
is best explained by the nature of the domestic threat facing the GCC states. He asserts: 
Once we understand the essentially domestic nature of the threat to GCC states, 
we understand the choice of issue areas for cooperation. 105 
Thus, Cooper concludes that the key to understanding the emergence of the GCC is 
that the greatest threat to its members was neither the spillover from the Iran–Iraq war 
nor direct Iranian invasion, but the spread of internal unrest. He indicates that the state-
centric analysis works better than the balance-of-threat theory in explaining the 
emergence of the GCC because by examining the internal threats to the states, one may 
explain both the timing and nature of the GCC. Meanwhile, the traditional balance-of- 
threat theory explains the timing of the origin of the GCC, but mischaracterises the 
organisation as primarily an external alliance.106 	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This research capitalises on Cooper’s theory highlighting internal threats as key 
elements in the emergence of the GCC. As the Gulf leaderships struggled to unify their 
stance on the region’s sudden political changes during the Arab Spring,107 their main 
sense of threat was how these changes might affect their domestic spheres and their 
legitimacy as rulers. The spread of political dissent during the Arab Spring led to the 
strengthening of unity among the GCC member states and further prompted the 
utilisation of tactics under the GCC strategy for regime preservation: enhancing 
legitimacy, heightening security and collaborating in a defence scheme. These tactics are 
also based on other research conducted by Cooper, predating his recent work, as laid out 
in an article he wrote with Brock Taylor.108 In this work, the authors assert that internal 
security cooperation is just as important as external security cooperation in the formation 
of the GCC. They further present three mechanisms within the internal security and 
economic fields that have enabled the GCC member states to retain their domestic 
stability, under these headings: increased legitimacy; intelligence sharing; and economic 
benefits.109 This research applies these mechanisms within its case study, which highlights 
a number of common mechanisms utilised by the Gulf leaderships in order to address 
their domestic political dissent during the Arab Spring. 
This research’s hypothesis argues that the Gulf monarchies utilised the GCC as a 
vehicle in preserving their regimes during the Arab Spring. Hence, it is crucial to present 
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Eric Peterson’s deep understanding of the ideology and objectives of the GCC. Peterson 
argues that the theoretical foundation of the GCC on unity and cooperation among its 
member states is based on the concept of ‘Arabism’. The framework of ‘Arabism’ came 
to the fore politically in the early 20th century: 
The beginnings of a collective Arab consciousness have been traced to the pre-
Islamic period in the Arabian Peninsula, when loose sociocultural ties among the 
Arab tribes were bolstered as a result of attempts at domination of the region by 
both the Persians and the Byzantines.110 
Due to the threat of domination by outside forces, Arab political consciousness was 
established as a necessary response to such threats and as a “distinct and evolving 
recognition of commonalities”.111 
From its inception, Islam has had an unparalleled effect on the emergence of Arabism. 
The Islamic movement was spread in Arabic, and “therefore served to unifying its 
adherents linguistically and socioculturally”.112 Another important effect of Islam on 
Arabism was the substantive direction and purpose it provided, which “expressed a 
comprehensive Arab spirit”.113 Islam provided the vital concept of the Islamic umma or 
nation, as well as the “standardization of perceptions, philosophies, and social conduct 
that served to bind further its adherents to a common identity and purpose”.114 However, 
it would be wrong to assume that all Arabs will follow the ideological beliefs of Arabism 	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or Islam, mainly because of the diverse circumstances in which each Arab state has 
emerged, including the varying extent of foreign power influence. As traditional 
monarchies took shape in the Arabian Peninsula during the mid-20th century, more 
radical movements manifested themselves in the concept of Arab nationalism in the 
broader Arab region. Ideological contradictions emerged between the conservative 
political systems of monarchies in the Gulf and the more socialist movements of 
Nasserism in Egypt and the Ba’ath factions in Iraq and Syria. Regardless, the 
representatives of all these Arab states continued to aim for the common goal of broader 
Arab unification.115 
The notion of Arabism was strongly manifested in the formation of the GCC; 
however, it did not represent an experiment in unity based on any Gulf-specific 
ideological movements or even pan-Arab political predispositions. “Rather, though it was 
rooted in the historical quest for unity and designed among other things to promote 
broader inter-Arab cooperation, the GCC framework was primarily nonideological in 
nature.”116 The GCC Charter states that the GCC system is “based on the conviction that 
coordination, cooperation and integration between [the member states] serve the higher 
goals of the Arab Nation” and that the organisation was intended to “reinforce and serve 
Arab and Islamic causes”.117 These passages clearly indicate that the organisation was 
created as a complement to rather than a substitute for the effort to institute a unified pan-
Arab framework. 
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Apart from the structural predispositions within the GCC framework in promoting 
greater Arab unity, clear differences exist between the GCC and other Arab efforts at 
cooperation.118 Peterson ascribes three characteristics to the GCC framework. First, the 
GCC is not rooted in ideology: “it is not another misguided effort at realizing Arab 
nationalism or another past experience choked because they tried to swallow more than 
they could digest.”119 Rather, the GCC states are guided by practicality and a clear 
definition of mutual interests and objectives when it comes to their alliance. A second 
characteristic is the “overriding pragmatism and deliberate nature that has characterized 
the organization from its inception.”120 Peterson argues that this aspect of pragmatism is 
evident not only in the GCC structure and procedures, but also in its emerging political, 
economic, social, and defence and security cooperation. Its approach is incremental, 
rather than absolutist, where it allows for the gradual and deliberate development of a 
broad foundation to promote further integration. A third characteristic presented by 
Peterson is that while “the Iran–Iraq war served as a catalyst in the formation of the GCC, 
it is also evident that the breadth of GCC mutual interests is far larger than only the 
defence sphere.”121 The GCC member states could and have substantially benefited from 
collective activity in the political, diplomatic, and economic realms. 
In the realm of political and social coordination, Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause 
also argue that while the Gulf leaderships established the GCC for statist purposes, the 
unintended consequence of its existence was the provision of greater mutual 	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identification at the societal level. They highlight the role of the GCC in the creation of a 
Gulf (khaliji) identity, where they claim that increasing numbers of citizens in the GCC 
see themselves as having common interests and a common identity.122 They attribute this 
identity phenomenon to the growth of regional functional organisations and the political 
vocabulary of Gulf citizens. The notion of a Gulf identity was implicit in the 
establishment of the GCC, given that the Gulf leaders, for symbolic and strategic 
purposes, introduced it during the 1980s as a way to offer a rival identity to secular Arab 
nationalism (promoted by Iraq) and political Islamism (promoted by Iran).123 The 
fostering of a Gulf identity was thus a means to produce security for the GCC states. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait further facilitated the rise of a distinct Gulf identity throughout 
the region. 
The Gulf identity was promoted by the GCC organisation throughout its Charter and 
official statements, where the GCC member states repeatedly stressed the historical, 
tribal, and cultural factors among the Gulf monarchies. An example is apparent in a 
working GCC paper established in May 1981 which stated: “The emergence of the 
council for cooperation among the Gulf states is in response to the historical, social, 
cultural, political and strategic reality through which the Gulf region passed and is 
passing.”124 These statements were meant to differentiate Gulf citizens from the wider 
Arab community.125 The creation of a unique Gulf identity later enabled the Gulf 
leaderships to disaffiliate with the Arab regimes that fell during the Arab Spring; they 	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quickly highlighted the difference in the political, economic, social and cultural aspects 
between the monarchical regimes and the authoritarian republics in the Arab world. In an 
interview in March 2011, the Secretary-General of the GCC at the time, Abdulrahman 
Al-Attiyah, highlighted the disparity in the level of political and economic development 
in the Arab region. He indicated that while the GCC member states have experienced 
“plenty of political and economic development … [yet] they still need to do more.”126 
Clearly, the Gulf identity is a political and instrumental creation aimed at enhancing the 
stability of the GCC regimes. The revival of the Gulf identity during the Arab Spring 
ultimately secured these regimes; it further enabled the GCC leaders to interfere in fellow 
GCC members’ domestic affairs under the pretext of a ‘Gulf brotherhood’. An example 
of such interference is the case of Bahrain, where the PSF entered the country to maintain 
its stability during the Arab Spring.127 
Ultimately, Barnett and Gause draw an analogy of the story of the GCC as one of two 
caravans travelling in opposite directions: at the state level, the six regimes have made 
some modest moves towards a deepening of cooperation, however seemingly blocked by 
mistrust and suspicion. At the societal level, on the other hand, there have been 
considerable developments that suggest a sustained and deepened cooperation and a 
sense of collective identity. They argue that what began as a symbolic organisation 
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became something more substantial at the level of interstate and transnational 
cooperation.128 
On the achievements and failures of cooperation efforts among the six GCC member 
states, Matteo Legrenzi asserts that the GCC is the most resilient sub-regional 
organisation in the Arab world. He argues that since its establishment, the GCC has 
achieved several results in enhancing the level of cooperation among its member states. 
However, he points out that the organisation falls short of the goals set out in its founding 
charter. He states: “I will submit that, from its onset, the GCC was not created to serve a 
regional institutional purpose, but rather, was deliberately made hollow and served 
primarily to project a semblance of unity.”129 This is due to the fear of the smaller 
member states of “the interdependence that such an institution was ostensibly designed to 
promote”. 130 Legrenzi emphasises the high level of cooperation achieved in the field of 
internal security, which he argues is strictly linked to the issue of regime survival. The 
collaboration in the realm of internal security is conducted mostly at the bilateral level 
and in an informal matter; meaning, the GCC Secretariat is largely excluded from dealing 
with internal security matters. At the most, it plays a liaison role between the member 
states. 
Legrenzi gives two main reasons why the GCC Secretariat plays only a minor role in 
internal security matters: first, “no one in the security apparatuses of the member states 
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wants to expose the technocrats of the Secretariat to the fairly brutal business of 
intelligence.” 131 Second, “the plotter in one country could well be the relative of the ruler 
of another country.” 132 In more general terms, the GCC member states have failed to 
create common expectations concerning non-interference in each other’s domestic 
politics. He gives an example of when GCC rulers in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia gave 
hospitality to Sheikh Khalifa Al-Thani, who was deposed by his son, Sheikh Hamad of 
Qatar in the summer of 1995. As a reaction to the GCC’s support for his father, Sheikh 
Hamad refused to participate in joint GCC military exercises that were planned for March 
1996. Hence, a main obstacle to deepening cooperation was “the recrudescence of fear 
among some of the ruling elites that their GCC neighbours were working against them in 
their own domestic politics”. 133 Legrenzi goes on to point out that while the GCC 
monarchies can collaborate swiftly when faced with a threat emanating from an external 
actor, there will always be an underlying sense that old rivalries could re-emerge quickly 
when an external threat is not looming. 
III. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this introductory chapter presented the main objectives of this research, 
and highlighted its hypothesis, justification of the case study and methodology. It 
presented a literature review that focused on the sources of legitimacy that have enabled 
the sustainability of the Gulf monarchies, and focused on the academic analysis of the 
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emergence of the GCC organisation.  In highlighting the main sources of legitimacy, this 
chapter assessed the role of the British Empire as a crucial element in the transformation 
of the ruling tribes into the current Gulf regimes, where the British shaped and 
restructured traditional perceptions in order to serve their interests in the region.134   This 
chapter has further expanded on the incorporation of traditional politics within the notion 
of modern nation-states that led to the establishment of a unique political structure that 
combines old and new approaches to governance.  This unique approach represents the 
core of the Gulf political environment, where the practices of tribalism and Islam play a 
crucial role in the Gulf rulers’ ability to acquire loyalty and legitimacy among their 
populations. Meanwhile, the distribution of oil wealth revenues secured the newly 
established political systems by demonstrating that the Gulf rulers were and still are 
intent on sharing the oil wealth with their population. The oil wealth revenues provided 
the Gulf rulers with the monetary capacity to control the economy, as well as providing a 
convenient bargaining tool in accumulating political loyalty.135  
The significance of examining the academic analysis of the GCC in the literature 
review lies in gaining an understanding, in the chapters following, of the main objectives 
of the GCC and how the Gulf monarchies have utilised the organisation as a vehicle in 
preserving their regimes. This research indicates that the greatest threat to the GCC 
monarchies is the spread of domestic dissent, and argues that the key motivation behind 
the alliance is the preservation of the six ruling Gulf families. Accordingly, as the main 
purpose of the GCC organisation, the preservation of the monarchies acts as a basis for 
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cooperation in each sphere, whether political, economic or security. It is through this 
perspective that the research presents the role of the GCC in the survival of the Gulf 





The Gulf Cooperation Council and its Member States: 
A Regional Framework (1979–2011) 
I. Introduction 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established during turbulent events in the 
region; the Iranian republic was threatening the GCC states with its expansionist 
ideologies and the Iraq–Iran war had been going on for almost a year. An analysis of the 
behaviour of the GCC countries in the face of these previous internal and external threats 
is key to understanding the GCC countries’ response to the Arab Spring that occurred 
three decades later.  This chapter aims to present the regional framework of the GCC and 
its member states; it begins by presenting an analysis on the two main events that altered 
the Gulf regional structure: the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War that 
began in 1980.  It further presents the main goals, organisational structure and 
cooperation efforts of the GCC during its first phase of existence (1981–1989). During 
this phase, the GCC states endured the spillover of the war and faced numerous terrorist 
attacks within their borders. The second part of this chapter examines the GCC states 
during the post-Cold War period; it first describes the events the led to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990, and analyses the GCC states’ response to the Gulf War in 1991. It 
provides an understanding of GCC security frameworks before the war and after, and 
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demonstrates how the GCC states’ decision to rely on Western military forces changed 
the regional framework in the Arab world. It continues to analyse the impact of the 
September 11 attacks in 2001 and the subsequent US war in Iraq in 2003 on the GCC 
countries’ internal and external security. Finally, this chapter presents a summary of the 
Arab Spring demonstrations that occurred in 2011–2012 in the GCC states of Bahrain, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. This research’s case study focuses on Kuwait, the GCC, and the 
Arab Spring and indicates that the threat of the Arab Spring demonstrations prompted the 
Kuwaiti leadership to strengthen its alliance in the GCC in order to preserve its regime. 
This chapter thus provides a summary of Arab Spring events in other GCC states as a 
comparative analysis to the case study and shows how the GCC was also utilised by these 
Gulf leaderships as a vehicle in preserving their regimes. 
 The main goal of this chapter is to indicate that an analysis of the GCC countries’ 
reactions to previous threats sheds light on the expected behaviour of the GCC 
monarchies confronting the threats of the Arab Spring. In past responses to internal and 
external threats, the GCC monarchies strengthened their unity under the auspices of their 
regional alliance; they did that by aligning their foreign policies and military goals.  
However, as they experienced common challenges they continued to pursue an 
individualistic approach to their domestic affairs, with the exception of Bahrain. Their 
reliance on Western military power in recent decades indicates a fear of domination or 
interference by fellow Arab countries, including fellow GCC members. Hence, the GCC 
monarchies’ response to past external threats resembles a pseudo-united front involving 
disengaged members that rely on foreign military powers to protect their borders. 
However, the response to internal threats has varied throughout the decades, with genuine 
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reliance on one another’s military capabilities (i.e. the sharing of intelligence) and the 
utilisation of a cultural ‘Gulf identity’ that unites the GCC monarchies on a subregional 
level. Overall, the analysis of past experiences of the GCC monarchies’ behaviour 
towards internal and external threats helps better to understand the leaderships’ reaction 
to the threats of the Arab Spring. As expected, the GCC monarchies announced a united 
front; however, the internal challenges of the Arab Spring prompted a deeper exigency to 
align their domestic policies and emulate one another’s tactics in order to preserve their 
regimes. 
II. The Emergence of the Gulf Regional Structure (1979-1989) 
In the decade before the establishment of the GCC in 1981, the six Gulf monarchies 
underwent a significant transformation period within their respective economic, political 
and even social and cultural fields. The 1970s was an era of modernisation, technology, 
independence, and construction during which the Gulf leaderships were transforming 
their desert towns into modernised cities, and developing their predominately rural 
communities into urbanised societies. It was the era when hospitals, schools, ministries, 
and highways were first established in the Gulf monarchies. There are four events that 
represent the crucial turning points during this era: the British withdrawal from the region 
in 1971, the increase in oil prices in 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran–
Iraq war in 1980.136 These events generated various security, political and economic 
challenges, and opportunities resulting in closer relations among the six Gulf monarchies 	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which ultimately led to the emergence of the GCC. The British withdrawal in 1971 
completely altered the political dynamics of the region by creating an instant power 
vacuum that intensified the issue of security among the smaller Gulf monarchies. 
Meanwhile, the increase in oil prices in 1973 provided a vast flow of oil wealth that was 
poured into developing the infrastructure of these states, prompting new challenges like 
the influx of expatriates and foreign workers. Oil wealth also enabled the establishment 
of an extensive welfare system that was mobilised by the Gulf ruling elites in further 
legitimising their rule. The rise and success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 presented 
severe internal and external threats to the Gulf monarchies. And the Iran–Iraq war in 
1980 posed as an international and regional security challenge detrimental to the survival 
of the GCC monarchies.   
a. The Iranian Revolution (1979-1980) 
The Iranian Revolution is considered one of the major political turning points in the 
history of the Gulf region. It led to the overthrow of the pro-Western Shah of Iran and 
replaced the Iranian monarchy with an Islamic republic. Iran’s new revolutionary 
government was led by Islamic clerics who aimed to establish an Islamic government that 
would enforce Islamic law and conduct domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with 
Islamic standards.137 Eager to export their revolution, the Islamic clerics embraced 
expansionist ideologies that included targeting “socioeconomic cleavages in the smaller 
and militarily weaker Gulf states in order to undermine social cohesiveness, religious 
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unity, and above all, the states’ Islamic legitimacy.” 138 Furthermore, the Revolution 
represented a profound threat in its plans to rid the region of the monarchical system, 
leading to a common security concern that compelled the Gulf leaders to create a joint 
security scheme under a regional organisation, the GCC. 
The first Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdulla Bishara, stated that the Iranian quest 
for supremacy in the Gulf was the main source of threat to the stability of the GCC 
states.139 The Iranian Revolution not only demolished America’s Twin Pillar policy, it 
induced a new global crisis where oil prices nearly doubled between 1978 and 1980. It 
led directly to the Iran–Iraq war, which further divided the political structures of the 
region, pitting the Islamic Iranian regime against the Ba’athist Iraqi regime with the 
support of the Gulf monarchical states. Finally, it altered the regional alignments that 
were developed in the previous decade, indirectly causing the Gulf monarchies to reach 
out for Western support, and in particular bringing about an increased American presence 
in the region. 
As a result of this vulnerability, the six Gulf foreign ministers met in Riyadh in 
February 1981 to discuss a regional organisation that would bring “stability to their 
peoples”. After more than a week of deliberation, the ministers reached a decision to 
establish the Gulf Cooperation Council; a charter was issued on May 25, and a working 
paper was issued the next day to provide a formal justification for the organisation – “the 
preservation of stability”. The document further stated: 	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International designs will not be able to find a foothold in a merged region which 
has one voice, opinion, and strength. However, they will be able to find a 
thousand footholds if this region, which is rich in oil and men, remains made up 
of small entities that can easily be victimized. 140 
The Gulf monarchies were particularly concerned at the substantial number of Shi’a 
Muslim residents and citizens among their populations. Iranians are overwhelmingly 
Shi’a,141 and in the Gulf monarchies the Shi’a represent a minority of the total population, 
yet, an important component with sizeable Shi’a communities in Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia.142 In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Shi’a are concentrated in the oil-rich Hasa 
province, where they constitute a majority of the population. 
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Table 2: Percentage of Shi’a citizens in the Gulf (as of 2013)143 
Country Shi’a as percentage of citizens 







Note: No official statistics distinguish between Sunni and Shi’a when estimating the number of Muslims in 
the Gulf countries. These are estimates for the Shi’a population in the states with access to the Gulf, based on 
the available literature and fieldwork across the Gulf. 
 
Despite the significant number of Shi’a across the Gulf, five out of six Gulf 
monarchies are ruled by Sunni leaders, “whose attitudes toward Shi’ism vary from cold 
indifference to acute hostility”. 144 (Oman is the only GCC country that is not ruled by a 
Sunni leader; Qaboos bin Sa’id is Ibadi).  Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment is 
particularly hostile to the Saudi Shi’a population, where they are denied basic economic 
and religious freedoms. The Saudi oil industry is based in Shi’a territory, where Shi’a 
contribute the bulk of the workforce; and the majority of the Shi’a did not benefit from 
the economic, educational or social opportunities provided by the oil wealth. They were 
banned from certain professions, such as working in military and educational institutions. 
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They were also banned from performing a Shi’a ritual called Ashura in public and from 
building their own Shi’a mosques.145 The Bahraini Shi’a also consider themselves 
“economically and politically disadvantaged second-class citizens”,146 where they are 
virtually excluded from the Bahraini army and interior ministry, and face a high rate of 
unemployment. Within these economically, politically, and socially unstable conditions, 
the Iranian Revolution accentuated the problems and the Iranian clerics were able to 
effectively exert their political and religious influence on the Shi’a populations, 
prompting political opposition to the Gulf monarchies. “By playing upon the religious 
loyalties of poor Shiite populations in Gulf countries, Iranian clerics seriously threatened 
domestic stability within Gulf states.”147 
A prime example of the Iranian Revolution’s influence on the internal dynamics of the 
Gulf monarchies occurred in November 1979, when a Sunni Muslim fundamentalist 
group threatened the stability of the Al Saud regime by seizing the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca. Even though the incident was void of Iranian involvement, the fact that an Islamic 
rebellion challenged the Saudi monarchy was alarming to all the Gulf states. 
Furthermore, inspired by the Iranian example, indigenous Saudi Shi’a groups began 
rebelling in late 1979 and again in February 1980.148 A major demonstration by the Saudi 
Shi’a came during the Shi’a ritual of Ashura to mourn the death of their martyrs, Hassan 
and Hussein, a practice forbidden by the Saudi state. In the following year, 1980, the 
Saudi Shi’a organised a larger demonstration and a series of strikes in Qatif, an eastern 	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province of Saudi Arabia, to voice their discontent over their status as second-class 
citizens.149 The Saudi government blamed Iranian clerics for distributing “seditious 
literature” to pilgrims, leading to the deportation of many Iranians from Saudi Arabia. 150 
So, the Iranian Revolution influenced the internal stability of Saudi Arabia: “… By 
targeting Saudi Arabia’s oppressed Shiite minority, Iranian clerics disrupted domestic 
tranquillity in Saudi Arabia and threatened the political and religious legitimacy of the 
state.” 151 The Grand Mosque attack and the demonstrations led by Saudi Shi’a were 
perceived by the Gulf rulers as a response to the calls made by Iran’s revolutionary 
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, for a general uprising of fundamentalist Muslims in the 
region. It thus prompted the Saudi monarchy to take the leadership role in securing the 
region against the threat of the Revolution. 
The Bahraini monarchy was also highly affected by the Iranian Revolution, where it 
experienced Shi’a upheavals in 1979 and 1980, and an attempted coup d’état by a pro-
Iranian Shi’a group in 1982.152 In January of 1982, the Bahraini government reportedly 
asserted that “the Iranian regime’s threat is embodied in its expansionist policy of 
sabotage against the Arab Gulf states and in its attempt to incite and sow sedition”.153 The 
Bahraini Prime Minister stated in an interview that the Iranian regime was exploiting the 
Shi’a in Bahrain and the Gulf, encouraging political ties with the ruling ayatollahs in 
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Tehran, and training them in the use of weapons and acts of sabotage to ferment chaos 
and threaten security.154 Three decades later, this line of argument is still being used by 
the Bahraini ruling elites against any form of political dissent within their population. 
The rising threat from Iran was primarily internal to the smaller Gulf states due to the 
significant number of Shi’a citizens and Iranian Shi’a residents among their populations. 
Iran’s new revolutionary regime under Ayatollah Khomeini was emanating a militant 
Shi’a rhetoric that openly denounced the monarchical and imperial form of governments 
by the Gulf rulers as having no place in Islam.155 The Kuwaiti monarchy experienced a 
series of violent attacks directly connected to Iran throughout the 1980s. In 1983, there 
were in multiple bomb attacks at the American and French embassies in Kuwait.156 The 
Iraqi Islamic Dawa Party, a group of Shi’a Islamists, claimed responsibility for the 
bombings and publically supported the Iranian Republic.157 Further assaults on Kuwait’s 
security included the hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane in December 1984 by group of Shi’a 
terrorist, resulting in the death of two Americans. The newly established GCC 
organisation strongly denounced the bombings and affirmed its support for its Kuwaiti 
member in facing such “criminal acts”.158 It condemned all violent acts and asserted that 
“such vile actions will only make Kuwait and its sister GCC states strong and more 
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solid”.159 Overall, the Iranian Revolution generated internal threats rather than external, 
military, threats within the Gulf monarchies. The start of the Iran–Iraq war further 
intensified these threats, and culminated in the necessity of establishing a regional 
organisation that would unite the six Gulf monarchies, the GCC. 
b. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) 
The Iran–Iraq war began on September 23, 1980 when Iraqi forces invaded Iran. The 
issue of supremacy over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway was a primary cause of the war.160 
In 1975, Iran and Iraq had signed an agreement where Iraq recognised Iranian 
sovereignty over half of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, 
claimed that his reason for invading Iran in 1980 was defensive: “to compel the 
revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran to cease support for subversion in Iraq and attempts 
to overthrow the regime”.161 However, there were more opportunist motives behind his 
invasion, where the collapse of the Shah’s regime in Iran had provided an opportunity for 
the Iraqi president to reverse the 1975 agreement on the Shatt Al-Arab waterway and 
possibly “liberate” Iran’s Khuzestan Province that borders Iraq’s Basra region and is 
largely inhabited by ethnic Arabs.162 The Iraqi regime claimed that it was not only 
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defending its territorial integrity, but the integrity of Arab lands as a whole from 
impending Persian dominance.163 
The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980 accelerated the coordination 
process that was already taking place between the six Gulf states. The war proved to be a 
catalyst for two reasons: on the one hand it temporarily excluded Iran and Iraq from a 
joint Gulf enterprise, “thus enabling the six monarchies to concentrate on their common 
ground without having to defer to the pressures and enticements of their bigger Gulf 
brothers.” 164 On the other hand, the war highlighted the common threats facing the six 
Gulf monarchies, and prompted them to overlook their differences and join forces. 
Saddam’s reaction to the establishment of the GCC was documented in an interview with 
an Arabic daily newspaper. He stated: “It is not proper that Iraq who fights Iran on your 
behalf should not be included at the emerging Gulf grouping. It will be obvious to 
everyone that Iraq has been excluded deliberately.” 165 The GCC ignored Iraqi pleas to 
join the organisation, and continued to consolidate its structure. 
During the first two years of the war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE provided 
Iraq with nearly $30 billion in grants and loans. From 1982 onwards, the direct military 
aid to Iraq stopped, and instead, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to produce Iraq’s quota 
of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day on its behalf and transfer the proceeds to Baghdad.  
The Iran–Iraq war proceeded to spill over to neighbouring GCC states; the most severe 
and immediate effect of the conflict on the security of the GCC states being the 
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promotion by Iran of subversive activities in the member countries. “Such acts have taken 
either the form of highly visible public disruptions, including attacks on public leaders or 
symbolic targets, or strikes on economic or other critical installations.” 166 Iranian attacks 
on Kuwait occurred repeatedly in 1987, and included missile strikes on Kuwaiti oil 
facilities and ships. Ongoing strikes on Kuwaiti shipping prompted Kuwait to seek the 
assistance of the superpowers in late 1986 to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf. 167 
In December 1986, the United States offered to protect Kuwaiti ships by reflagging them 
with an American flag.168  
The Gulf monarchies’ security-based response to the war can be divided into three 
categories: diplomacy, military build-up, and a combination of both.169 Oman strongly 
advocated military preparedness; it perceived the Iranian Revolution as not only a threat 
to the Gulf region, but also a pretext for Soviet intervention if the Islamic Republic was 
replaced by a communist regime. However, most of the Gulf monarchies opted for a less 
threatening response: at the beginning of the war, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE opted for 
diplomacy, where each monarchy embarked on individual diplomatic initiatives that 
would lead to a truce between Iran and Iraq. The Gulf leaders attempted a diplomatic 
approach with the Iranian government, where they aimed to mediate between the warring 
countries. On May 16, 1983 the Kuwaiti and Emirati Foreign Affairs Ministers visited 
both Iran and Iraq to discuss ways of ending the conflict. However, the Gulf monarchies’ 
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efforts towards rapprochement failed, and the Iranian Republic continued its negative 
propaganda against the Saudi regime and its Gulf neighbours, leading the Gulf leaders’ to 
lend their full support to Iraq.170 
Another response by the Gulf monarchies to the Iran–Iraq war was a combination of 
diplomacy on the one hand and military strength on the other, a position that was led by 
Saudi Arabia. With the prolongation of the war, other Gulf monarchies began to follow 
Saudi’s position, which became known as the Saudi policy of reliance on diplomacy 
augmented by military backup.171 Accordingly, in support of this policy, Bahrain, Qatar 
and the UAE sought bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia in February 1982, while 
Kuwait and Oman did not seek formal agreements. The security agreements provided for 
the exchange of equipment, expertise, and training and for extradition of criminals and 
border cooperation. 172 The GCC monarchies did not sign a unilateral agreement; 
however, they all followed a policy of military build-up and “a definite policy … of 
diversifying arms-supplying countries to the extent possible so that the obstacle of 
reliance may be minimized”.173 The decision by the GCC monarchies with a long-
established supplier relationship with the United States to diversify their weaponry 
sources was an indication of their determination to limit the perception of their political 
exposure to Washington.174 Nonetheless, the United States played a prominent role as an 
arms supplier to the GCC states by proving over 37% of military systems development 	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over the years of 1981–1985. 175 Eventually, each monarchy formulated their own defence 
plan, with Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia strengthening their individual military and 
intelligence links with the United States.176 
The development of GCC military coordination was majorly influenced by the Iran–
Iraq war. “The conflict has been responsible for both impelling and preventing the GCC 
member states from engaging in ever-closer cooperation.” 177 Albeit the conflict did serve 
as a catalyst for the formation of the GCC and as a basis for enhanced military 
cooperation between the GCC member states, the severity of events was such that among 
the GCC monarchies, provoking Iran by the continued pace of GCC military cooperation 
was viewed as unnecessary confrontation.178 This led to a highly uneven pace of military 
cooperation among GCC members. Furthermore, reliance on the West for security may 
also have delayed military coordination efforts among the GCC states. The decision by 
Kuwait to allow a U.S. military escort operation in July 1987, rather than endure 
continued Iranian intimidation and attacks, was an act of survival by the Gulf monarchy. 
The heightened presence of the United States in the region was perceived as a necessary 
measure in response to the political and economic difficulties posed by the continued 
Iranian strikes on Kuwaiti shipping. “By engaging in direct mediation or encouraging 
wider international support for an end to the Iran–Iraq war … the GCC has sought to 
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realize the predominant objectives set out in its constituent instruments.”179 Thus, the 
reliance of the GCC monarchies on the United States for security during the Iran–Iraq 
war did not contradict the organisation’s formal objectives of greater cooperation efforts 
in the economic, political, and military realms. 
The war ended in July of 1988, and a ceasefire was agreed between the two countries 
on August 20, 1988. The costs of the war were high for both countries. There were at 
least 350,000 Iranian casualties and 150,000 Iraqi casualties.180 Iraq acquired a debt of 
$80 billion to pay for the war, half owed to the Gulf monarchies and half to Europe. 
Within a year and a half of the ceasefire, Iraq was embroiled in regional conflict with 
Kuwait that would lead to a second Gulf war involving increased U.S. military presence 
and a coalition of more than thirty countries.181 
Overall, both the Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq war “represent supremely 
compelling reasons for GCC initiatives to effect greater collective political and 
diplomatic actions, on the one hand, and higher levels of military cooperation, on the 
other.” 182 The Iran–Iraq war prompted the Gulf states to secure defence pacts and 
establish a new regional organisation, the GCC, which excluded Iraq and Iran from the 
Gulf dynamic. Iran directed most of its efforts in subversive activities towards Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia due to their financial support of Iraq. Meanwhile, Oman, the UAE, and 
the smaller GCC states had a more ambivalent position regarding the war and maintained 
contacts with Iran. As Iran attempted to divide the six GCC member states by singling 	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out Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as propaganda targets, the “GCC functioned as an umbrella 
to express a more severe condemnation of Iranian actions”. 183 From this point of view the 
GCC proved a useful forum for the six Gulf states throughout the Iran–Iraq war to 
advance common diplomatic positions in multilateral organisations such as the United 
Nations, the Arab League and the ICO. 
c. The GCC: Main Goals, Organisational Structure and Cooperation Efforts 
On May 25, 1981, the six heads of states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) assembled in Abu Dhabi184 and declared the 
establishment of their regional organisation, the Gulf Cooperation Council. The basic 
objective of the GCC was stated in Article 4 of its Charter: “to effect coordination, 
integration and cooperation between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity 
among them”.185 The emergence of the GCC was an instant reaction to the turbulent 
regional events of the Islamic Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraq–Iran war in 1980. 
Due to the external and internal threats generated by these two events, the Gulf 
monarchies hastily arranged the formation of the organisation, taking less than three 
months (from February to May of 1981) to unanimously agree on the general ideas, 
structure and objectives of the GCC before announcing its formal birth.186 
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In terms of an internal perspective on the emergence and purpose of the GCC, the Gulf 
states were divided on the objectives of their newly-formed alliance. Each Gulf state had 
varying intentions as to the purpose of the GCC and envisioned very different models of 
cooperation; three main draft proposals were put forward at the first meeting of the six 
foreign ministers on February 4, 1981. Kuwait envisioned the emergence of the GCC as 
mainly an economic institution that would lead to a non-binding Gulf common market, 
loosely corresponding to the European Community (EC).187 The Kuwaiti government 
stressed the importance of ensuing an organisation that takes a position of neutrality in 
regard to the Cold War. Kuwait was the only Gulf country at the time to have diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union; and it sought to place the GCC’s principle significance in 
the areas of economic and social coordination, partly so that the new organisation would 
not be seen as a military organisation aligned with the United States.188 It also believed 
that should the GCC members coordinate their security, it should be confined to the 
exchange of information, without pursuing a joint military arm. Meanwhile, Oman 
envisioned the GCC as purely a military alliance between all six states, corresponding to 
a Gulf version of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Due to its strategic location in the lower 
Gulf region, Oman’s main concern was the protection of the Straits of Hormuz from 
threats to freedom of navigation. 189 The Omani proposal openly stressed the importance 
of military alliance with the United States; and envisioned the creation of a naval 
taskforce to be drawn from the United States, Britain and West Germany to ensure 	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continued freedom of navigation through the strait. “While the Omani preoccupation with 
freedom of passage in the Straits of Hormuz was recognized, the focus of the meeting 
shifted to the threat of domestic uprisings stemming from Iranian calls to ‘export the 
revolution’ to the Arab sheikhdoms of the Gulf.”190 The Saudi Arabian proposal was 
based on internal security priorities due to the threats emanating from revolutionary Iran. 
It stressed that the main purpose of the GCC was political integration, and that the six 
Gulf states needed formal cooperation in the realm of internal security and a commitment 
to military intervention to preserve and restore order and stability. Saudi Arabia’s priority 
was thus the preservation of its regime and the establishment of an organisation that 
“would primarily provide its six states a sense of collective security while each 
individually pursued its own policies and interests”.191 As such, the three proposals 
reflected very different approaches to the nature of the organisation. Ultimately, all six 
states emphasised the primacy of cooperation in the economic and social fields, which 
was reflected in the wording of the organisation’s charter. 
On March 9, 1981, the six foreign ministers met again in Muscat to approve the basic 
structure of the organisation and the draft Charter. The ministers specifically approved 
three documents that set out the by-laws for the Cooperation Council, the Supreme 
Council, and the Ministerial Council. They also decided in principle that the first 
Secretary-General of the GCC would be from Kuwait; this was a decision made in order 
to “project the idea that the new organisation would steer a neutral course between the 
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two superpowers”. 192 Abdulla Bishara, Kuwait’s then permanent representative at the 
United Nations, became the first Secretary-General of the GCC. Bishara was behind 
Kuwait’s draft proposal (mentioned above) and insisted that the organisation’s charter 
should forego any mention of internal and external security cooperation. He believed that 
the new organisation needed to project its neutrality in order to survive, and “his view, 
along with the Kuwaiti version of cooperation, won the day even if the foreign ministers 
who met … to finalize plans for the establishment of the GCC did not rule out the 
adoption of the Omani and Saudi perspectives at a later date.” 193 Hence, the door was left 
open for incorporating cooperation objectives in the internal and external security fields, 
which the member states eventually implemented. The first GCC summit took place on 
May 25, 1981 in Abu Dhabi. At the second GCC summit in Riyadh in November 1981, 
the first agreement signed after the nomination of Abdulla Bishara as the first Secretary-
General was the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA).194 The main objective of the UEA 
is to provide a vehicle for the integration of the member states’ economies into one large 
regional economy.195 In order to coordinate and unify their economies, the member states 
developed ways to encourage the production and transportation of GCC-produced goods; 
“these goods include all agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products.”196 
The UEA also contained specific provisions for the unification of member states’ policies 
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in other areas that include development, technical cooperation, financial and monetary 
policy and energy policy. By 1983, the GCC region constituted a customs union by 
normal economic standards, and in the following three years, steps were taken towards 
creating a common market economic structure.  
In common with most institutional documents in the Gulf region, the GCC Charter is a 
carefully drawn document that lays down a proper organisational hierarchy and assigns 
functions and powers to each of its components; however, in practice, the decision-
making is highly personalised and ad hoc. The Charter consists of 22 Articles, and is 
divided into six topics: Basic Information; Structure; Functions of the Main Bodies; 
Privileges and Immunities; and finally, Charter Implementation, Amendment and 
Deposition. The first topic covers basic information, such as the name of the organisation 
and the location of its headquarters: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The names of the six members 
are definitively listed so as to limit membership to those six states – if any expansion 
were to happen, it would require an article amendment.197 The hierarchical nature of the 
organisation designates a Supreme Council to preside over the structure, composed of the 
six heads of state, who rotate as president of the organisation on an annual basis. At the 
second level is the Ministerial Council, which consists of the foreign ministers and is 
where most of the organisation’s joint decisions are reached. A Secretary-General is 
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appointed for a renewable three-year term, and six directors supervising 23 departments 
lead a Secretariat.198 
The GCC framework revolves around the Supreme Council, which possesses the sole 
decision-making authority on all issues of substance. However, the supporting 
committees and councils are an integral part of the organisation, especially as concerns 
the development of the programmes and procedures. The Ministerial Council and the 
Secretariat General are “the formal vehicles through which broader objectives as 
elaborated by the Supreme Council are ratified, implemented and monitored”.199 Due to 
the decision that resolutions on substantive matters must be unanimous to be carried in 
the Supreme Council, the ultimate binding decision of the organisation must be based on 
a consensus as to the common denominator among the member states. Although this may 
restrict the activities of the Council on contentious issues between the members, it also 
compels them to reinforce areas of cooperation. Furthermore, even though decisions are 
based on unanimous votes, in practice the procedures are often take second place to the 
monarchical personalities in the Supreme Council, leading to a personalised way of 
generating decisions.200 
The GCC Charter engages in lofty and ambiguous terminology such as “unity, 
integration, cooperation, and coordination”. The objectives as defined in Article Four of 
the Charter are as follows: 201 	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1- To achieve cooperation among the member states in all fields as a prelude to unity. 
2- To strengthen the links of cooperation among the peoples of the member states in 
different fields. 
3- To establish similar systems among the member states in all fields, including 
economics and finance; commerce, customs and communications; education and 
culture; social welfare and health; information and tourism; and legislation and 
administration. 
4- To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, 
mineralogy, agriculture and marine and animal resources. Also, to establish 
common projects and encourage cooperation from the private sector for the 
common good of the peoples of the member states. 
As per Bishara’s preference, Article 4’s objectives did not mention cooperation in the 
area of security. However, security was and remains the leading factor behind its various 
activities.202 The issue of security was specifically excluded in the organisation’s 
objectives for three main reasons. First, it attempts to forestall negative responses from 
the members’ powerful neighbours, Iran and Iraq. The GCC leaders did not want to alarm 
their neighbours by announcing defence cooperation in a new regional bloc that excludes 
them.203 Second, downplaying any security role for the GCC was to “allay suspicions in 
Iran and the Arab world that the organisation was a cover for an alliance with the United 
States”. 204 The GCC states collectively asserted their preference for regional 	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independence and resistance to foreign intervention, even though both the Soviets and the 
Americans were actively courting the Gulf states. Third, by emphasising economic and 
cultural integration, the smaller Gulf states ensured their own independence from Saudi 
dominance. Overall, “rhetoric about economic and cultural cooperation was simply less 
threatening to outsiders and insiders.”205 
The proclaimed structural aim of the GCC as stated in the Charter206 is to achieve a 
“confederal” union; however, it is not clear to what extent. The envisioned system 
surpasses the objectives of most regional organisations, as it moves beyond the concept 
of an association between states.207 The GCC structure is aimed at reinforcing common 
interests among the member states, and refrains from highlighting any differences that 
may arise between them. However, a main objective of the GCC is to improve 
coordination among its members rather than to instigate specific integration schemes that 
would override the individual sovereignty of each state. The term “confederal” did not, 
therefore, imply an actual confederacy between member states, but rather a consensus of 
joint political and economic effort. Abdulla Bishara made a statement to emphasise this 
approach: 
Despite the fact that the GCC Charter does not contain a clear-cut political 
theory, there is consensus on some form of confederacy between its six member 
states. Every Arab country is keen to maintain its special characteristics, 
independence and legislative authorities, while at the same time a strong desire 
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exists among these states to promote their regional potential within one 
framework. There is common agreement that, acting under the umbrella of the 
Council, they will be able to pool their political, economic and other efforts in a 
confederal manner.208 
It is clear from this statement that at the moment of its creation, the GCC did not 
intend unification to be the eventual outcome. The stated objectives in Article 4 make no 
reference to an end result, which signifies that their emphasis is on the process of 
cooperation, rather than the outcome of integration, and on “consensus-building rather 
than progressive development”.209 At the time of its establishment, Saudi’s King Fahad 
said: “The aim of the GCC is to achieve practical cooperation among GCC members. At 
present it is premature for the GCC to become a political union or federation, and talk 
about this matter is also premature.” 210 The recent Saudi proposal, the Riyadh 
Declaration, made at the GCC summit in December 2011, declared that it was time to 
transition the GCC from its cooperation phase to a union phase “as envisioned at its 
founding”.211 In order to justify the legitimacy and significance of the Riyadh Declaration, 
the Saudi King referred to the GCC Charter by citing its ambiguous wording as grounds 
for his proposal. This is telling – the Charter’s main objectives were written with 
equivocation, the ambiguous terminology enabling the GCC states to refer to their 
organisation’s charter to accommodate future endeavours, whatever they might be. 
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Regardless of the GCC Charter’s silence on defence and security cooperation among 
the six members, on January 25, 1982 the defence ministers of the six GCC states held a 
meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and laid the foundation of GCC defence cooperation. 
The GCC Secretary-General, Abdulla Bishara, announced that the meeting had “forged 
the tool for the edifice that will safeguard the security and stability of the Gulf with its 
own forces and without help from anyone”.212 It was agreed to establish a joint command 
structure, and three main sets of actions in pursuit of common military goals were listed: 
a coordinated arms procurement policy, the development of a GCC military industry, and 
an improved, autonomous capacity for military training. The most important outcome of 
this meeting was the ‘institutionalisation’ of the GCC, where a broad guideline of defence 
cooperation was formulated by the defence ministers and, in turn, a defence structure 
under the Military Committee at the GCC Secretariat was established.213 
It is important to note that the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980 had produced the 
conditions enabling the six GCC states to create a joint defence pact that excluded the 
two regional powers: Iran and Iraq. Since the 1970s, the Gulf’s eight littoral states214 had 
been expressing their intention of formulating a joint regional security pact; however, 
they could not agree on a common formula. “Such a pact … would provide a joint 
defence network against external threats, help prevent disputes from flaring into 
hostilities, and possibly constitute an initial step toward turning the Gulf into a zone of 
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peace.” 215 The main obstacles to the regional pact were Iraq and Iran: Iraq inspired 
mistrust due to its pan-Arab socialist ideology, while Iran was treated with suspicion 
because it was non-Arab and because of its age-old perceived efforts at Persian 
hegemony in the Gulf. The six GCC states thus took the opportunity during the Iran–Iraq 
war to establish a defence agreement that would highlight their security concerns as one 
sub-regional bloc. 
The milestone development towards GCC defence cooperation was the establishment 
of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) in October 1983, which saw the first-ever military 
exercise among the six member states. The chief purpose of the PSF had seemingly been 
to deter and deal with possible threats to the external security of the member states. 216 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE committed around 1,000 men; Bahrain and Qatar sent 
300 men each, and Oman sent 350 men to the UAE where “the exercises consisted of 
armoured ground units with fighter aircraft and attack helicopter support with an attack 
on a simulated ‘enemy’ position under-taken by the combined forces.” 217 The exercises 
were meant to demonstrate the feasibility of developing the GCC’s own rapid 
deployment force (RDF). “Such exercises could bring army commanding officers 
together and create a GCC rapid deployment force which can repel any external attack 
against any member state of the council.”218 
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The PSF headquarters is in a Saudi army base at Hafr al-Batin, northeastern Saudi 
Arabia, under the command of a Saudi general. The headquarters contain an additional 
infantry-strength brigade gathering approximately 5,000 soldiers from all across the 
GCC; the PSF is composed mainly of Saudi soldiers, with Kuwait being the second-
largest contributor. 
While the PSF has a multinational Gulf character, the core of the fighting 
capability is likely the Saudi Army brigade that existed in the area prior to the 
PSF’s establishment. The multimember GCC force is reputedly under capacity, 
and it is not yet apparent whether the units have unilateral authority to intervene 
during domestic emergencies of civil disturbances. 219 
 Its mission had not been clearly defined; however, it was intended to deter and 
respond to any military aggression against all or any of its members. Specifics entailed 
the PSF being the first line of defence against any external aggressor and then being 
assimilated into the chain of command of follow-on host nation forces. 
The second annual exercise of troops, Peninsula Shield II, was held in 1984 and 
involved 10,000 men from all six states; it “included parachute drops of men and 
equipment, air support and intercept missions, night-time offensives and antiaircraft 
demonstrations”.220 According to the GCC Secretary-General, Abdulla Bishara, “the 
importance of the Peninsula Shield II manoeuvres lay in displaying the unity of vision 
and the determination to confront any aggression.” 221 Although the joint forces of the 
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GCC states would familiarise themselves with terrain and address other logistical matters 
in each other’s country, the aim of the exercises was not to train them to fight together in 
a battlefield. 222 Rather, the exercises were intended to train commanders and staff in 
achieving coordination for various military operations. The annual exercises were thus 
meant to prepare the individual forces of the GCC states to participate in a collective 
GCC RDF once it actually came into existence. As the Brigadier commander of the 
Kuwaiti force describes it, the idea behind forming such a force was to create “a striking 
force to deter any designs to interfere in the GCC states’ internal affairs.”223 
On June 5, 1984, Iranian fighter aircraft entered Saudi Arabian territory, flying over 
Gulf shipping lanes; Saudi fighter aircraft were forced to engage and ended up shooting 
down an Iranian F-4 plane. The incident prompted the GCC states to increase their efforts 
in defence cooperation; on June 23, the GCC Chiefs of Staff decided to focus on air 
coverage as the best means for protecting navigation in the northern part of the Gulf. 
They recommended that the GCC leaders grant Oman an estimated of $2 billion to 
upgrade its defence system and to “increase the effectiveness of its nascent radar network 
in the Strait of Hormuz in order to monitor Iranian activities aimed at obstructing 
navigation in the Strait”.224 They also established a blueprint for a joint GCC deterrence 
capacity under the command of a Saudi general. The GCC rapid deployment force would 
gradually be achieved through “the linking of air and maritime defences under a unified 
centralised command, equipment standardization, joint training programmes and 
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exercises, and enhanced cooperation between and integration of internal security forces 
and their procedures”. 225 However, approval for the GCC force appeared to be for a 
limited time period; it was intended as a temporary force that would be drawn from units 
of all six states in an emergency and then disbanded at the end of the crisis.226 Thus, the 
RDF was largely symbolic, as it did not really exist. 
Although the GCC framework facilitated cooperation in defence, there were certain 
constraints on creating a common defence system due to disagreements among GCC 
states on the main purpose and technicalities of the PSF. The six members were unable to 
reach a consensus on who the GCC force should guard against: Saudi Arabia proposed 
splitting the force into two nuclei, deploying it into the southwestern and northeastern 
borders.227 This was mainly rejected by Oman on the grounds that it would constitute a 
provocation vis-à-vis Iran. Furthermore, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE insisted on a 
provision that when the force entered a member’s territory, the command structure would 
revert from Saudi Arabia to that of the host country. “This insistence underlines the 
preoccupation of smaller member states with Saudi meddling in their internal affairs and 
underlines the symbolic nature of join military enterprises.” 228 The smaller GCC states 
were wary of the notion of Saudi Arabian hegemony within the fields of external and 
internal defence cooperation. 
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Meanwhile, the Saudi leadership took the lead in attempting to institutionalise internal 
security cooperation by pushing for a multilateral agreement among the six GCC states.229 
In 1982, Saudi Arabia signed bilateral security agreements with Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar 
and Oman.230 Kuwait was the only GCC member that refused to sign a bilateral 
agreement with Saudi Arabia, nor did it sign a multilateral internal security agreement 
that was proposed at the fourth GCC summit in November 1983. The bilateral and 
multilateral agreements provided an extradition clause that allowed the right of hot 
pursuit by other member states into a member’s territory,231 which contradicted the 
Kuwaiti constitution (more on this issue in the case study chapter). Overall, even though 
defence plans were not taken further in practice, and although a multilateral security 
agreement was yet to be signed, the GCC states managed to protect their sovereignty 
during the Iran–Iraq war and create a significant institutional base for a united military 
defence strategy. 
III. The GCC Monarchies in the Post-Cold War Middle East 
The post-Cold War period brought about the ‘new world order’ presented by US 
President George Bush after the fall of the Soviet Union in early 1990. The foundation of 
the new world order was to be the notion of a post-Cold War international society in 
which justice and fair play and protection of the weak against the strong would drive the 
international community. “The will of that international society would be exercised 
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through consensus and implemented through an energised UN system free of the shackles 
put on it by the Cold War.”232 Its main element was that a regional conflict would not 
serve as a proxy for superpower confrontation, but rather, nations from around the world 
would join together against an aggressor under the auspices of the United Nations 
Security Council. President Bush further defined the notion in the first of a series of post-
Cold War speeches: 
The New World Order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or 
forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our 
successes. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter 
aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to 
achieve peace.233 
The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 presented the world with 
its first post-Cold War crisis: “the global impact of the crisis … provided the first test of 
cooperation across the old East-West divide and for the international community’s ability 
to reverse Iraq’s aggression.”234 The ensuing Gulf War in 1991 dramatically changed the 
Gulf region’s emerging balance of relationships, and more importantly, inserted a 
permanent American military infrastructure in the region. A key aspect of the post-Cold 
War notion of the new world order was its impact on US ambitions in the Gulf region: 
after US and coalitional military forces successfully pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, the US 
did not go further and invade Iraq. Instead, the US adopted the policy of “dual 
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containment”, cutting off diplomatic relations with two of the most important regional 
capitals: Baghdad and Tehran.235 Thus, US ambitions in the Gulf region during this period 
were modest, where the main goal was “to sustain the regional territorial and political 
status quo”. 236 The Gulf strategic picture further changed after the September 11, 2001 
attacks in the United States and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second 
Bush administration adopted a new policy under its “war on terror”, and changed its 
policy towards Iraq from containment to regime change.237 
This chapter aims to present the GCC responses to all these events and the impact of 
the changing US policies in the region on their defence cooperation. The Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 created a heightened sense of insecurity which united the GCC states in 
terms of solidarity, but also highlighted the military weaknesses of these states, and thus, 
led to bilateral security agreements with the US Due to their foreign dependence in 
security matters, this research argues that the GCC states experienced a stagnated period 
of collaborative defence cooperation. The following sections will thus present the GCC 
response to each event in terms of security and political integration efforts. 
a. The Gulf War and the GCC response (1991) 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s decision to 
invade was justified on the basis of Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory; his suspicion that his 
regime was threatened by regional and international forces; and the economic and 	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political repercussions of the eight-year long war with Iran. Iraq accumulated a debt of 
around $70 billion due to the war, and despite government attempts to promote the 
private sector and domestic agriculture, Iraq remained in a weak economic position even 
after the end of the war in 1988. Saddam had demanded that its debt to Kuwait incurred 
during the war with Iran be cancelled. He further demanded that Kuwait pay 
compensation for Iraq’s defence of Arab interests in the war. Saddam had accused 
Kuwait and the UAE of depriving Iraq of oil revenues by producing above their OPEC 
quota and so pushing down the price of oil. He also accused Kuwait of unfairly taking oil 
from the Rumaila field, which straddles the two states’ border. “The seizure of Kuwait 
offered a solution at several levels – a distraction from domestic resentment at economic 
mismanagement, the possibility of acquiring Kuwaiti assets and investments, and the 
seizure of the oil wells themselves.” 238 
As the end of the Cold war had brought down communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a 
widespread debate emerged in the Arab world about possible future democratisation in 
Iraq and elsewhere.239 Europe and the United States were calling attention to Iraq’s efforts 
to obtain nuclear weapons and to Saddam’s human rights abuses. Saddam thus began to 
suspect that domestic, regional and international forces were working against him, to the 
extent that his regime’s survival was at stake. He adopted a more hostile attitude to the 
United States in particular, and began to openly criticise Washington. He called for an 
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Arab financial boycott of the US and returned to anti-Israeli rhetoric to mobilise 
support.240 
Such rhetoric was designed for consumption in the Arab world, as such tactics 
sought to rally Arab opinion, particularly in states that were supporting a 
growing coalition based in Saudi Arabia that had the potential to not only fight 
for Kuwait, but to undermine Saddam Hussein’s regime by invading Iraq.241 
Saudi Arabia had posed a potent threat to Iraq as it served as a base for the American 
coalition forces after its invasion of Kuwait. In the wake of the crisis, the GCC 
monarchies lined up behind their GCC partner, Kuwait; their unity was important to the 
US because it provided US military forces access to ports and bases in all six of the GCC 
states.242 
The GCC states faced their most serious test of cooperation with the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. Given their military weakness during the previous Iran–Iraq war, “the speed and 
unanimity with which the Gulf states came together to support Kuwait and accept 
American and other international forces that would expel Iraq from Kuwait were 
remarkable.”243 All five of the GCC states stood behind Kuwait, even those whose 
security was not immediately threatened by the Iraqi occupation (Qatar, the UAE, and 
Oman), which demonstrates their belief that they saw their security as interdependent. 
The regional organisation’s solidarity was symbolically expressed by the role of their 
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joint military force, the PSF, in the war. The PSF cooperated under a single command, 
yet maintained its individual national organisation and officers. General Khalid bin Sultan 
(the Saudi commander during the crisis), however, mixed units from different GCC states 
in various task forces, where he assigned the battalions of Omani, Emirati, Qatari and 
Bahraini brigades to the Kuwaiti border and to accompany Saudi forces in the original 
defence plans. The Peninsula Shield did not manage major achievements, nor was it a 
unitary GCC force; however, “it did express tangibly the unified sense of threat the Gulf 
regimes perceived from Iraq.”244 
Meanwhile, the US had several reasons to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. For 
decades, US policy had indicated that the oil resources of the Persian Gulf were a vital 
American interest; Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait had given him control of 25% of the 
world’s oil reserves.245 With Saddam’s military on the Saudi border, Iraq was also 
threatening the United States’ closest Gulf ally, Saudi Arabia. The United Nations had 
also condemned the invasion, and issued numerous resolutions calling upon Iraq to 
withdraw.246 On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, 
authorising the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 
15, 1991. Iraq did not comply, and on January 17, US forces along with British, Kuwaiti, 
and Saudi air forces, began air attacks on Iraqi targets, dubbed “Operation Desert 
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Storm”.247 The ground war began on February 24 and ended 100 hours after it began. 
Kuwait was liberated.248 
Before the Gulf War in 1991, the GCC states had sought security assistance from 
outside sources (mainly the US), whilst publicly asserting the principle of self-reliance.249 
They valued highly the prospect of US military assistance but only as a very last resort. 
“They preferred to deal with threats by diplomatic means, inter-Arab coalitions, and pay-
offs to potential aggressors.”250 Hence, none of the GCC states had entered into an official 
defence agreement with the United States. The GCC states had also been limited in 
binding themselves by a formal collective security arrangement. Abdulla Bishara, the 
GCC Secretary-General, outlined the two prime concerns on collective security amongst 
the rulers of the six states: first, any cooperation must be founded on trust and depend on 
the extent to which interests will be sufficiently similar as to make cooperation 
meaningful, useful and non-threatening. Second, “there exists the not unreasonable 
conviction that the resources of the governments of the six states are theirs alone to 
dispose as they see fit. No one should have any prior claim on those resources or decide 
how they should be exploited.” 251 The unwillingness of the GCC states to commit 
themselves to arrangements that might limit or control their own resources is a key 
characteristic of their security policies. These concerns, in fact, characterised the 
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formation of the GCC and represented the relatively loose arrangements surrounding 
their cooperation efforts. In the ten years since its establishment: 
[E]lements within that culture have made it extraordinarily difficult for the rulers 
to bind themselves to any collective institutional arrangement, whether in the field 
of security or economic affairs. Instead, the GCC provides a forum for periodic 
consultation and for declarations of solidarity, as well as a framework for 
bilateral internal security cooperation agreements.252 
The GCC defence and security policies after the Gulf War remained a mixture of 
existing concerns, efforts to deal with the immediate impact of the war itself and attempts 
to make the necessary adjustments to ensure that members did not have to face the same 
situation again. Bilateral agreements and individually contractual arrangements have been 
the favoured ways of proceeding in any area in which the vital interests of the state have 
been concerned. The Gulf crisis did nothing to change that; indeed, it served only to 
highlight this approach to collective security, witness the individual signing of defence 
pacts with the US.253 
There wasn’t a broadly based strategic defence concept shared by the US and the GCC 
states. Rather, the US dealt with each state separately. On September 18, 1991, Kuwait 
signed an official defence agreement with the US and followed it up by pacts with Britain 
and France. Around a month later, Bahrain signed a defence pact with the US and further 
agreed to house the regional headquarters of the US Central Command. These 




them arms.254 The GCC defence scheme after the Gulf crisis thus relied on agreements 
with major powers and the advancement of their own military technology.255 US officials 
described the GCC defence scheme after the Gulf War in a 2000 Congressional Report: 
Each GCC member has preferred to assure its primary defense against 
external aggression through unilateral measures: strengthening its own armed 
forces to the degree possible, and accepting defense cooperation agreements 
with outside powers. The United States…has signed defense cooperation 
agreements with all the members, except Saudi Arabia, and is seen by the GCC 
states as the primary guarantor of their external security.256 
However, certain disadvantages gradually emerged from the Gulf states’ absolute 
reliance on US and Western forces against external military threats. 257 After signing 
defence agreements with the US, the Gulf monarchies faced internal security threats from 
radical Islamic groups that were against a US military presence in the region.258 The US 
had stationed troops in various locations in the Gulf which had become the target of 
attacks by these radical Islamic movements.259 Tensions were heightened when two US 
army bases in Saudi Arabia were attacked by radical Islamic militants in June 1995 and 
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in November 1996.260 The Saudi leadership had experienced religious criticism and 
“fundamentalist-initiated riots” 261 against the government during the Gulf War in 1990–
1991, and so had avoided signing an official security agreement with the US as other 
Gulf states had. For the same reason it had tried to deflect media attention as much as 
possible from the US military presence on Saudi soil. Hence, while the US remained the 
GCC’s supreme defence guarantor, the GCC states tried to limit their reliance on the US 
military, “since its presence and security policies were counterproductive to other Gulf 
security concerns”.262 
To cope with these other threats, the GCC relied on other means of defence, including 
diplomatic cooperation with Syria and Egypt. In a somewhat symbolic step towards 
collective defence, the six GCC states had signed the Damascus Declaration in 1991, an 
initiative by Egypt and Syria to “entrust GCC land defences to Syrian and Egyptian 
infantry and armoured forces”.263 However, the GCC did not implement the accord 
because they did not trust Egypt and Syria, politically or in terms of their military 
capabilities. Understandably, from the Kuwaiti government’s perspective its immediate 
environment was perceived as uncertain and dangerous. The Kuwaiti minister of defence 
at the time stressed that “Kuwait is in a world in which the principle of Arab solidarity 
and respect for each other’s sovereignty had been torn apart by Iraq.”264 Hence, military 
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assistance from friendly Arab states, whether in the GCC or beyond, could only have 
symbolic value.265 Nevertheless, the Damascus Declaration provided a framework for 
military and economic cooperation,266 and fulfilled certain political purposes, mainly 
reaffirming the principles of the Arab League, which encouraged “a natural degree of 
bilateral consultation and limited cooperation that might take place among any group of 
friendly Arab states”.267 
The GCC states also attempted to increase military cooperation among themselves. 
The military technology purchased from the US and Europe could potentially have given 
them superiority in equipment over Iran if they combined their operations in response to a 
threat. However, the Peninsula Shield had suffered difficulties in coordination and 
command since its formation in 1981. As noted above, the small (approximately 10,000 
personnel) Saudi-based multilateral force did not react militarily to the 1990 Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, which exposed its deficiencies and weakness.268 Also, internal 
disputes among the GCC states complicated cooperation efforts, leading to the 
development of divergent threat perceptions. The disputes mainly surrounded their 
relations with Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had a dispute over Saudi’s 
progressive rapprochement with Iran; the Iranian takeover of Abu Musa (an island 
claimed by the UAE) had not yet been resolved; and Qatar and the UAE were making 
diplomatic overtures towards Iraq, which upset Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.269 Nevertheless, 
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the GCC leaders continued to hold bilateral meetings and collective forums that served as 
a “declaratory process to legitimize, debate, or reject new security initiatives”.270 
Overall, “the practice of achieving security in the Gulf combined a mix of imperfect 
strategies. While each strategy could prove to be advantageous in one area, it could strike 
at other shortcomings in Gulf security.”271 For example, the GCC states’ reliance on US 
military power was essential; however, leaders had to compensate for liabilities such as 
terrorist attacks directed at US military stations and media criticism of their overreliance 
on the “imperialist” power. The GCC states sought to combat this criticism by building 
legitimacy through political and economic cooperation with Egypt and Syria, and by 
doing so, avoided developing military reliance on these states. Furthermore, the 1990s 
marked a decade free from serious security threats and conflicts in the Gulf region – the 
prospect of an Iraqi attack on the GCC states was substantially reduced after the Gulf 
War. Most of Iraq’s army had been destroyed in the war and its ability to harm the GCC 
states was effectively checked by UN Security resolutions, followed by occasional air 
and missile raids launched by the US and British forces against Iraqi targets. Meanwhile, 
Iran did not constitute an imminent threat, although it had demonstrated an appetite for 
territorial dominance in its occupation of the Abu Musa island. “Moreover, weapons of 
mass destruction with both unconventional and ballistic capabilities were presumably still 
held by Iraq despite constant UN inspections and also developed by Iran during the 
period in question.”272 However, since the Iran–Iraq war, Iran had shown no interest in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




new war; rather, it preferred to establish good relations with the GCC in order to isolate 
its regional rival, Iraq. Hence, for the first time since the establishment of their regional 
alliance, the GCC states did not find themselves realistically threatened by either Iraq or 
Iran. The absence of immediate external threats to their sovereignties during the 1990s 
thus led to a period of stagnation in GCC cooperation efforts. 
In September 2000, the GCC states agreed to increase the size of the PSF to 22,000 
personnel; however, no timetable was set for the actual implementation of the plan. In the 
GCC summit in December 2000, the six GCC leaders signed a “defence plan” that would 
presumably commit them to defend each other in case of an external attack.273 More 
incremental progress was achieved in early 2001, when the GCC inaugurated its “Belt of 
Cooperation” network for joint tracking of aircraft and coordination of air defence 
systems. This system was expected to eventually include a link to US systems. The 
project is part of the US Cooperative Defence Initiative to integrate the GCC defence 
systems with each other and with the US. Another part of the initiative is US–GCC joint 
training to defend against a chemical or biological attack, as well as more general joint 
military training and exercises.274 However, as the GCC states did not enter into a 
collective GCC-centred security pact, their reliance on the West has allowed them to 
“grow lax in their regional security and diplomatic coordination.”275 
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b. The 9/11 Attacks and the GCC Response (2001) 
The September 11, 2001, (“9/11”) attacks on the United States introduced new frictions 
in US relations with the Gulf states. The 9/11 attacks were claimed by a militant Islamist 
organisation Al Qaeda, where fifteen of the nineteen individuals involved were from 
Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, was a Saudi national, greatly 
opposed to American policy in the Gulf region. Thus, “Saudi Arabia was the source not 
only of the personnel who carried out the attacks, but also of much of the ideological 
fervour and many of the logistical networks that underlay the growth of the salafi jihadist 
movement in the 1980s and 1990s.” 276 The Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia originated 
during two successful Saudi–American cooperation efforts: the jihad in Afghanistan 
against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the Gulf War in 1990–91. Since then, the 
Saudi–American relationship had been conducted far from the public gaze; however, 
after 9/11, the American public “wanted to know how a country that had been so close to 
the United States, which American forces had gone to defend just a decade earlier, had 
produced both the mastermind of the attacks and most of the perpetrators.”277 
The immediate response to the 9/11 attacks by the Saudi authorities was to deny any 
Saudi involvement, noting that bin Laden had been stripped of his citizenship and was no 
longer a Saudi national. However, the American media continued to focus on the role of 
Saudi Arabia in the attacks, and the Saudi leadership took a defensive position. The 
remarkable aspect of the incident was that “elites on both sides worked to tone down the 
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heated public rhetoric and maintain the relationship against its critics.”278 Indeed, the 
Saudi–American relationship remained strong, which is testament to how central it is to 
the security strategies of each country. In response to the media’s criticism of Saudi 
Arabia, the Bush administration stressed that all the GCC states had strongly condemned 
the 9/11 attacks, and that they had responded, to varying degrees, to US requests that they 
shut down financial networks used by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.279 The GCC 
states cooperated with the United States in the fields of intelligence, law enforcement and 
financial regulations.280 “Virtually all the Gulf states have instituted mechanisms to 
identify bank accounts of known or suspected terrorists or Islamic charities allegedly 
funding terrorist organisations, although they have been hesitant to freeze such 
accounts.”281 Moreover, several of the Gulf states have indulged in active cooperation by 
arresting, facilitating the arrest of, or combating members of alleged terrorist cells on 
their territories. “In particular, the UAE has provided information that led to a few major 
arrests of Al Qaeda operatives, according to several press reports. Saudi Arabia 
announced in November 2002 that it had incarcerated more than 100 Saudi nationals 
suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda.”282 
The 9/11 attacks in the United States added a new dimension to US relations with the 
Gulf states, beyond the need to contain longstanding threats from Iran or Iraq. After the 
attacks, the United States began pressing the Gulf states for their cooperation against Al 	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Qaeda activists and financial channels located in the Gulf states. The need for the United 
States to deal with all the security threats emanating from the Gulf gives the US a stake in 
the political stability of the Gulf regimes. However, tensions between the US and the 
GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, heightened over allegations that Gulf charities had 
“unknowingly” been contributing to or tolerating groups and institutions linked to Al 
Qaeda. “Many experts believe the Gulf states were tolerant of the presence of militants in 
order to avoid a backlash among citizens that agree with the militant’s anti-US, anti-
Western stances.”283 For example, the September 11 Commission report had stated that 
the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 plot, Khaled Shaykh Mohammed,284 was warned by 
Qatari officials in 1996 of a US indictment, and fled. Qatar also hosts an outspoken 
Islamic cleric, Shaykh Yusuf Al-Qardawi, who has openly stated that it is a religious duty 
for Muslims to fight US forces in the region (after the US invasion of Iraq). Despite his 
anti-US rhetoric, the Qatari authorities tolerate his presence in their country and further 
allow him to appear at panel discussions with senior Qatari officials. Several Saudi 
Arabian clerics, and even some Saudi government officials, have made similar statements 
that appear to blame the United States and its policy for Islamic terrorism against the 
US.285 Nevertheless, the GCC states continued to work with the US against Al Qaeda and 
its affiliate movements in the region which posed a threat to their domestic stability. In 
May 2003, a Western house complex in Riyadh was attacked by Islamic militants, killing 
23 people including nine Americans. More attacks occurred in the Kingdom, and 	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sporadic attacks also occurred in Kuwait; however, the GCC states were able to capture 
and eliminate the Islamist militias.286 
c. The US Invasion of Iraq and the GCC Response (2003) 
The US invasion of Iraq in April 2003 generated a new set of threats and challenges for 
the GCC states.287 In May 1993, the Clinton administration had declared a policy of “dual 
containment” of Iraq and Iran, where the policy was explained as an effort “to keep both 
Iran and Iraq strategically weak simultaneously, in contrast to past policies that sought to 
support either Iran or Iraq as a counterweight to the other.”288 The US pursued this policy 
in cooperation with the GCC states – the threats had made it highly dependent on a 
significant military presence in the Gulf. Meanwhile, Iraq’s failure to fully comply with 
UN Security Council resolutions289 preventing the rebuilding of its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) capabilities and prohibiting Iraq from importing any conventional 
weaponry since its invasion of Kuwait in 1991, sustained the strained relations it had with 
the US. In November 1998, the Clinton administration “publicly added a dimension to 
US policy that went beyond containment – promoting the change of the Iraqi regime – 
although the Clinton administration ruled out major US military action to achieve that 
goal”.290 
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In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration changed US 
policy toward Iraq from containment to regime change, as part of the overall “war on 
terrorism.”291 On January 29, 2002, President Bush addressed the American nation in a 
State of the Union speech, where he called Iraq part of an “axis of evil”, along with North 
Korea and Iran.292 He identified the key threat as Iraq’s potential to deliver WMD against 
the United States and its friends and allies, or to transfer WMD technology to terrorist 
groups.293 For the most part, the GCC states publicly indicated that they would only 
support a US attack on Iraq if such an action were authorised by the UN and had broad 
international support. After gathering a small contingent of international supporters, the 
US and allied forces launched Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003; 
subsequently, on April 9, the Saddam regime was ousted.294 “Two of the Gulf states, 
Kuwait and Qatar, were more openly supportive of the US position, and both hosted 
substantial buildups of US forces and equipment that were used in the offensive against 
Iraq.”295 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was the most vocally opposed to a US offensive 
against Iraq, even though the prospect of the overthrow of Saddam held out the 
possibility that the 6,000 US personnel that were based in the Kingdom, in anti-Iraq 
containment operations, would be able to depart. That redeployment happened after 
Saddam’s fall. 
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The ousting of Saddam generated a sense of relief among the Gulf states, but also 
apprehension for as long as a stable, moderate government is not in place in Iraq and 
attacks on US-led forces continue. In the final statement of the 26th GCC summit in Abu 
Dhabi in December 2005, the Gulf leaders expressed their concerns that the spillover 
from the Iraq war could be worse than they had anticipated.  Since the GCC states’ 
support to the US and allied forces in the invasion of Iraq, several Sunni Islamist 
insurgents have committed acts of retribution against the GCC governments, and 
attempted to attack US military stations in the Gulf states. 296 Furthermore, some Gulf 
states were concerned that the strategic weakness of post-war Iraq would embolden Iran 
to take a more active role in Gulf security and to seek to enlist the Gulf states in an Iran-
led Gulf security structure.297 American policy in Iraq had strengthened Iran’s regional 
role and placed Iranian allies in control of Iraqi politics. The GCC states thus worried 
about Tehran’s efforts to spread its influence throughout the Arab world and 
Washington’s unwitting assistance to Iranian ambitions. 298 
Meanwhile, GCC–US relations continued to be strengthened and GCC states’ facilities 
were made available for the US to operate militarily in Iraq; they have even facilitated 
operations in Afghanistan. In terms of GCC defence cooperation, after the Iraq war, in 
2006, the GCC PSF witnessed a significant operational change following a proposal by 
the Saudi monarchy. It proposed that the PSF should be transformed into a rapid 
deployment force (RDF), with troops based in their home countries but under a joint 
command. The idea was that the RDF would be able to immediately respond to any crisis 	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in the GCC member states following a request by the GCC member in question.299 This 
crucial alteration in the format of the GCC’s joint military force led to the unprecedented 
interference of the PSF in Bahrain in March 2011. 
IV. The GCC Monarchies and the Arab Spring (2011–2012) 
The Arab Spring demonstrations in the GCC states were perceived as extreme internal 
threats to the Gulf monarchies, mainly due to their consequences in terms of regime 
change in neighbouring Arab countries during 2011 and 2012. Of the six GCC states, the 
four most affected by the Arab Spring were Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait, demonstrations involved approximately 1% of the total 
citizen population; meanwhile, in Bahrain, the figure was around 40%.300 These numbers 
are relatively low in comparison to other demonstrations that occurred in the Arab region 
during the Arab Spring; however, this research asserts that the impact of these 
demonstrations speaks volumes in terms of the public perceptions of the Gulf leaderships.  
Regardless of the low participation in demonstrations, the high level of media attention 
that these events attracted, domestically and internationally, was considered an extreme 
threat to the legitimacy of these regimes (particularly due to the fact that neighbouring 
Arab dictators fell as a direct result of street demonstrations).   
The GCC leaderships’ response to the Arab Spring demonstrations was unprecedented 
in terms of the intensity of violence and the strengthening of unity among member states. 
More importantly, the threat of the Arab Spring demonstrations prompted the Gulf 
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leaders to include the GCC within their domestic affairs by strengthening GCC unity and 
fostering collective mechanisms in the preservation of their regimes. Each Gulf monarchy 
faced demonstrations with varying demands, and each Gulf leadership responded 
differently due to its particular political structures and governance. This section thus 
presents the various political and economic challenges in each state, which ultimately 
culminated in the demonstrations of the Arab Spring. As this research selected Kuwait as 
its case study, the following section will describe the events of the Arab Spring in each of 
the other GCC countries by way of comparative analysis. 
a. Bahrain 
Under Al-Khalifa rule, Bahrain gained its independence from Britain in 1971; the 
leadership proclaimed Bahrain a constitutional democracy as a result of public demand.301 
Domestic movements demanding greater political representation may be traced back to 
1938, when a group of activists from both the Shi’a and Sunni communities approached 
the Bahraini leadership and the British governor with a list of demands for wider political 
participation.302 The Bahraini constitution was approved on June 3, 1973, comprising 109 
Principles, and the Bahraini ruler ratified it in December of that year.303 It defines the 
country as an Arab Islamic State, governed by hereditary rulers, but also provides for the 
separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature.304 Bahrain’s first 
National Assembly was inaugurated in December of 1973; the council consisted of 30 	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members elected and 30 members appointed. Among the elected members, the majority 
were Shi’a candidates and those in opposition to government. Due to the alarming (anti-
government) results of the election, the parliament was dissolved in 1975. Bahrain has 
since witnessed secular, nationalist, and leftist movements inspired by the political, 
social, and economic conditions of each decade. 
Like its neighbours, Bahrain’s reform process has been driven by a combination of 
external and internal factors; external factors include the rulers’ response to pressures for 
reform by Western leaders. 305 After signing a defence pact with the US in 1991, Bahrain 
became a vital island in the stationing of the US navy; it is the headquarters of the fifteen 
vessels of the Fifth Fleet, entailing around 1,500 US personnel. 306 The Bahraini Emir’s 
relationship with the American government was thus strengthened, and substantially 
enhanced his domestic position. The alliance with the US provided the Emir with an 
added dimension of power, similar to how his predecessors had secured greater strength 
with every signed treaty or agreement with the British government. As a result, the gap 
between the Emir and the Bahraini people widened after 1991, leading to an increased 
level of violence and an intensifying of government repression.307 The mid-1990s 
witnessed a deprived economy and the political alienation of large parts of Bahrain’s 
society, which ultimately led to a series of violent riots and an aggressive government 
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responses.308 The strong US presence, along with the growing political and economic 
problems in Bahrain, prompted 300 leading professionals to petition the Emir, appealing 
for the restoration of the National Assembly in Bahrain, dissolved since 1975. The Emir 
responded to the petition by establishing a Consultative Council in December 1992, 
comprised of thirty appointed men for a period of four years. 309 
Another petition was drawn up in early 1994 when the country’s unemployment rates 
continued to soar, in particular in the Shi’a towns and villages where it reached an 
estimated 30% (whereas the national average was 15%).310 The Shi’a community leaders 
led the movement and supported calls for political reform and the reinstatement of the 
1973 Constitution and election of a new National Assembly. The Bahraini Shi’a have 
been marginalised from formal power structures and face institutional discrimination by 
the government. The government reacted harshly to their petition and arrested a young 
Shi’a cleric regarded as the leader of the movement. As crowds gathered in protest at the 
arrest, security police attacked the protestors with tear gas and rubber bullets, sparking a 
popular response throughout the country. By late 1994, several of the instigators of the 
movement had been either imprisoned or forced into exile, which led to further 
demonstrations demanding their release. This event prompted a long period of 
confrontation between Bahrain’s security police and Bahraini protestors.311 
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Demonstrations continued calling for the reinstatement of the Constitution and the 
National Assembly, the improvement of economic conditions, and for the release of 
prisoners who had been held for many months without charge or access to lawyers. The 
government responded to these demands by inflicting further aggression on 
demonstrators; in April 1995, riot police stormed the University of Bahrain to disperse 
200 students who had gathered to protest against the arrest, imprisonment, and enforced 
exile of many Bahrainis. By mid-1995, an understanding seemed to have been reached 
between the Shi’a community leaders and the government; however, it did not last long. 
The international community began to express their concerns about the events in Bahrain, 
in particular the massive arrests and absence of charges, the torture of detainees and 
capital punishment for political prisoners.312 In January 1996, Amnesty International 
urged the Bahraini government to release prisoners, to ensure that those charged had legal 
access, and to ban torture in prisons.313 
In 1999, the accession of the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Issa, led to a series of 
reform measures that had an immediate impact on the Bahraini political scene. He 
developed a dialogue with opposition leaders and made concessions that included the 
release of all political detainees, and he welcomed exiled Bahrainis back to their 
homeland. He further announced municipal council elections and pushed for the right of 
women to vote in them. His most significant step towards political reform was the 
appointment of a Supreme Committee to prepare a “National Action Charter” that would 	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amend the constitution and provide a general framework for constitutional, legislative, 
judicial, political, and economic reform, in November 2000.314 Two years later, on 
February 14, 2002, Sheikh Hamad announced in a televised speech that the “amended 
constitution” had been enacted. In the same speech, the Emir declared Bahrain a 
Kingdom, and proclaimed himself King.315 By this time, the enthusiasm for King Hamad 
that was apparent in his first two years of rule was beginning to diminish; furthermore, 
the amended constitution (or the “new constitution”) was presented to the people without 
any room for discussion or negotiation. 
Bahrain’s government opposition renders a wide spectrum of groups; distinctions 
reflect the Sunni–Shi’a divide, as well as a division between Islamic and liberal 
ideologies, and differences in the assessment of King Hamad and his policies. 
Discussions and heated debate revolved around a long list of specific grievances, among 
the most important of which involved the following: the National Charter, the new 
parliament, the security services, corruption and the role of the ruling family, and 
continued discrimination against the Bahraini Shi’a. Opposition groups argue that the 
National Charter is an ambiguous document which the Bahraini people had no choice but 
to accept: “their choice boiled down to either remaining in a situation of oppression or 
trying their chances with a badly drafted document.”316 They accused the government of 
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completed Charter at their first meeting. The members of the committee were expected to 
review and approve it, regardless of provisions stating that the King and the Charter were 
to be empowered above the Constitution. This led to the resignation of five members of 
the committee. The opposition, therefore, charged that the King completely altered the 
1973 Constitution without seeking the agreement or even the opinion of the people. 
Objections to the National Charter included the way in which it was enacted in an 
unconstitutional way and the fact that it completely changed the Constitution contrary to 
the rights of the people. “The King has used the charter as a way around the constitution 
in order to propose very limited amendments to his new “amended constitution” as it is 
officially termed.”317 
The National Charter also restricted the role and powers of parliament in comparison 
with the previous powers of the National Assembly under the 1973 constitution. The 
National Assembly initially consisted of 30 elected members and a maximum of 14 
government ministers; the number of elected members rose to 40 during its second 
legislative term. However, under the 2002 constitution, the new parliament consists of 40 
elected members as well as 40 members appointed by the government (replacing the 14 
government ministers). Thus, the number of elected and appointed members was made 
equal, with the President of the Consultative Council being given voting rights in case of 
a tie, providing a 51% majority for the appointed members. King Hamad had promised 
that the appointed Consultative Council would be purely consultative, while legislative 
functions would be reserved for the elected lower house. However, both bodies are 
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considered to be the legislative body; and any changes or amendments to the constitution 
would require a two-thirds majority of the combined houses.318 
Another major grievance aired by the opposition was the unconstrained role of the 
Bahraini security forces. Allegations of abuses during demonstrations remained 
unresolved, where no action was taken against any security official who committed 
crimes of torture. On the contrary, senior officers of the security forces had been 
rewarded. Furthermore, the security forces are monopolised by the Al-Khalifa family and 
their Sunni allies, who acquire command positions, while a high proportion of the lower 
ranks consists of non-Bahrainis. Corruption, and the role of the Bahraini ruling family, 
also represented a serious grievance by the opposition: the family remains above the law 
and reaps unfair economic benefits from the system. “Tales abound of the top members 
of the family taking over nearby islands as their personal estates, owning hotels, shopping 
malls and office buildings.” 319 Furthermore, an increase in family members in 
government positions was noted in 2007, where 14 out of the 26 ministers were from the 
ruling family. Finally, continued discrimination against the Bahraini Shi’a by the royal 
family is a central opposition grievance. Many Shi’a have pointed out that there has not 
been much done to improve their inferior social and economic positions. Sitra, the third 
largest island in Bahrain, whose population is predominantly low-income Shi’a, had 
endured the most arrests during demonstrations. The Shi’a form between 60% and 70% 
of the total Bahraini population320, yet only 10% of the top government officials are Shi’a. 	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Furthermore, while many Bahraini Sunnis support the demands of the Shi’a, they are said 
to have been threatened by the regime to keep quiet in order to save their jobs or business 
prospects. “Indeed, it is held that the government actively encourages sectarian conflict 
for its own purposes by persuading Sunnis that the Shi’as threaten them and the 
system.”321 
The Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, a prime Shi’a government opposition group, 
achieved a major victory in the first municipal election in 2002. In fact, “… it has in 
effect been the leading force in a cluster of opposition groups in the country and its 
actions have had a critical impact on the process of reforms in Bahrain.”322 As it won the 
majority of seats in the municipal elections, when it came to the more important 2002 
parliamentary election, it chose to boycott due to the provisions in the new constitution 
that expanded the role of the appointed Shura Council. The elections were held in 
October 2002, when the absence of Al-Wefaq was accentuated by the increase in the 
number of seats taken by Sunni Islamic candidates. Sunni Islamists won 20 seats, the 
Shi’a independents won a total of 13, and the rest went to independent Sunni candidates. 
Nevertheless, the new parliament that was created in the wake of the 2002 constitutional 
amendments lacked many essential features of an autonomous institution. It was therefore 
a key setback in Bahrain’s political reform process, and prompted relations to further 
deteriorate between the government and the opposition.323 
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In March 2004, four of Bahrain’s opposition groups (Al-Wefaq Society, the National 
Democratic Action Society, the Nationalist Assembly, and the Islamic Action Society) 
sought to collect signatures to urge the King to annul the 2002 constitutional 
amendments. The amendments had awarded the appointed Shura Council the same 
legislative powers as the elected Council of Representatives, resulting in claims of a weak 
parliament. The Bahraini Royal Court advised against organising the petition; however, 
the opposition groups went ahead and started to collect signatures. This led to the arrest 
of 19 opposition figures on the charge of “advocating changes to Bahrain’s political 
system by illegal means, encouraging hatred of the state and distributing false news and 
rumours”. 324 This action marked the first political arrests made during King Hamad’s 
reign. 
In September 2004, the Bahraini government arrested Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja, the 
former executive director of the banned Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, and disbanded 
the organisation after al-Khawaja publicly blamed the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa Al-
Khalifa, for the country’s economic problems and human rights abuses. The arrest 
prompted further demonstrations that exerted pressure on the regime to release al-
Khawaja following a royal pardon in November 2004. However, demonstrations 
continued in March 2005, where around 80,000 demonstrators marched on the streets of 
Sitra. The demonstration was in response to Al-Wefaq’s call urging constitutional 
reforms in defiance of a government ban on demonstrations.325 Four years after 
boycotting the new general elections, the opposition decided to change its strategy and try 
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to work within the system. In the November 2006 parliamentary election, Al-Wefaq 
gained most of the seats it contested, giving them 17 seats. The King appointed the new 
upper house, selecting mostly liberals to offset the victory of religious conservatives in 
the lower house. A new government was formed in December 2006, with Sheikh 
Khalifah bin Salman Al-Khalifa reappointed as Prime Minister; and for the first time in 
Bahrain’s history, one of his three deputy Prime Ministers was a Shi’a, and another Shi’a 
was named Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.326 Despite the continuing political crisis, 
where the government failed to address the core issues of representation and allocation of 
power in the new constitutional monarchy, the government managed to hold its third 
parliamentary election, in October 2010. However, the 2010 parliament faced further 
disruptions; demonstrations broke out before the first session, leading to police brutality 
and mass arrests. Any sort of political dialogue has been discredited due to the 
government’s brutality against the opposition. “The government’s efforts to launch a 
national dialogue over the summer of 2011 with the opposition stalled in the aftermath of 
state brutality against Shi’a neighbourhoods and wholesale arrests of members of the 
opposition.” 327 
Overall, the promise of political, economic, and social reform at the turn of the century 
had been delayed as the Bahraini government failed to address its citizens’ grievances.328 
By the mid-2000s, it was clear that the future of political and economic reform depended 
as much on the support the ruler received from the conservative forces within the regime, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Parolin (2011), 21. 
327 Ehteshami (2013), 145. 
328 Bassiouni (2011). 
 131 
as from the demands being made by the opposition. Sectarian tensions were apparent 
while the government’s unwillingness to relinquish parliamentary power to the majority 
curtailed the prospect of reform. By the time of the Arab Spring demonstrations, it was 
evident that there was no easy balance between the opposition and the regime in 
Bahrain.329 
The roots of the Arab Spring in Bahrain can therefore be traced back to the accession 
of King Hamad Al-Khalifa in 1999. He had offered a programme of reforms in an 
attempt to move away from Bahrain’s authoritarian tradition; however, the lack of 
implementation of many of the reforms had added to the growing dissent.330 
Dissatisfaction with the pace of reforms carried over to the 2010 parliamentary elections, 
with calls by the opposition to boycott elections. Inspired by the events of the Arab 
Spring in the region, a Facebook page called “February 14th Revolution in Bahrain” was 
established and called for mass protests throughout Bahrain to commemorate the 10th 
anniversary of the National Action Charter. The page rapidly gained popularity with 
several thousands of people joining. Furthermore, a youth group emerged calling itself 
the “Youth of the February 14th Revolution” and issued a statement outlining their 
demands; they claimed to be unaffiliated with any political organisation or any religious, 
sectarian, or ideological base for their demands. They also underlined their intention to 
organise peaceful demonstrations. Political movements such as Haq, the Bahrain Islamic 
Freedom Movement, and Wa’ad began supporting the planned demonstrations. 
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On February 14th, 2011, (the ‘Day of Rage’) peaceful demonstrations erupted 
throughout Bahrain. Protests varied in size and political orientation; the number of people 
participating in the demonstrations was estimated to be over 6,000. Demand slogans 
varied, with some calling for political reform and others for socio-economic change. 
Political reforms focused on constitutional reform and the removal of the Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, who has held his position since 1971.331 
The demands expressed during the earlier demonstrations related mainly to 
political and constitutional reform, which was to pave the way for greater 
popular participation in governance, equal access to socio-economic 
opportunities and development, action against corruption, and termination of the 
alleged practice of political naturalization. These demands were supported 
across the board, and did not reflect sectarian or ethnic characteristics.332 
The Bahraini government was aware of the planned demonstrations and began 
dispatching police patrol cars around the capital to attempt to disperse them. Clashes 
occurred between demonstrators and police that eventually led to the use of tear gas and 
rubber bullets, and the death of a couple of demonstrators due to police brutality led to 
larger crowds of mourners. 
Over the next three weeks, more opposition groups, including the largest Shi’a 
opposition group, Al-Wefaq, joined the demonstrations. As the movement expanded, the 
demonstrators displayed sharp differences in their agendas; opposition groups Haq and 
al-Wafa were putting forward new sets of demands that called for the outright end of the 	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Al-Khalifa monarchy and its replacement with a republican system.333 Meanwhile Al-
Wefaq presented limited demands that mainly called for a real constitutional monarchy in 
which the Prime Minister would be chosen by the parliamentary majority.334 Clashes 
intensified when demonstrators began to march around the capital of Manama demanding 
the end of the Al-Khalifa monarchy. The government initially responded with force, 
opening fire on demonstrators and allowing “pro-regime thugs” to attack them.335 
However, due to Western pressure, the Bahraini government allowed peaceful protests to 
continue. Behind-the-scenes discussions began to take place, where demonstrators 
continued their protest in a relatively peaceful atmosphere. However, the government and 
the opposition failed to yield in the sense of moving towards a meaningful course of 
action. According to a political analyst: “This apparent stalemate, coupled with 
increasingly provocative protestor tactics and Riyadh’s view that protecting the regime 
was a red line, likely triggered the intervention of Bahrain’s partners.”336 
At the request of the Bahraini government, on March 14, 2011 the GCC Peninsula 
Shield Force entered Bahrain. The force consisted of an estimated 1,200 Saudi troops 
accompanied by an estimated 500 Emirati police, along with a few Qatari troops.337 While 
dozens of tanks and over a hundred army trucks entered Manama, King Hamad 
announced a three-month “state of national safety”, stipulating a partial curfew, a ban on 
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demonstrations and broad powers for the military.338 The “state of national safety” is in 
accordance with the Bahraini constitution, which seeks to cover all areas of Bahrain, 
mandating the Bahraini Defense Force (BDF), public security forces, National Guard and 
any other forces as necessary, measures and procedures to preserve the safety of the 
nation and its people.339 Regardless of the King’s decree, demonstrations continued in the 
following weeks, and the government began a definitive crackdown on demonstrators 
leading to a death toll of at least 45 individuals since February 2011, along with 
thousands of arrests.340 According to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
(BICI), at least five people were reported dead as a result of torture in the custody of the 
Bahraini government. 341 
On March 16, 2011, security forces stormed the Pearl Roundabout, the centre point of 
the demonstrations, and forcibly evicted protestors. The government then began to launch 
“a clearly planned and orchestrated crackdown on the Shi’a political and community 
leaders and activists who had been prominent in leading the protests …”342 The Bahraini 
ruling elite targeted the Shi’a in order to stir up sectarian tensions within the country, and 
delegitimise the demonstrators’ calls for political reform. Although the majority of the 
protestors were Shi’a, the demonstrations did not initially have a sectarian agenda. 
Rather, they were driven by demands for political and democratic reform and calls to 
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solve the dispute over the place and powers of Bahrain’s weak bicameral parliamentary 
system.343 However, by focusing on the Shi’a demonstrators, the government was creating 
a sectarian dichotomy and “playing a classic divide and rule card by hindering the 
emergence of a unifying cross-sectarian opposition group”.344 With the support of the 
Saudi monarchy, the Bahraini leadership went further in accusing the Shi’a demonstrators 
of being Iranian “loyalists”. By associating Iranian influence with the protestors’ 
demands and intentions, the Bahraini government (in accordance with the Saudi 
leadership) enabled the Sunni Muslim regimes in the Gulf region to delegitimise demands 
for political reform by fusing the issues of Shi’a loyalties and Iranian influence onto “one 
amorphous threat”. 345 Police checkpoints were set up at the entry and exit point of Shi’a 
villages and towns, and hundreds of Shi’a were arrested. The government also began 
demolishing dozens of Shi’a mosques, deeming them illegal and claiming that they were 
used as staging points for attacks against police forces and for the manufacture and 
storage of weapons. In its attempts to associate pro-reform demonstrations with sectarian 
strife, any form of anti-government protests thus became labelled ‘unpatriotic’. 346 
This research asserts that, as with Kuwait, the subject of the case study, the Bahraini 
Arab Spring came out of the country’s existing political and economic atmosphere and 
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the fragile position of the Al-Khalifa ruling family. It points to the struggle between the 
government and the opposition, and mostly the overwhelming disappointment over the 
King’s failed promises of reform. The Bahraini experience corroborates this research’s 
hypothesis in claiming that the Gulf leaders utilised the GCC as a vehicle for regime 
preservation, applying similar tactics to survive the Arab Spring. The Bahraini monarchy 
utilised all three tactics under the broad GCC strategy for regime preservation: enhancing 
its legitimacy, heightening its internal security, and collaborating in a defence scheme. 
During a GCC ministerial meeting held in Riyadh on March 10, 2011, the GCC alliance 
pledged USD 20 billion to both Bahrain and Oman. The financial plan was arranged to 
support the Bahraini and Omani populations by creating job opportunities for the 
unemployed and improving overall living conditions.347 By accepting the GCC’s $10 
billion in financial assistance, the Bahraini monarchy attempted to enhance its legitimacy 
by providing its citizens with financial incentives to prevent further dissent. The Bahraini 
monarchy also heightened its internal security by utilising police violence on peaceful 
protestors. And finally, it collaborated in a defence scheme by requesting the PSF to enter 
its capital, Manama, in order to quell the demonstrations. 
This research further argues that the Bahraini uprisings represent deeper grievances, 
mostly experienced by the Shi’a majority of the Bahraini population who had suffered 
repression and discrimination despite the promise of democratic reform by the Bahraini 
leadership ten years before. The sectarian divide within the Bahraini population was a 
key tool that was utilised by the Bahraini and Saudi leaderships; in aggravating sectarian 
tensions, the aim was to deflect demands for political reform and discredit the opposition. 	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The intensity of the Bahraini demonstrations during the Arab Spring had prompted the 
Saudi Arabian monarchy to propose the Riyadh Declaration in December 2011, where it 
suggested a closer GCC union as an attempt to secure the GCC regimes. Overall, the 
deployment of the Saudi-led GCC force into Bahrain speaks volumes on regime 
perseverance in the Gulf region, where the combination of financial compensation, 
repressive forces and regional alliances represent the main tactics utilised by the Gulf 
monarchies in sustaining their autocratic rule over their respective populations. 
b. Oman 
 Sultan Qabus Al Bu Sa’id rules Oman as an absolute monarch. With the support of the 
British in 1970, he had orchestrated a coup d’état, overthrowing his father, the reigning 
Sultan, Sai’d ibn Taymur. 348  Although oil exports began in 1964, Sultan Sa’id had 
refused to change his conservative policies. The country seriously lacked social and 
economic development; towards the end of his reign, there were only three schools in the 
country and a few miles of paved roads.349 Due to the Sultan’s strict isolationism, the 
British supported a coup d’état by his son, Qabus, in 1970. The first pressing issue that 
faced the new Sultan was the expanding rebellion in the province of Dhofar. The 
rebellion had begun in 1964 as a popular protest against Sultan Sa’id and his autocratic 
and neglectful rule; however, at the end of the 1960s, Marxist groups overtook the 
leadership of the protest and expanded the scope of the movement to include anti-
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monarchical and anti-imperial goals. The Dhofar rebellion became the home base for 
Marxist forces throughout the Gulf region; China and the Soviet Union provided 
assistance to the rebels, while South Yemen offered sanctuary to those who fled the 
Sultan’s forces. Sultan Qabus received assistance from neighbouring monarchs, including 
the Shah of Iran and the King of Jordan, who both sent contingents of troops to help 
contain the spread of Marxism.350 In the midst of the rebellion, Sultan Qabus directed 
large sums of development funds to projects in the Dhofar province; his reconciliation 
policy succeeded in defusing the rebellion, and in 1976, a combined force of Iranian and 
Omani troops defeated the rebel forces and reestablished the Sultan’s rule. 
After disposing of the insurgency, the new Sultan was able to begin the transformation 
of his nation; he was faced with a country that was plagued by disease, illiteracy and 
poverty. He had also inherited an old and autocratic-patriarchal political system where 
the sultan holds all the power. The people would come directly to the sultan for advice, 
demands and requests. The existing structure of government was minimal and ill-
equipped. The previous sultan’s deliberate policy against formal education had prompted 
most of the educated Omanis to work outside the country.  “The country lacked nearly all 
infrastructure, including a modern port, roads, schools, electricity outside the capital area, 
and even office space for the government.”351 One of the Sultan’s first measures was to 
abolish the old political system and replace it with a modern government structure and 
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develop the country’s resources.352 He thus began the transformation of his nation with 
the launch of an extensive infrastructure development programme. “Schools and 
highways were quickly constructed, and the capital city, Muscat, underwent a rapid 
change in appearance.”353 The development programme also aimed at upgrading health 
and educational facilities around the country. In his first speech to his nation in August 
1970, the Sultan launched his vision for the country and emphasised the importance of 
his people’s well-being. As part of his method of administrating the country, the Sultan 
initiated an annual meet-the-people tour around the country, where he would visit every 
corner of the country and be accompanied by government ministers and advisors. The 
philosophy behind the tour was that the government should not be alienated from the 
ordinary citizen.354 Within a decade of assuming power, Qabus was able to raise the 
standard of living of his population and generated widespread support for his rule. 
As Sultan Qabus maintained his rule as an absolute monarch, a political system slowly 
began to develop. Oman had neither a constitution nor a legislature; the Sultan himself 
served as the Prime Minister, while members of his family headed the ministries. It was 
not until 1981 that initial steps toward political participation were taken; Sultan Qabus 
issued a decree for the establishment of a Consultative Council, consisting of 45 
members, including the 17 members of government. The Council was to convene four 
times a year, and its powers were limited to discussion of public policies and 
recommendations to the government. Ten years later, in November 1991, the Sultan 	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replaced the Council with a Consultative Assembly, Majlis al-Shura, as a way to broaden 
the process of public political participation in government. The Assembly consisted of 59 
“elected” members (final selection is made by the Sultan) and has minimal legislative 
powers; it mainly serves as a channel of information between the people and the 
government ministries. It is permitted to provide recommendations on drafts of economic 
and social legislation prepared by the ministries; however, it does not have any authority 
in the areas of foreign affairs, defence, security, and finance.355 In 1994 , the Majlis 
expanded the number of its seats to 79 and in 1998, it was further expanded to 89 due to 
Oman’s population increase between the years 1994 and 1997.356 
In November 1996, Sultan Qabus issued a royal decree setting out the Basic Law of 
the state. This was seen as the first written expression of constitutional law in the 
country’s history, providing the legal framework for the development and 
implementation of all legislation and government policy.357 It became the basis for all 
legal decisions in the country and the ultimate point of reference for judicial authority.  
The Basic Law guarantees various rights for citizens within the framework of Shari’a and 
customary law; it also provides rules for the royal succession. The Basic Law provides for 
a Council to be formed, called the Majlis Oman, which comprises members of the elected 
Consultative Assembly and the appointed Majlis al-Dowla, and an independent judiciary.  
The main purpose of this Majlis is to determine the basic structural organisation of the 
political administration in the country; it is not intended as a democratic institution that 
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represents the will of the people. Instead, it provides a forum for the exchange of views 
and for mediation between government and people. 358 Several amendments were made to 
Article 9 of the Law, where it states that the Council is to acquire some legislative powers 
in the social and economic fields, and the right to question members of the government. 
However, despite these significant amendments, Omani political participation has 
remained minimal.359 
Sultan Qabus remains the prominent authoritative figure in all decisions concerning 
the country. Nevertheless, his efforts in developing and modernising the nation, in 
comparison to the isolationist views of his father, have greatly impacted his popularity 
among the population. History plays an important role in the preservation of a monarchy, 
and the promulgation of social and economic development has empowered the Sultan to 
perpetuate his rule of governance for the past four decades. However, as this research will 
soon discuss, the new era of the Arab Spring in 2011 has brought out an inclination in the 
Arab world towards meeting demands for public participation in governance, regardless 
of the popularity of a monarch. 
Influenced by the Arab Spring in the region, Oman experienced a set of early 
demonstrations in the port city of Sohar, northwest of its capital, Muscat. Beginning with 
a small-scale demonstration on January 17, 2011, just days after the Tunisian President 
Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, an estimated 200 Omanis protested against the rising price 
of basic goods, government corruption, and low wages. The protest was organised 
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through social media, and included a protest by a number of teachers who staged a sit-in 
outside the Ministry of Education, demanding fair wages and a syndicate of teachers.360  
Sporadic protests quickly spread across the country, leading to the first of a series of 
so-called Green Marches.361 The first and second Green Marches were organised by 
Omani youth in Muscat, through the use of Facebook and other internet forums. The 
Omani activists were calling for social, economic and political reform; and were basically 
prompting the Sultan to restart a neglected political reform process.  Demands included 
an elected Prime Minister and Parliament, the end of corruption, new cabinet ministers, 
and more economic opportunities for college graduates and the youth.362  
In late February 2011, a sit-in was organised in the town of Sohar by young and 
unemployed people from neighbouring cities at the local branch of the Ministry of 
Manpower. Skirmishes with the Sohar police led to mass arrests and the death of one 
protestor.363 The news quickly spread across the country, and from then on Sohar’s Globe 
Roundabout, renamed ‘Reform Square’, became a gathering place for protestors.  Further 
demonstrations sprouted across the country, demanding more job opportunities and 
measures to curb rising prices and inequalities, along with an end to corruption, the 
promulgation of a constitution to replace the Basic Law, the guarantee of a separation of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and above all, the appointment of a prime 
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minister. Meanwhile, accounts of harassment by security forces and violations of basic 
human rights were exposed on the Internet.364 On April 22, 2011, Oman faced its biggest 
pro-reform demonstrations, in the southern port city of Salalah.365 Around 1,000 
protestors demanded political reform and regime accountability, referring to the 
corruption of former ministers within the government.366 
The government’s response to these protests was violent; police were sent in, leading 
to the death of at least two protestors.367 At the same time, Sultan Qabus conceded to a 
petition that was handed to him outlining the protestors’ demands for civil and political 
rights and making calls against government corruption. The Sultan responded by firing 
several cabinet ministers who were accused of corruption, raising the minimum salary of 
Omani citizens by 25%, and promising the creation of some 90,000 jobs in the public 
sector. He also promised the acceleration of the process of ‘Omanization’, which aims to 
ﬁll positions occupied by expatriates with Omani citizens.368  
Overall, the protests appeared to be triggered by heightened economic and political 
expectations rather than a radical discontent with the regime. The demands revolved 
around additional reforms, such as higher salaries, by the Sultan rather than around 
revolutionary change.369 The demonstrations eventually subsided due to the gradual 	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political and economic reform efforts put in train by the Sultan, the positive image he 
holds among Omanis and the moderate use of repression by the police force. According 
to news sources, Sultan Qabus made a decision to pardon 234 protestors detained over 
the course of the Omani demonstrations.370 On October 15, 2011, the government held 
scheduled elections for the lower house of the country’s legislative body, generating a 
high turnout by the Omani population.371 With more positive changes, the Sultan further 
assured the Omani people freedom of speech and formally asked the government to fight 
corruption with the full force of the law.372 
The demonstrations in Oman certainly raised concerns among the members of the 
GCC. Unlike to the Bahraini monarchy, the Sultan of Oman was able to handle the 
country’s unrest without calling for the assistance of the GCC Peninsula Force to quell 
the protests. However, the Sultan did accept the USD 10 billion financial package offered 
by the GCC to Oman as an opportunity to create employment and improve the overall 
living conditions of the Omani population.373 To further ensure a GCC role in any future 
protest that would take place in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia advanced a plan for political unity 
among the Gulf States in the Riyadh Declaration. However, the plan to move the GCC 
‘from a phase of cooperation to a phase of union within a single entity’ was not fully 
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supported by other GCC leaders, as they were wary of surrendering their sovereignty. 
Oman was perhaps the most vocal in opposing this Saudi plan.374 
The Omani experience in the Arab Spring in 2011 has its similarities and differences 
with other GCC states, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. First, as the main purpose of 
the Omani demonstrations was to protest against economic and political conditions, the 
people were not demanding complete regime change. After ousting his father in 1970, the 
Sultan had brought remarkable prosperity and modernised the country’s infrastructure. In 
fact, according to a 2010 United Nations Development Programme  report that examined 
the overall progress made in 135 countries over the past 40 years, Oman ranks first in 
health, education, and income.375 Nevertheless, since 2009, young Omanis have begun to 
push for more political change, the rule of law, freedom of speech and new institutions.376 
Second, there was a mix of violence and concessions in response to the Arab Spring 
demonstrations. Violence did occur, with a death toll of two protestors and more than a 
hundred individuals arrested.377 However, several peaceful demonstrations took place in 
Oman, a marked distinction from how the Bahrain ruling elite was violently reacting to 
its demonstrators at the time.378 Moreover, Sultan Qabus quickly recognised that the 
promise of reform was a better and more pragmatic solution.379 
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On October 15, 2011, seven months after Omanis took to the streets to demonstrate for 
reform, Oman held scheduled elections for the Majlis al-Shura, the consultative 
council.380 Voter turnout was 77%,381 and a record of 1,113 candidates ran for the 84 seats 
at the council.382 The Sultan had promised to expand the powers of the Majlis, evolving it 
into a proper legislature. However, many Omanis did not perceive the elections “as a 
vehicle to bring the change they were seeking, either because of distrust of the candidates 
or scepticism about the assembly’s ability to wield influence in a system dominated by 
Sultan Qabus”.383 Referring to the election, a businessman in Muscat stated: “I think it has 
a fifty percent chance to bring change. There is hope. But most [economic and political] 
development comes from the government and His Majesty. He has more knowledge.” 384 
Even though the Sultan took steps towards reform by creating jobs and firing corrupt 
ministers, Omanis were sceptical as to the implementation of further political reforms. 
According a social policy specialist at Oman’s Sultan Qabus University: “These moves 
were aimed at calming the situation. They wanted to prevent bigger protests [from 
developing].” 385 
A final feature of the Arab Spring in Oman relates to its special relationship with Iran. 
Sultan Qabus is the only Gulf leader, in fact, who has a strong relationship with Iran; 
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strategic alliance with Iran while aligning himself with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).”386 Unlike its neighbours, Oman is not wary of an Iranian threat; according to 
some political analysts, its Shi’a community is not susceptible to Iranian influence.387 
Although this research does not adhere to the theory that Iran has instigated any of the 
demonstrations in the Gulf states during the Arab Spring, it does assert a degree of 
Iranian influence on the Bahraini demonstrations through Iranian media outlets. Oman, 
on the other hand, has the advantage of there being no threat of Iranian influence on its 
population. 
Overall, the Omani leadership did use similar tactics too other GCC states in 
suppressing street demonstrations during the Arab Spring. This research highlights its 
utilisation of three tactics under the GCC strategy for regime preservation: first, the 
Omani leadership attempted to enhance its legitimacy through the distribution of 
financial incentives. The private sector minimum wage for citizens was increased by 43% 
in mid-February 2011. 388 The Omani government further introduced a monthly allowance 
of about $390 for job seekers, created new jobs for citizens in the public sector, doubled 
the monthly social security allowance for eligible families in need and increased student 
allowances. The Omani government also utilised the tactic of heightening its internal 
security in its deployment of police to suppress peaceful demonstrations, leading to at 
least three deaths of protestors. It attempted to discredit its opposition, where “the 
repeated labelling of the protesters as scum and vandals by senior official and national 
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media showed the regime’s inability to accept the legitimacy of those who were 
expressing alternative opinions without accusing them of breaching the public order.” 389 
Lastly, the Omani government collaborated in a defence scheme when it signed and 
ratified the GCC Internal Security Agreement in November 2012. Although Oman 
rejected Saudi Arabia’s plan to upgrade the GCC into a union of the six states,390 it did 
not refrain from ratifying the GCC internal security pact aimed at strengthening mutual 
cooperation in security matters. 
Furthermore, Oman registered a 51% increase in defence spending in 2012, where its 
defence and national security forces absorbed 36.5% of the state’s expenditure in 2012.391 
Hence, although the Omani government did not apply extreme measures like the Bahraini 
regime, it did take a harsh approach in Sohar, where this research asserts that the death of 
the three protestors should not be taken lightly. Further strengthening its defence and 
security on an individual and collective GCC level implies that the Sultanate will go 
further down the extreme line in preserving its regime. Like its fellow GCC neighbour, 
Kuwait, Oman has had a history of ensuring an individual approach (with no GCC 
interference) when it comes to its domestic policies. However, just like in Kuwait, the 
Arab Spring has brought the threat of regime change and led the Omani leadership to 
preserve its regime in both an independent and a collective GCC capacity. 
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c. Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Arabian political system is based on a fusion of tribal and state institutions.392 
Under Al-Saud family rule, the political system has changed remarkably little since 1902, 
where Ibn Saud and his successor sons have established a traditional autocracy. In 1954, 
the Saudi Kingdom established a Council of Ministers that is presided over by the King; 
the King and the Council of Ministers were to be the ultimate source of legislative, 
executive and judicial power in Saudi Arabia. In 1958, regulations were made to 
consolidate the authority of the Council of Ministers. However, it was not until March 
1980 that a Constitutional Committee was entrusted to draft a formal constitution.393 The 
sons of Ibn Saud continue to rule the Kingdom; each son brought certain reforms during 
their leaderships in the context of different circumstances pertaining in the Kingdom. In 
1962, King Faisal introduced his Ten-Point Program aimed at demonstrating his 
commitment to political reform. Its pledges included freedom of speech within the 
framework of the Islamic faith and general law and order; improved healthcare, education 
and social services; economic reform; and the complete abolition of slavery.394 One of the 
most important elements of his planned reforms was the creation of a ‘Basic Law’ or 
constitution and the creation of a Consultative Assembly, an independent judiciary. 
However, Faisal’s proposal did not pass into law and gradually disappeared from public 
awareness. 
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Nevertheless, during his reign, King Faisal engaged in an aggressive state-building 
programme, instituting an expansive welfare system that guaranteed free health insurance 
and education for all Saudi citizens. He also instigated massive national projects aimed at 
building the nation’s infrastructure: airports, roads, power stations and communication 
networks. Despite the modernisation efforts, the status of women was still bound by tribal 
laws. King Faisal’s path towards reform and modernisation, like many Saudi kings after 
him, came up against the conservative ulema, or Islamic clerics. During his reign, he 
established the Ministry of Justice, where the ulema were appointed to the ministry and 
became state officials; this gave Faisal the power to hire and dismiss the religious 
authorities whose permission was required for his reforms. He ultimately hired the most 
liberal and removed those most resistant to change.395 Further political reforms were 
attempted under the reign of his brother, King Fahad, in 1982; however, hopes for reform 
were crushed, as the early 1980s brought the ascension of the religiously strict 
Mujahedeen and the downward movement of the Saudi economy.396 It was not until the 
1990s, after the Gulf War, that minimal reforms were introduced. 
Saudi Arabia experienced its first Arab Spring demonstrations in late January 2011, 
influenced by the uprising in Tunis and triggered by a devastating flood in its second 
largest city, Jeddah. Demonstrators in Jeddah staged a rally protesting against the city’s 
poor infrastructure; after dozens were arrested, the Saudi government vowed to improve 
things.397 In February and early March 2011, the protests spread to cities across the 
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Kingdom, including its capital, Riyadh and its Eastern Province. The demonstrators were 
making various demands that included the release of political prisoners, labour rights and 
women’s suffrage. According to Human Rights Watch, Saudi police arrested more than 
160 protestors; one particular Saudi citizen, Khaled al-Johani, was arrested for allegedly 
calling for freedoms and democracy in Saudi Arabia during a protest in Jeddah.398 Local 
non-profit organisations, such as the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association and the 
Saudi Human Rights First Society, also took part in the protests. Saudi women organised 
a suffrage campaign called “Baladi” through the social network, Facebook, pointing out 
that Saudi law stipulates women’s electoral rights, yet, the government bans their 
participation.399 Also included was a women’s right to drive campaign, where a Saudi 
woman, Manal al-Sharif, posted a ‘YouTube’ video of herself driving that led to her 
detainment by the Kingdom’s religious police.400 
The highest number of casualties due to police force, however, occurred in the Shi’a-
dominated Eastern Province. Viewed by the government as the most controversial, the 
Shi’a protestors called for the release of all political prisoners, freedom of expression and 
assembly and an end to economic and religious discrimination against the Eastern 
region.401 Demonstrators’ chants also included calling for the downfall of the Al-Saud 
monarchy.402 As the organisers of the demonstrations insisted on the use of non-violent 
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resistance against police force, many demonstrators were shot dead or arrested,  and 
numerous accounts of police brutality and torture were reported. 403 A cycle thus began, 
where funerals of dead protestors led to more protests, and protests led to more arrests 
and police violence. 
As a tactic in regime preservation, the Saudi King announced a plan to distribute a 
financial package to all citizens on February 23, 2011. King Abdulla declared funding to 
offset high inflation, granting salaries for the young unemployed, higher wages for 
students studying abroad, as well as cancelling some citizen loans. Moreover, Saudi 
employees received a 15% increase in their wages, and additional cash for housing loans. 
The overall Saudi welfare package introduced by the King is worth $10.7 billion;404 
exceeding the cost of every national budget prior to 2007.405 This research identifies the 
Saudi government’s financial package as the most conspicuous of its answers for 
restraining Saudi citizens from demanding reforms. The government’s commitment to its 
citizens has been deemed unsustainable in terms of future funding; allowing such a drain 
highlights the drastic measures that the Saudi leadership is willing to adopt in order to 
preserve its regime. The drawback to this welfare package lies in the uncertainty that the 
good economic environment of the past years will continue; the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has forecast Saudi’s GDP growth to decrease by almost half from 2011 to 
2012. Furthermore, the collective GCC financial assistance pledge to Bahrain and Oman 
will add to the future budgetary burden of the Kingdom. Therefore, maintaining an 	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upward curve on the government’s commitments to its citizens is a key challenge for the 
Saudi leadership in the long run.406 
The Saudi government’s attempts to placate its population by financial incentives did 
not appear to be enough to ensure loyalty to the King. Alongside such generous benefits 
lay a form of conditional demands: in March of that year, the Grand Mufti, head of the 
Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars, issued an anti-protest fatwa. The fatwa warned 
citizens against internal dissent, and declared that reform measures will be dictated by the 
royal and clerical powers, and not by the people.407 The fatwa came along conveniently 
after the King announced the benefit plans – a clear manoeuvre to obstruct rather than 
delay any form of political and social demands by its citizens. With the announcement of 
the financial packages and, thereafter, the fatwa, certain tensions were alleviated. 
However, demonstrations throughout the Kingdom continued to manifest, indicating the 
difficulty in financially appeasing a country consisting of 16 million nationals afflicted by 
a lack of political, social, and economic, and human rights. 
In further attempts to prevent street demonstrations, the Saudi authorities began the 
process of creating a new anti-terror law which, according to Amnesty International, 
“threatens to exacerbate an already dire situation for freedom of expression, in which any 
real or perceived dissent is almost instantly suppressed”. 408 The law would legalise a 
number of abusive practices, including arbitrary detention. Several human rights groups 
described the draft anti-terror law as setting out to “strangle peaceful dissent” and detain 
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people “potentially indefinitely” without charge or a trial.409 Activists say thousands of 
people are being held in Saudi prisons without charge or access to lawyers, despite a law 
that limits detention without trial to six months. The draft law would largely formalise 
such practices.410 Consequently, Saudi authorities have announced their revision of the 
law, making it less severe.411 
 Nevertheless, the Saudi monarchy’s repressive reaction towards demonstrations 
during the Arab Spring indicates that the monarch will not tolerate internal dissent, and 
will do everything in his power to keep control of citizens. The Al-Saud monarchy has 
historically allied itself with the Wahhabi religious group, allowing them to control the 
religious and social elements of the country. Some Saudi citizens believed in King 
Abdulla’s willingness for reform, and criticised the Saudi Wahhabi authorities for 
preventing such reforms to happen. Moreover, as the King warned against national 
disunity, the actions of the police and the deaths of many protestors have spurred 
sectarian tensions. The Saudi Shi’a have long felt discriminated against by the monarchy; 
the Saudi authorities responded harshly to their demonstrations in the Eastern Province, 
and further began accusing them of being Iranian loyalists. However, demands for 
political reform have been echoing throughout the Kingdom, rising above the Shi’a/Sunni 
dichotomy, and many political analysts have predicted that, eventually, the situation will 
worsen if the Saudi leadership does not yield to gradual reform. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 Al-Jazeera. (2011). Rights group criticises Saudi anti-terror law.  
410 Refworld. (2011). Response to Saudi Arabia over draft anti-terrorism law.  
411 The National. (2011). Saudi anti-terrorism law is being revised, official says. 
 155 
Overall, the Saudi monarchy proved that it would go to extremes in order to preserve 
its regime during the Arab Spring. It utilised its position in the GCC to take military 
action against political dissent, and encouraged a strengthened union among GCC 
leaderships as a key strategy for regime preservation. The Saudi leadership enlisted its 
fellow GCC members to follow a strategy for regime preservation in the Riyadh 
Declaration in December 2011, where the Saudi monarch mentioned the particular tactics 
of financial incentives and a collaborative defence scheme to suppress internal dissent. 
Saudi Arabia’s goal of creating a “greater GCC” and transforming it into a union does not 
seem far off given the reality on the ground: the six member states of the GCC are 
dependent on each other, and it is acknowledged by all leaderships that if one regime 
falls, others will follow. All six members are facing internal challenges where their 
citizens are demanding more political participation; and all six governments have utilised 
tactics in delaying such demands. Hence, the future of the GCC regimes are interlinked, 
and the governments’ response to the Arab Spring demonstrations have certainly 
portrayed their keenness to preserve their regimes within a united GCC. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter presented a brief overview of the Gulf regional framework, and cooperation 
among the six GCC states. It began with a brief overview of the main goals and 
objectives of the GCC organisation and its economic, political and defence cooperation 
during the Iran–Iraq war (1981–1989). It then presented the external challenges these 
states faced during the post-Cold War period, starting with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Reliance on the US and Western forces to liberate Kuwait became a crucial 
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driver in terms of transformation of the GCC states’ defence arrangements. Before the 
Gulf War, the GCC states had stressed the importance of self-reliance within their 
security realms – even though they were purchasing large amounts of arms from the US. 
However, after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the GCC states’ security became heavily 
dependent on foreign assistance, and most of the GCC monarchies signed bilateral 
defence pacts with the US. Furthermore, the consequences of US policy in the region 
after the 9/11 attacks on the US and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted 
Islamist militias to threaten the internal security of the GCC states. Yet, the GCC states 
continued to strengthen their relationship with the US. Finally, this chapter presented the 
events of the Arab Spring in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, and thus provided a 
comparative analysis to the Kuwaiti case study (see chapter four). It confirms this 
research’s hypothesis by demonstrating that all three of the mentioned Gulf leaderships 
utilised the GCC as a vehicle in preserving their regimes: throughout their individual 
Arab Spring demonstrations in 2011–2012, they attempted to enhance their legitimacy, 
heighten their internal security and collaborate in a defence scheme. The next chapters 
will thus focus on Kuwait, its political history, and its experience during the Arab Spring. 
Overall, this chapter provided a key understanding of the expected behaviour of the 
GCC countries to internal and external threats. The analysis of the GCC reaction to past 
experiences has shed light on the expected behaviour of the GCC countries to the Arab 
Spring. In facing threats in the past, the GCC countries made attempts at strengthening 
their cooperation within the GCC; however, they mainly depended on outside forces, 
focusing on their independent foreign and domestic policies. The expected behaviour is 
thus characterised by two main reactions: first, presenting a pseudo-united front, where 
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GCC members announce their strengthened unity without a clear roadmap to how they 
will do so; and second, maintaining their individualistic policies in foreign and domestic 
issues. When the Arab Spring demonstrations in the region began to pose a threat to the 
Gulf monarchies, the GCC members reacted in the expected manner. However, an 
interesting turning point occurred when GCC members began to allow the threat of the 
Arab Spring to override their individualistic domestic policies. An unprecedented degree 
of unity among the GCC monarchies during the Arab Spring is accounted for by the 
implementation of common tactics under a broad GCC strategy of regime preservation. 
This chapter has indicated the pretence of a GCC united front in the face of previous 
challenges, and in upcoming chapters, this research will build a case that indicates a 
deeper GCC unity that was generated by the fear of regime change in the Middle East 




The Kuwaiti Political System 
I. Introduction 
This chapter provides the political background of Kuwait in order to better understand 
this research’s case study on how the Kuwaiti leadership was able to overcome the 
political turbulence generated by the Arab Spring. The hypothesis of this research is that 
the Gulf leaderships utilised their regional organisation, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), as a vehicle in preserving their regimes during the Arab Spring. It demonstrates 
that the Gulf leaderships depend, to some extent, on each other for survival, and have 
employed shared tactics in order to preserve their regimes. The case study examines the 
Kuwaiti Arab Spring between early 2011 and late 2012; a timeline chosen on the basis 
that it marks the beginning and end of street demonstrations and government responses 
thereto. The last set of demonstrations took place towards the end of 2012; it was 
followed by a period of stability and, according to this research, marks the end of the 
Arab Spring in Kuwait.  
This chapter provides a brief background on Kuwait’s political history and the origins 
of its political system, unique within the Gulf region inasmuch as the constitution offers 
the right to political participation and freedom of speech.412 The chapter outlines the 	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structure of the political system from its inception during the late eighteenth century and 
further explores historical relations between the Al-Sabah rulers and Kuwaiti society 
during the pre-oil era. It briefly examines key historical transformations such as the 
British–Kuwaiti colonial relationship and the advent of the oil industry. The discovery of 
oil in 1938 and the distribution of its revenues during the 1950s generated an interesting 
shift in Kuwait’s political development, especially in the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled. The makeup of its population demographic after the rise of the oil industry 
also represents an interesting aspect which showcases the Kuwaiti leadership’s capacity 
to manipulate groups within the population in order to maintain its rule. Finally, this 
chapter presents an analysis of the Kuwaiti Constitution and its electoral system. 
II. The Origins of the Kuwaiti Political System 
Kuwait is the most politically liberal of the six GCC member states, with an independent 
domestic policy that respects the freedom of its citizens.413 It has a political structure that 
may be traced back to the eighteenth century, and whose main ingredient is the practice 
of consensus and consultation. The establishment of the Kuwaiti Constitution in 1962 
further engraved this notion on the political consciousness of the country, where 
parliamentary politics developed and a partially elected parliament became the main 
source of legislative power. Kuwait was founded in the early eighteenth century by clans 
of the Anaiza, a tribe from Najd (a region in central Saudi Arabia).414 A group of different 
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tribes migrated from Najd to the Gulf coast to escape drought and famine, and within 
these migrations, a new tribe was formed with the name of ‘Bani Utub’. As the Bani Utub 
tribe migrated south of the Gulf coast in search of water, they finally settled in the area of 
kut, or Kuwait, where they found a small settlement already established by the Bani 
Khalid tribe.415 The Bani Khalid tribe was welcoming and peaceful, allowing the Bani 
Utub to flourish, making use of in the skills of boatbuilding sailing from their maritime 
heritage. Although the Bani Khalid controlled the harbours, the tribe kept to the desert, 
and the Bani Utub began a bountiful maritime trade that transformed the settlement into 
one of the busiest harbours in the Gulf. “Bani Khaled support (to the Bani Utub tribe) 
contributed to Kuwait’s rapid rise as a trading town.”416 Testimonies and letters were 
written by several European travellers and British political residents from as early as the 
1800s that testify to Kuwait’s prosperous trading and the busy harbour.417 One such 
traveller described Kuwait as: 
Chiefly inhabited by mercantile and trading people, who engage in all branches 
of commerce carried on throughout the Gulf. The port sends out, at least, a 
hundred sail of vessels, large and small; and the people who navigate 
them…have the highest character for probity, skill, firmness, and courage. 
(Buckingham, 1891: 463).418 
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The peacefulness of the Bani Khalid tribe is not the only reason for the success of the 
port; its prime location enabled it to profit from the caravan trade to Aleppo and 
Baghdad, and also from the trade of the neighbouring Shatt al-Arab port. Due to the 
equity of its rule and the freedom of its trade, the Kuwaiti settlement flourished, 
becoming a prosperous trading and maritime town that regularly attracted immigrant 
groups from surrounding areas (Najd, southern Iraq, Iran, Baluchistan, Yemen, Oman and 
the southern Arab coast).419 In 1863, a British political resident estimated Kuwait’s 
population at 20,000 inhabitants.420 
To adapt to life in a settled economy, the Bani Utub tribe developed new political, 
economic and social structures. “Tribal traditions were retained, but they were now 
placed within a more complex occupational and social stratification.”421 A division of 
labour appeared, where pearl divers were distinguished from rope pullers, captains, or 
merchants. The proceeds from pearling and trade were thus divided on the basis of 
occupation; at the top was the merchant class, who soon became an elite. With the aim of 
establishing a political arrangement within the tribe, the merchant elite families held a 
council meeting and chose a respected member of the community, a man named Sabah, 
to become their leader, subject to consultation.422 The Al-Sabah family had arrived from 
Najd during the seventeenth century. The appointment was based on the practice of tribal 
consensus and consultation, where a practical division of tasks between governance and 
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commerce was preferred over the ascension of one family to a position of dominance 
over the rest. 423 Sabah was thus elected as a representative of the settlement and ruled 
until his death in 1762. 
The basis of Al-Sabah power was political. The Al-Sabah rulers were not the most 
pious or learned; they were not skilful sailors or warriors; nor were they the wealthiest 
family. “Their currency was diplomatic and negotiating skills.” 424 Their role was 
mediating relations between clans and maintaining peaceful relations with neighbouring 
tribes and the Ottomans. Kuwait was considered as “an Ottoman dependency, linked 
administratively and economically through Basra”.425 The Al-Sabah family also became 
the tax collectors of the settlement – taxation was a significant source of revenue in this 
period – making them not only the diplomatic face of Kuwait to neighbouring settlements 
but also the overseers of local administrative affairs. By the late eighteenth century, a 
political hierarchy was well established, “the merchants deferring to direct orders from 
the Sheikh”. By the nineteenth century, the ruling Al-Sabah was able to name his son as 
successor, thus transferring the family’s role “from leader to ruler”.426 Nevertheless, the 
merchant families were at the height of an economic hierarchy where the town’s public 
treasury was mostly derived from revenues from their import duties and boat taxes. The 
Al-Sabah family depended on these revenues in order to protect land trade caravans and 
fend off incursions from Arabian raiders. Thus, the relationship between the merchant 
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families and the Al-Sabah rulers was established on the basis of a balance of interests, 
where as long as the merchants accepted Al-Sabah power, the Al-Sabah rulers tolerated 
the merchant families’ financial supremacy and heeded their political demands.427 
This arrangement constituted the basis of Al-Sabah rule and led to four main 
distinctive attributes: first, the Al-Sabah ruler was not seen as a superior power, but rather 
as fulfilling a particular function as part of a necessary division of labour within a 
growing economy and society.428 Meanwhile, the merchants were in control of trade and 
imports, which provided finance for the ruler. The merchants thus viewed the Al-Sabah 
ruler as merely one among equals, and it was often the case that the rulers were 
personally indebted to the merchants, who financed their commercial as well as political 
endeavours. 429 This functional partnership between the Al-Sabah family and the merchant 
families was based on ‘representation with taxation’; it was the tax revenues generated by 
the merchant families’ activities that sustained the ruler and his administration.430 Second, 
the Al-Sabah ruler was tasked with looking after the interests of the town as a whole, and 
not with promoting the interests of his family. This attribute specifically dictates that the 
ruler should not deem himself superior or regard other groups or families as his or his 
family’s subjects. The Al-Sabah family did not rule as a group or a coalition; rather, 
power resided in the ruler alone. The strategy of placing family members in powerful 
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positions was yet to be adopted by the Al-Sabah rulers.431 Third, the administration of the 
town was not based only on political affairs, but was managed on the basis of a balance 
between the political, economic and civilian domains. The implication of this attribute is 
to highlight the communal aspect of life in the town, where each area was integral to the 
administration and management of society as a whole. Fourth, the rule of the Al-Sabah 
was not imposed by force, but rather by consent and agreement. The Al-Sabah rulers 
were never regarded as autocratic despots; their power was usually limited by custom and 
the checks exercised by the strong merchant oligarchy.432 The traditional decision-making 
apparatus was firmly established within the context of consultation (Shura) where the 
ruler did not have absolute power. Taken together, these four distinctive attributes 
epitomise Kuwaiti politics. 
In 1899, under the leadership of Kuwait’s seventh Al-Sabah ruler, Sheikh Mubarak the 
Great,433 Kuwait signed a strategic treaty with the British that incorporated it into the 
‘Trucial system’.434 Sheikh Mubarak signed further agreements with the British, including 
a guarantee letter stating that Great Britain would ensure the defence of Kuwait if 
attacked by a foreign power.435 In around 1908, Sheikh Mubarak utilised his newfound 
support from the British to impose a more authoritarian style of domestic politics, and as 
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a consequence, dismantled the structure of cooperative partnership between the Al-Sabah 
family and the merchant family oligarchy.436 In an attempt to marginalise merchant 
interests, Sheikh Mubarak raised the rents of merchant shops and levied new boat taxes 
and customs duties, which elicited drastic resistance from the merchant community. The 
wealthiest businessmen protested by relocating to Bahrain and Qatar while threatening to 
withdraw their hundreds of vessels and labour crews.437 Their absence proved to be highly 
disruptive – leaving the settlement and taking their wealth with them had significantly 
reduced the economic and military strength of Kuwait.438 Mubarak ultimately rescinded 
his taxes and personally appealed for the merchants’ return, which led to waves of protest 
and dissent and culminated in the earliest demands for a written constitution.439 
In 1921, after the death of Sheikh Mubarak (he had died in 1915) and the subsequent 
short-term rule of his two sons, a group of leading notables asserted the right of the 
community to resolve succession crises within the Al-Sabah family.440 The practice of the 
consent of the people in the nomination of their ruler reflected “an unwritten social 
contract between the ruler and citizens that obedience would not be granted except after a 
promise of consultation”.441 The group organised themselves into a council and submitted 
a petition to the Al-Sabah family demanding their right to advise on the administration of 
the country, and specifically, on the right of the community to resolve the succession 	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crisis within the Al-Sabah family.442 The council was composed of twelve notables 
representing the east and west sides of the city; they demanded that the ruling family 
select from among three contenders within the Al-Sabah family that they had approved. 
After consultation, the Al-Sabah family selected one of the contenders, Sheikh Ahmad 
Al-Jabir, who would rule until his death in 1950. Sheikh Ahmad agreed to govern with 
the advice of a council; however, within two months of assuming the role of leader, he 
abandoned the council and ignored demands for political participation.443 Although the 
council was short-lived, it did generate a highly politicised merchant community and 
formed the basic foundation for public participation in decision making in Kuwait.444 
a. The 1938 Majlis Crisis 
In 1938, the small and well-organised Majlis445 movement emerged with the aim of 
establishing a legislative council at the centre of Kuwait’s governing structure. The group 
consisted of merchants and educated Kuwaitis who presented the ruler with a petition 
demanding of reform of local conditions by the election of a new council that would 
assist the ruler in managing the affairs of the country.446 The geopolitical context of the 
1930s greatly influenced the emergence of the Majlis movement, where the Kuwaiti 
economy was negatively impacted by the collapse of the pearling sector and diminishing 	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foreign trade. Moreover, a Saudi economic blockade from 1923–1937 had deepened 
economic hardship in Kuwait. King Abdulaziz Bin Saud, the founder and ruler of Saudi 
Arabia, initiated the blockade as a result of alleged tax evasion by the reigning Kuwaiti 
ruler, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sabah.447 Fortunately, it was during this time that the British 
discovered oil deposits in Kuwait. In 1938, Sheikh Ahmad signed a concession treaty 
allowing the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), a new Anglo-American establishment, to drill 
for oil in return for annual royalty payments.448 
The disbursement of these initial funds became a source of dissent between the old 
merchant families and the Al-Sabah rulers. Public pressure mounted, calling for the 
creation of a legislative council. Two local institutions founded by the merchant elders 
became the mouthpiece of dissent against the Al-Sabah rulers: the Education Council 
established in 1936 and the Municipality Board.449 The Municipality Board generated the 
first hint of the Majlis movement that ultimately took shape in 1938 when a group of 
merchants secretly met to draw up a list of reforms and circulated them via leaflets and 
anti-government graffiti.450 The government initially responded to the Majlis movement 
harshly, with the arrest and beating of one of the main dissidents. However, the Al-Sabah 
ruler ultimately consented to the demand for the establishment of a legislative assembly. 
A restricted election took place among 150 elite families in June 1938, with the objective 	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of electing Kuwait’s first legislative council made up of 14 members representing equally 
the two districts within the town. The newly elected Majlis chose a reformist within the 
ruling family, Sheikh Abdullah al-Salem Al-Sabah, as their president due to his 
democratic inclinations and positive relationship with the nationalists.451 The Majlis 
issued the founding document of the Kuwaiti Constitution, providing the basic law which 
balanced the executive, legislative and judicial powers. The constitutional document 
consisted of five articles that were accepted by the ruler on July 2, 1938. 
The document asserted that the people were the source of all authority, that 
 they were represented by their elected deputies, that the National Assembly 
alone had the right to produce legislation, and that all treaties and concessions 
must go through the National Assembly.452 
To some Kuwaiti scholars, this document represents Kuwait’s first constitution.453 The 
document stipulated that the legislative assembly would be authorised to legislate on all 
matters of concern to the country, including budget, justice, general security, education, 
health, housing and states of emergency. Article 3 specifically stated that all internal 
concessions, leases, and monopolies, as well as external agreements and treaties, should 
not be considered legal and binding unless approved by the elected legislative 
assembly.454 This was clearly aimed at restraining the ruler’s control of oil revenues. The 
British and the oil companies had begun exploring for oil deposits and were anxious to 	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acquire concessions from the Emir. The Majlis was soon dismantled when it demanded 
control over the KOC oil royalties; the reigning Sheikh Ahmad considered that this 
particular demand was a red line not to be crossed. He believed that surrendering control 
over oil royalties would eventually lead to the downfall of his family’s regime. Hence, in 
December of 1938, Sheikh Ahmed called on his tribal supporters to arm and disband the 
Majlis by force. The Education Council and the Municipality Board were also disbanded, 
sparking public clashes and seemingly ending the democratic challenge.455 The authority 
and viability of new political bodies and councils ceased until independence in 1961.456 
There are two main outcomes of the Majlis crisis of 1938. The first was that the Al-
Sabah rulers continued cultivating the turbulent relationship with the merchant and 
trading class, regardless of the fact that they almost terminated their dynasty. Instead of 
destroying this antagonistic class to prevent more rebellions, the ruler took the opposite 
path: 
By the early 1940s, Ahmad had freed most jailed Majlis activists and amnestied 
exiled dissidents. The old pact returned. The al-Sabah government continued to 
tolerate the merchant and trading caste, which in retaining its assets and 
mobility  remained an integral part of Kuwaiti society on the eve of the oil age. 
This coalitional shift back to bargained acceptance was a forced move that 
exposed the logic of regime survival in harrowing circumstances. 457 
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After the dismantling of the Majlis, the merchants remained an integral part of the 
country’s economic prosperity. The government could not afford to lose the fiscal 
backbone of the country by destroying its most productive class; neither could it rely on 
the British to reconfigure the domestic balance of power. When the Majlis had demanded 
more control, Sheikh Ahmed had turned to the British for support, only to be rebuffed as 
the British political agent458 at the time considered it as an internal dispute that did not 
merit an intervention (more on the British role in the Majlis crisis below). Hence, Sheikh 
Ahmed’s most realistic chance of sustaining his rule was to keep his relationship with the 
merchants as his predecessors had from half a century earlier.459 
The second main outcome of the Majlis crisis in 1938 was that it forced Sheikh 
Ahmad to reach out to domestic allies, heralding a sedentarisation process that 
constituted a major shift in the Al-Sabah’s social alliances. During the crisis, Sheikh 
Ahmad had rallied expected support from loyal Bedouin tribes, yet he also capitalised on 
discontent among the Shi’a minority, who compromised a fifth of the population, by 
assuring them of protected status under his rule. Many Shi’a feared restrictions under the 
all-Sunni Majlis when it seemed to show its hand by dismissing Sheikh Ahmed’s 
personal secretary, who happened to be a prominent Shi’a. The ruler further engaged with 
the maritime labour force and other poor workers, promising them better security over 
their livelihoods. The Al-Sabah began to recognise that these domestic groups needed to 
be courted as sources of political support in case another similar crisis should occur: 
“Given that the possibility of endemic future opposition, the Kuwaiti leadership looked 	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upon these domestic groups no longer as passive social units, but rather as sources of 
political support that needed to be engaged and captured.” 460 
b. The British–Kuwaiti Relationship 
The colonial relationship between Great Britain and the Kuwaiti leadership certainly 
influenced the development of the political system in Kuwait. The most important 
example was during Sheikh Mubarak the Great’s reign, when he entered into a protected-
state relationship with the British over concerns about Ottoman political control, in 
1899.461 The Ottomans had their eye on Kuwait’s strategic location as a possible 
“terminus for the Berlin–Baghdad railway”.462 The Ottomans were also attracted to 
Kuwait’s lucrative trade due to the strategic location of its port. Meanwhile, the impetus 
for the British to sign a treaty with Sheikh Mubarak was the Berlin–Baghdad railway – 
they wanted to retain their dominance in face of other powers (mainly Europeans and the 
Ottomans) within the region. The British signed additional treaties with Sheikh Mubarak 
that gave them significant control over Kuwait’s foreign policy. The signing of the 
treaties benefited both parties. For Sheikh Mubarak, the British protectorate limited 
Ottoman interest in Kuwait, while for the British, adding Kuwait to their Trucial 
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Agreements463 extended their control within the region and reinforced their power relative 
to European rivals. 
In 1922, the British protectors negotiated away half of Kuwait’s territory to Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq in the Treaty of Uqair.464 The treaty represents a key reason for the 
subsequent survival of the Al-Sabah regime in face of both Saudi and Iraqi territorial 
claims for decades to come.465 Sheikh Mubarak also personally benefited financially from 
Kuwait’s protectorate status: “each time an agreement was signed, a monetary payment 
from Britain to Mubarak went along with it to seal the bargain.”466 British payments to 
Sheikh Mubarak contributed to his ability to hire and maintain an armed guard to protect 
him from domestic groups who might otherwise attempt a coup. Resources provided by 
the British also allowed him to become independent of the merchants467 – “to free himself 
from the necessity of behaving nicely in order to get their financial support”. 468 The most 
important personal gain from protectorate status was British alignment with his plan “to 
limit the future rulers of Kuwait to his sons and their offspring, cutting off other branches 
of the Al-Sabah”. 469 The British had promised Sheikh Mubarak that they would support 
his designated heir as long as he upheld the agreements, and that “they were prepared to 
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intervene quietly, if necessary, to ensure that the rulership passed to Mubarak’s eldest 
son, Jabir, upon his death”.470 
Under the reign of Sheikh Mubarak’s second son, Sheikh Ahmed al Jaber, the British 
had a crucial impact on the domestic politics of Kuwait. During the 1938 Majlis crisis, 
the British advised Sheikh Ahmed to mobilise support against the Majlis. Although the 
British supported Sheikh Ahmed, their control did not extend in any sense to control over 
the population; it was the local ruler who dominated over domestic social groups. The 
British, for their part, advised Sheikh Ahmed to consult with and rely on family 
members, and he obliged. By December 1928, Ahmed had appointed family members to 
“superior posts in all departments”.471 Hence, “the result was to mobilise the Al-Sabah as 
a clan in support of the ruler and the regime by identifying the political and economic 
interests of family members with the continuation of the family’s role as provider of the 
leaders of the state.”472 This led to the key transition to inclusion of members of the Al-
Sabah family in the ruling of the country. 
The relationship between Britain and Kuwait changed after the expansion of Kuwait’s 
oil industry and the decline of Britain as a world power after WWII. After the shutdown 
of the Iranian oil fields in 1951, Kuwait developed into a main source of British supply, 
providing around 38% of its total imports in terms of volume in 1960.473 As a result, the 
British economy became heavily dependent on the stability and security of Kuwait. The 
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concession in 1934 and consequently discovered oil in 1938. However, the first 
commercial quantities were not exported until after WWII.474 “Oil revenues doubled in 
1952 and again in 1953, straining the domestic relationships within Kuwait, as well as the 
relationship between Kuwait and Britain.” 475 The Al-Sabah family resented British claims 
over their oil revenues, and unlike his predecessor, the reigning Sheikh Abdulla Al-Salim 
Al-Sabah had no personal investment in his relationship with the British. Hence, 
“Abdullah Salim engineered Kuwait’s transition from a British client to a state dependent 
on oil revenues for the security of nation and regime.” 476 In 1960, the ruler requested the 
abrogation of the 1899 Treaty. On June 19, 1961, the treaty was replaced by an Exchange 
of Letters, which reaffirmed the close friendship between the two countries, and declared 
an end to Kuwait’s position as a British Protectorate.477 
c. Oil and the Domestic Politics of the Al-Sabahs 
The discovery of oil in 1938 and the distribution of its revenues during the 1950s 
prompted Kuwait’s development of new economic structures and the establishment of a 
welfare system that radically upgraded the lives of inhabitants from poverty to prosperity. 
In 1946, Kuwait’s oil income was not more than $760,000; however, by 1971, it had 
risen to $963 million, and by 1979 to $8.9 billion.478 It is during this rapid economic 	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development that new social forces emerged in Kuwait. The distribution of oil revenues 
to citizens seemed a reasonable strategy in controlling domestic politics, from the 
perspective of the Al-Sabah rulers. The oil revenues not only enabled the ruler to buy off 
domestic elites and retain his independence from the merchant class as the source of state 
income, but also created a huge constituency that supported his regime through the 
establishment of the welfare system.479 The immediate consequence of the oil revenues 
was the breakdown of the historical alliance binding the ruling family with the merchant 
oligarchy. Prior to the discovery of oil, the merchants had provided the ruling family with 
most of its income through taxes. The oil revenues, however, positioned the monarchy as 
the sole distributor of oil wealth and ultimately reversed the relationship of economic 
dependency.480 
The external nature of oil rents, the enclave nature of the industry, and the size of 
the boom spared rulers the need to extract, through taxation and repression, 
economic and social resources allocated through other (tribal, religious, but 
especially mercantile) networks of obligation, freeing the rulers from their 
historical, economically based dependence on the merchants. 481 
The oil revenues enabled the government to repay all its debts to the merchant class; 
however, the regime was apprehensive that such repayment might eliminate the 
merchants’ strong presence in the country’s political, economic, and social realms. 
Hence, rather than marginalise the merchants, the government engaged their interests by 	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way of a deliberate strategy to maintain their support. The ruler “chose to restore the 
merchant’s economic relevance, co-opting former enemies by transforming them into 
conditional loyalists”.482 In other words, the merchant class was bought off by the state. 
One of the strategies included the land acquisition programme, which transferred state 
funds to merchant elites through unregulated property sales. Through this programme, 
which continued from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, the government channelled up to 
$6.5 million to the eighty wealthiest merchant and trading families. The government 
further ceded virtual monopolies to new merchant firms in the fields of banking, real 
estate, and retail, with capital injections, trade measures, and other state protections 
constantly boosting their conglomerates. The Al-Sabah family further excluded their own 
participation in the private sector, thus removing the prospect of competition with 
merchant enterprises. This created a new balance between capital and politics: by leaving 
the non-oil economy to the merchant elites, the government could claim state offices as 
their exclusive domain.483 The new relationship between the Al-Sabah family and the 
merchant class had positioned the merchants into no longer making a claim to power 
within the political system, as they had in the past. On the other hand, these strategies 
financially strengthened the merchants as a class, and convinced them that once the 
British protectorate ended, their economic opportunities would increase and the sectors of 
the economy that had been dominated by British nationals would be available to them to 
exploit. “In 1960, the shape of this future exploitation was indicated by the passage of the 
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Law of Commercial Companies, which required that 51 percent of all companies in 
Kuwait be owned by Kuwaitis.” 484 
Oil revenues also gave the Al-Sabah family the financial and institutional resources to 
rally a diverse coalition through the establishment of an extensive welfare system: “a 
larger sector of the population was wooed by the construction of a welfare state whose 
benefits included free housing, utilities, education, and medical care.”485 Through 
Kuwait’s welfare system, the government is constitutionally obliged to care for the 
young, the old, the ill, and the disabled; it is also obliged to provide public education and 
public health. These rights are limited to Kuwaiti citizens, while the remainder of the 
population has few political and civil rights and enjoys only restricted access to the 
benefits of the state welfare system.486 The Kuwaiti welfare institution played a huge role 
in the nation-building process; as the government spent a massive amount of the oil 
revenues on extensive benefits for its citizens, it also provided them with security, law 
and order, and an overall collective national identity. In other words, the government 
established the Kuwaiti welfare state in order to promote nationalism, where the 
allegiance of citizens is extended towards the state, rather than a tribe, clan or ethnic 
group. Through the welfare programme, the state takes over the traditional task of the 
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tribe, to which was to provide individuals and families with security, thus shifting 
loyalties from tribe to nation.487 
III. Kuwaiti Citizenship and Social Divisions 
The disposition of the ethnic and social demographics of Kuwait is a major factor in the 
development of the Kuwaiti political system. Indeed, the rulers’ approach to the control 
and manipulation of the various social groups is a significant characteristic of the 
political rule of the Al-Sabah. Kuwaiti society is complex, with diverse and often 
overlapping distinctions along confessional, historical, political, and national lines.488 At 
present, the population of Kuwait is almost 4 million, with expatriates accounting for 
69% and Kuwaitis for around 31%.489 The total population consists 77% of Muslims, 
17% of Christians and 6% unspecified.490 The majority of Kuwait citizens are Muslim, 
with around 70% Sunnis and 30% Shi’a.491 The expatriates consist of Arabs and non-
Arabs; Arabs come from all over the Middle East and North Africa, with the largest 
group being Egyptians. The non-Arabs are mainly from the Asian continent: India, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; and a minority from Iran and the 
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Western countries – Europeans, Americans and Australians.492 Within the 6% unspecified 
is a significant population of ‘stateless persons’, or Bidoon, who total around 150,000–
180,000.493 The term ‘Bidoon’ means ‘without’, and more specifically in Kuwait it means 
‘without nationality’ (the situation of the Bidoon will be discussed later in the chapter). 
There are significant social divisions within Kuwaiti society; the main two being the 
sectarian division between Sunnis and Shi’a,494 and the urban–tribal division between the 
Hadhar (‘city people’) and the Bedouins (‘tribespeople’).495 The term ‘Hadhar’ is 
designated to Kuwaitis whose forefathers lived in Kuwait before the advent of the oil era 
in 1946 and worked as traders, sailors, fishermen and pearl divers.496 Meanwhile, the term 
‘Bedouins’ is mainly designated to a specific group of newcomers: immigrants who 
arrived in Kuwait between the 1960s and the1980s from Saudi Arabia. The Bedouins and 
the Hadhar originate from the same North Arabian tribes;497 however, differences 
emerged between the two groups on the basis of the time of settlement – the Bedouins 
who lived in Kuwait before the 1950s are considered as Hadhar. Further social divisions 
include distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, such as the expatriates and the 
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Bidoon; and political divisions such as Liberals versus Islamists. All are examples of 
overlapping groups that shape the Kuwaiti political system.498 The Kuwaiti Constitution 
does not recognise the existence of political parties, and although societal distinctions are 
not translated into a political party spectrum, citizens’ socio-religious-political identities 
are relatively important within political life.499 
 
Table 2: Kuwait’s Main Social and Ethnic Divisions 500 
Sunni vs. Shi’a 
Hadhar vs. Bedouins 
Citizens (First/Second Categories) vs. Expatriates/Bidoon 
Liberal vs. Islamist  
Men vs. Women  
 
The most salient division within the population is between citizens and non-citizens. 
According to Anh Longva, the presence of foreign workers (known as expatriates) in 
Kuwait, whose number has consistently been greater than that of the native population 
since the 1970s, highlights the focus of Kuwaiti citizenship as the basis of exclusion. 
Longva argues that it is the presence of expatriates and their legal, social, and political 
subjection to Kuwaiti citizens that allows for the reproduction of a political structure with 
quasi-autocratic features.501 In the modern democratic practice, political rights are 	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‘universal’ in the sense that they are held by all adult citizens, regardless of gender, race, 
class and cultural background; the essential requirement being citizenship. Hence, “non-
citizens are lawfully denied political rights on the principle that the exercise of such 
rights is indissolubly associated with the nation-state, which constitutes the natural frame 
for their practice.” 502 This national principle leads to important implications for the status 
of non-citizens all over the world, where they find themselves at the bottom of the socio-
economic structure and unable to exercise political rights. “They depend for their 
protection on the goodwill of the host country and on the ability and readiness of the 
authorities of their native countries to intervene in their favour.” 503 
In Kuwait, the vulnerability of non-citizens and their lack of security have a particular 
significance because of their sheer number. Thus, the demographic imbalance between 
citizens and expatriates in Kuwait plays a major role in the constitution of the Kuwaiti 
national identity. The exclusion of expatriates involves their being excluded from basic 
rights such as property ownership and basic duties such as tax payment or military 
service. In Kuwait, neither nationals nor expatriates pay personal income tax; however, 
the right to own real estate belongs exclusively to Kuwaiti nationals. Furthermore, the 
expatriates in Kuwait are imported for the sole purpose of serving the native minority, 
and are thus labelled as a non-national underclass which “depends for its identity as well 
as its material well being” 504 on the native minority. Longva argues that academics who 
focus on democratisation in the Gulf region fail to appreciate the social, psychological, 





and political impact that a majority population of rightless migrant workers can have on 
the way this privileged minority conceptualise and practice political rights among 
themselves. She thus describes Kuwait as a ‘civic ethnocracy’, (ethnocracy is defined as 
government by an ethnic group); she asserts that in Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf 
region, the defining feature is not race, language or religion, but citizenship conceived in 
terms of shared descent. While all ethnocracies may be described as involving 
domination through exclusion, civic ethnocracy is when exclusion is practised on the 
basis of citizenship. 
The impact of the oil economy has further established Kuwait’s civic ethnocracy by 
reinforcing the notion of Kuwaiti nationality and pre-oil social stratification: “It has been 
said often enough that the evasive presence of foreign workers is a problem, even a 
scourge, for Kuwait, yet this ‘scourge’ plays a critical role in displacing the social 
tensions that inevitably arise when a traditional society is faced with rapid 
transformations, as is the case in the Gulf region.” 505 Within a generation, Kuwait went 
from being one of the world’s poorest nations to being one of the richest; and during this 
process, many basic features of its society were transformed. Sea and caravan trade were 
no longer practised; neither was nomadism. “Sailors, pearl-divers and nomadic shepherds 
have turned into state employees working in offices and living in air-conditioned houses 
distributed by the government.” 506 Another crucial impact of the advent of oil is the end 
of the Al-Sabah ruling family’s dependence on the merchants, where roles were reversed 
and the merchants became dependent on the rulers’ willingness to create and maintain 




conditions favourable to their businesses. However, against the backdrop of all the 
changes generated by the oil economy, the social stratification that characterised Kuwait 
in its pre-oil days has remained intact since Kuwait’s independence in 1961: 
… the social prestige that surrounds the old merchant families has remained 
unchanged...Like the Al-Sabah, this mercantile aristocracy practice  class 
endogamy. With the ruling family and the big merchants controlling access to 
political and economic power respectively, the rest of the population is kept in 
the role of clients to these patrons …507 
Longva highlights the continued reproduction of the pre-oil power structure as a key 
feature in Kuwait’s present political system; she gives two explanations with regard to 
the concept of citizenry in Kuwait. First, education and other social improvements have 
not led to social mobility, where each individual has the opportunity to work their way 
upwards, moving freely across class boundaries. “Upward mobility has indeed taken 
place in Kuwait, but in a collective fashion, with the Kuwaiti class structure as a whole 
being lifted upward through the introduction at the bottom of the hierarchy of a new 
underclass, the foreign workers.” 508 The social divisions remain the same as in the pre-oil 
era; however, the working class now has an ethnic underclass beneath it, leading to the 
whole of Kuwaiti citizenry enjoying a higher collective status. This leads to her second 
explanation: “whatever sense of unease and powerlessness is engendered by social 




change is to a certain degree counteracted by the unique sense of empowerment derived 
from domination over the migrant underclass.” 509 
Hence, even though oil has brought Kuwaitis material comfort and the welfare system, 
if they had built their welfare state with their own hands (built their own houses and 
highways and manned the desalination and electrical plants that ensure the daily supply 
of water and electricity), demands for greater social and political equality among citizens 
would have been louder and more persistent. The expatriates not only relieve citizens of 
the burden of physical nation-building, “they ensure that each Kuwaiti citizens enjoys a 
measure of middle-class status and a feeling of empowerment.”510 Combined with the fact 
that they are a minority within their own country, “this gratifying experience helps 
convince Kuwaitis that there is more to gain in accepting the status quo than in trying to 
challenge it.”511 Thus, the presence of expatriates has had a twofold impact on political 
development in Kuwait. On the one hand, the government has had to take special 
measures in furnishing Kuwaiti citizens, who have become a minority in their own 
country, with greater privileges (such as the welfare system). Such privileges have led to 
the alienation of the expatriates, who were the backbone of the rapid transformation of 
Kuwait’s economy and society. Meanwhile, the presence of the large percentage of 
expatriates “has accentuated political fragmentation and has hindered the process of 





integration essential to healthy political development”.512 The participation of expatriates 
in the political system seemingly could come only at the expense of the monarchy.513 
Due to the influx of foreign skills into the country, the government undertook 
defensive measures on behalf of its citizens, the most important of which was the 1959 
nationalisation law, which restricted the granting of Kuwaiti citizenship to those residents 
who had lived in the state continuously since 1920. Throughout the 1950s, the 
government institutionalised preferential treatment based on nationality through a series 
of nationality laws. “State benefits and services were available exclusively or 
preferentially to Kuwaitis….Public housing segregated non-nationals.” 514 Thus, the 
government created a sharp difference between citizens and non-citizens and essentially, 
this differentiation became a key characteristic of the Kuwaiti national identity. The Al-
Sabah rulers have administered the institution of citizenship to create a dividing line in 
the population, where the citizen is granted welfare benefits and opportunities that 
differentiate him from the non-citizen. They further devised a stratification system where 
the traditional social classes remained, while creating a foreign underclass that would 
provide an aura of privilege around the citizens. As the expatriate population grew, the 
government developed stricter nationality laws to regulate the special treatment of 
Kuwaitis.515 
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a. The Nationality Law of 1959 
The first attempt at defining the requirements for extending the Kuwaiti nationality was 
made two years after the advent of the oil industry in 1948; residents whose ancestors had 
been in Kuwait since 1899 were defined at citizens, including children who were born in 
Kuwait to non-Kuwaitis. The government also announced that Arabs or Muslims residing 
in Kuwait for up to ten years could apply for citizenship. In 1957 Kuwait’s first census 
revealed, however, that foreigners who immigrated to the country for work opportunities 
constituted 45% of the population. Hence, a more restrictive nationality law was passed 
in 1959 that eliminated the options of citizenship by birthright or long-term residence.516 
Under the Nationality Law of 1959, Kuwaiti nationals were defined as those persons and 
descendants who resided in Kuwait prior to 1920 and maintained residence there until 
1959. Those who arrived in Kuwait after 1945 had to complete at least twenty years of 
residency and satisfy certain other criteria such as being fluent in Arabic, being capable 
of earning a living, and being a Muslim before applying for citizenship.517 
The 1959 Nationality Law also provided an official ranking of citizens to distinguish 
between ‘original’ Kuwaitis (bil ta’sees) and Kuwaitis ‘by naturalisation’ (bil tajnees).518 
It created fixed categories of Kuwaiti citizens according to the duration of their residence. 
The ‘original’ Kuwaitis were those whose descendants had settled in Kuwait since 1920; 
they received ‘first category’ citizenship (il jinsiya il ‘oula) that granted them full 
political rights and social benefits. Kuwaitis ‘by naturalisation’ were those who could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 Al-Nakib (2014). 
517 Tetreault, M. and Al-Mughni, H. (1995). Gender, Citizenship and Nationalism in Kuwait. British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No.1/2, pp. 64–80. 
518 Longva (2005). 
 187 
obtain Kuwaiti nationality through ‘naturalisation’: Arabs and non-Arabs (mostly 
Persians) living in Kuwait prior to 1945 and maintaining residence there until the law was 
promulgated in 1959. Those Kuwaitis who became citizens through naturalisation were 
classified differently from original Kuwaitis, who held first category citizenship.519 
Naturalised citizens were granted ‘second category’ citizenship (il jinsiya il thanya), 
which, while providing them with equal rights to employment, land ownership and 
welfare benefits, stripped them of their political rights, such as voting and running for 
parliament (they were also excluded from senior level positions in government). The 
distinction between original and naturalised Kuwaitis was developed in order to confine 
political rights to a small percentage of the population; the more citizens with political 
rights, the more political participants within the political system, which might lead to an 
increase of demands for reform.520 The fact that exclusion from political rights is the only 
difference between the first and second categories of citizenship indicates that the 
Kuwaiti ruling elite utilised the inclusion and exclusion of rights as a strategy of control 
and manipulation of the political system. 
The division between first and second category citizens is not as steep as the division 
between citizens and non-citizens or the Bidoon. However, it is important to explain the 
reason behind the division in citizenship in this research, not least because it is a political 
one. The exact percentage of the division (between first and second category citizens) is 
not easily obtained; however, the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion estimates 
that 80% of Kuwaiti citizens have first category citizenship, while 20% have second. The 
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division “does not correspond to religious sects”, 521 but rather relates to the time of 
settlement. Dividing citizens into first and second categories is a strategy used by the 
ruling family to restrict political participation. Kuwaiti citizens with second category 
citizenship are not permitted to participate in parliamentary elections (they can neither 
vote nor run) until twenty years after their naturalisation. Other exclusions from the right 
to vote include membership of the armed forces, the police, women (until 2005) and 
persons who have been convicted of a felony.522 Such limitations ensure a smaller 
percentage of eligible Kuwaiti voters in parliamentary elections; thus enabling the rulers 
to control and manipulate election results. The concept of citizenship is, therefore, 
distinguishable from the concept of nationality – the notion of a national community 
suggest an inclusiveness that is contradicted by the inequalities of citizenship. Thus, in 
the Kuwaiti case, having Kuwaiti nationality does not translate into being a full ‘citizen’ 
in terms of equality of political and economic opportunity.523 
The Nationality Law of 1959 also brought about the historical distinction between the 
Hadhar (urban people) and the Badu or the Bedouin (tribespeople). Among those who 
obtained first category citizenship are the Hadhar; the term ‘Hadhar’ refers to those who 
had been settled in the Kuwaiti towns and villages before the beginning of the oil 
industry. Their origins are in the same North Arabian tribes524 to which the majority of the 	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Bedouin immigrants belong; however, the timing of their settlement in Kuwait, prior to 
oil, establishes them as those who built Kuwait into what it is today. At the top of Hadhar 
society are the Sunni merchant families who founded Kuwait in the early 18th century.525 
Prior to the discovery of oil, the merchant oligarchy had provided the ruling family with 
most of its income through taxes. They were the main source of revenue for the Al-Sabah 
rulers and they had an important role in the country’s development. During the 19th 
century, the merchants travelled to India, Iraq, Persia, Syria, and Yemen and brought 
back a variety of goods to Kuwait. They were the basis of civil society in the city, where 
they established the first school in 1911 and another in 1920. They also opened the first 
library in 1920 and produced the first magazine in 1928. 526 Thus, it was mostly their 
contribution to Kuwaiti society before independence that granted them first-category 
status. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the government granted second-category citizenship to 
approximately 220,000 people, the overwhelmingly majority of them Bedouins.527 Almost 
all Bedouins originate from Saudi Arabia and used to live by animal pastoralism; most 
were Saudi subjects before they opted to become Kuwaiti citizens. Some moved to 
Kuwait during the 1950s, but larger numbers migrated during the 1960s and 70s. Their 
immigration was neither individual nor spontaneous, but collective and encouraged by 
the Kuwaiti government for a number of reasons. First, the government needed an 
increase in its population demographic in order to strengthen Kuwait’s viability in the 
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face of Iraq’s annexation threats. “Six days after Kuwait declared its independence on 19 
June 1961, Iraqi troops stood at its border and threatened to invade the new state on the 
grounds that Kuwait used to belong to the province of Basra during the Ottoman period 
…” 528 Second, the government needed them for manual labour, fearing that the large 
numbers of workers from other Arab and foreign countries would overwhelm the 
economy and alter the ‘Kuwaiti heritage’. “Conventional wisdom has it that ‘Kuwaiti 
traditions’ and the ‘Kuwaiti way of life’ are under threat and that expatriates are the 
major source of this menace.”529 The government was mostly concerned about the ‘Arab 
political threat’, as Arab expatriates who work in Kuwait share the same language and a 
majority adhere to the same religion, Islam. As such, they have a unique opportunity to 
spread their ideas among a wide Kuwaiti audience: 
The Arab impact on Kuwaiti nationals at the intellectual, cultural and political 
level is extensive…Arabs who come to work in Kuwait bring with them their 
political opinions and ideologies, which has always worried the Kuwaiti 
authorities. 530 
Accordingly, the government believed that the traditional Bedouins would be more 
loyal to the regime than the more radical and urban-oriented Arab expatriates (such as the 
Lebanese, Palestinians and Syrians).531 The Bedouin culture of tribal traditions and values 
promotes conservative social and political practices, and “purports a blind obedience 
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toward the power holders, first and foremost, the ruling family”. 532 Hence, the 
government sought “to make use of tribal symbolism to elicit loyalty and devotion to the 
nation-state and the state’s leadership”. 533 The third reason that prompted the Kuwaiti 
government to encourage the immigration of Bedouins was the aim to build a pro-Al-
Sabah support base to counter the merchant opposition and ensure the family’s longevity 
after the introduction of limited parliamentary politics under the 1962 constitutional rule. 
The Bedouins were culturally the most homogenous group within the Kuwaiti population 
and were the most easily manipulated and susceptible to government incentives (more on 
the role of the Bedouins in the Kuwaiti political system below). 534 
Among the naturalised Kuwaitis who received second-category citizenship are Sunni 
Arabs from Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, a small percentage of Christian 
Arabs from Southern Iraq and Palestine, and Shi’a families who originate mostly from 
Iran, but also from Southern Iraq and Eastern Saudi Arabia. Some of the naturalised 
Kuwaitis are also part of the Hadhar community because as traders, labourers, seamen, 
teachers and doctors, they had all contributed to the economy and development of the 
town before 1961 (Kuwait’s independence).535 These various social groups overlap, as 
they may be of a certain religious sect while also being part of the urban community. 
Such an example exists within the Shi’a community in Kuwait, an urban group that 
migrated to Kuwait before and after the 1920s from the Arabian Peninsula and from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Iran.536 Unlike the Bedouins, they are not part of a homogenous group, as they 
immigrated to Kuwait from different areas in the Persian Gulf region. They thus consist 
of four sub-groups who migrated to Kuwait due to poverty, drought, and famine: 
descendants of the original inhabitants of Bahrain; immigrants from the eastern province 
of Saudi Arabia (al-Hassa); Arab Shi’as who migrated to Persia from Arabia and back; 
and the largest group, the Persian Shi’a, who migrated from Iran.537 There is no official 
government census to clarify the numbers from each group (the Kuwaiti census does not 
give specific information based on these distinctions). 
The presence of the Shi’a community in Kuwait is perceived as legitimate; with the 
majority arriving and settling in the area around the same time as their Sunni counterparts 
in the early 18th century, they too contributed to building the nation. The early (pre-oil) 
arrivals became part of the Hadhar community, and thus received first-category 
citizenship. After Kuwait’s independence in 1961, several of the Shi’a families in Kuwait 
succeeded in the trade and finance sectors, and played significant roles within the private 
sector. The Shi’a currently consist of between 25% and 30% of Kuwait’s population, and 
represent a significant proportion of the elite merchant class.538 They have also attained a 
level of equality within the social and political fabric of Kuwaiti society, and the 
government has relied on their pro-government votes several times in parliamentary 
elections down the years. They hold high government positions and regularly make up a 
considerable proportion of Kuwait’s National Assembly. 
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 Overall, the 1959 Nationality Law has been amended seven times in the thirty 
years since its enactment, each time for the purpose of further restricting access to 
citizenship. For example, in 1960 an amendment applied a limit of fifty to the number of 
naturalisations allowed each year; while in 1981, an amendment restricted the granting of 
citizenship to Muslim candidates.539 Such restrictions on citizenship contributed to the 
emergence of a stateless category of persons, the Bidoon, who are recognised as 
permanent residents but hold no documents other than a laissez-passer permitting them to 
leave and re-enter the country.540 There are thus a group of people living in Kuwait that 
are neither Kuwaiti citizens nor citizens of another state. Most of the Bidoon came from 
nomadic tribes that settled in Kuwait’s urban centres and were welcomed by the 
government as allies during the 1960s; some were naturalised and given full political 
rights in order to increase the number of pro-government voters. However, the Kuwaiti 
government speculates that many in the Bidoon community had escaped oppressive 
conditions in neighbouring countries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia). It claims that these 
individuals slipped through the Kuwaiti border, destroying evidence of non-Kuwaiti 
citizenship and pretending to be Bedouins in order to receive Kuwaiti citizenship.541 
Reasons for such actions have mainly to do with the Kuwaiti welfare system, where the 
state grants free housing, free healthcare and free education to its citizens, as well as a 
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host of other economic advantages such as heavily subsidised basic food items, water, 
electricity and petrol.542 
Some Bidoon were offered citizenship during the early 1960s; however, due to 
illiteracy and/or suspicions of the government’s motives, many did not bother to go 
through the application process.543 Other reasons include lack of proper documentation 
and unmet demands for full political rights under second-category citizenship status544 
offered by the government.545 Over time, the Bidoon community expanded with further 
generations being born in Kuwait, yet they were neither naturalised as citizens, nor were 
they asked to leave. Bidoon claims to Kuwaiti citizenship became a highly complicated 
and contentious matter – the Kuwaiti government has been approached by several 
international human rights organisations over the years and pressured into finding a 
solution.546 Encouraged by the Arab Spring in 2011, the Bidoon were the first group in 
Kuwait to take to the streets demanding their right to equal citizenship.547 
Overall, due to developments in education, the media, employment, financial 
opportunity and immigration policies, Kuwaiti society has continued to transform over 
the years. The country’s rapid economic and social transformation, beginning in the 
1950s, caused tensions to develop between the state and the various social groups within 
Kuwaiti society, where opposition groups multiplied and ideological movements emerged 	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(the Islamic movement, for example, gained momentum in the 1980s). The Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were also major events that 
shook the country’s social, economic, and political foundations. Furthermore, during the 
1990s, members from the Bedouin community began moving from the fringes of the 
country into the urban areas of Kuwait. Bringing with them their values, particularly their 
conservative orientation, they began to further transform various facets of Kuwaiti 
society. All these elements contributed to the strains on the relationship between state and 
society in Kuwait.548 In order to better understand this relationship, it is important to 
examine the origins of the Kuwaiti political system, with a focus on the Kuwaiti 
Constitution, its National Assembly, and the overall fundamentals of the electoral system 
in Kuwait. 
IV. The Kuwaiti Constitution, the National Assembly and the Electoral System 
On June 19, 1961 Kuwait gained its independence from Great Britain. The newly 
independent state would have an elected legislature, a constitution, and full separation of 
powers.549 Several months later, in December 1961, the reigning Emir, Sheikh Abdullah 
Al-Salem Al-Sabah, called for the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a 
constitution and to act as a temporary parliament for the country.550 The change in the 
regime structure from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional system was decided by 
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the ruler and is attributed to two main factors.551 First, Iraq’s claim of sovereignty over 
Kuwaiti territory led to the urgency “to provide an image of national unity and popular 
participation in the face of foreign aggression”.552 Promulgating a new political system 
that centred on a legislative assembly with limited supervisory powers was a way to fend 
off foreign aggression, as well as enable the ruler to seek a neutral foreign policy free 
from superpower entanglements. Second, the growing pressure of an emerging middle 
class demanding political participation prompted the introduction of a semi-parliamentary 
system. The ruler needed an internal political mechanism to placate potential opponents 
while strengthening his relationship with various groups across Kuwaiti society. So, the 
regime aimed at introducing ‘partial liberalisation’ where lawmaking authority still 
resided with the ruler and his appointed cabinet, political parties were prohibited, and 
voting rights were limited to male citizens.553 Such controlled participation gave those 
who demanded political participation a sense of proximity to power, while ultimately 
safeguarded the ruler’s authority. 
Immediately after independence, Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim issued a decree 
establishing a Council of Seniors consisting of several of Al-Sabah family members and 
prominent members of the merchant community, to draft electoral laws and to make 
preparations for an elected constituent council. The election took place on December 30, 
1961; it produced twenty candidates to represent ten electoral districts (two candidates 
per district). The vote was by secret ballot and was open to all Kuwaiti male citizens over 
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the age of twenty-one. There were an additional eleven members appointed to the 
council, all of them from the Al-Sabah family, which raised the number of the council to 
thirty-one.554 
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Table 3: Elected Members of the Constituent Council (1962) 555 
# Name Social Group 
1 Abbas Munawir Badu 
2 Ali al 'adhina Badu 
3 Yusuf al Mutari Badu 
4 Abdullah Fahd al Shamari Badu 
5 Muhammad al Sudairan Badu 
6 Nayif al Dabbus Badu 
7 Khalifa al Jari Badu 
8 Abd al Aziz al Saqar Merchant 
9 Humud al zaid al khalid Merchant 
10 Ya'qub al Humaidi Merchant 
11 Abd allatif al Ghanim Merchant 
12 Ahmad al Fawzan Merchant 
13 Sa'ud al Abd al Razzaq Merchant 
14 Muhammad al Nisf Merchant 
15 Mubarak al Hasawi Merchant 
16 Mansur al Mazidi Shi'ite 
17 Muhammad Ma'raff Shi'ite 
18 Ahmad al Khatib Hadhar 
19 Abd al Razzaq Aman Hadhar  
20 Sulaiman al Hadda Hadhar 
 
The table above shows the name and social group of each elected member, reflecting 
various groups within Kuwaiti society. The Bedouin (badu) accounted for 35% of the 
elected members, the Shi’a accounted for 10%, and the merchant community accounted 
for 40%, while other urban members accounted for 15%. The task of the Constituent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Alhajeri, A. (2004). Citizenship And Political Participation In The State Of Kuwait The Case Of The 
National Assembly (1963–1996). University of Durham. 
 199 
Council was to draft the country’s permanent constitution. While the appointed members 
participated in the deliberations, only elected members could vote. 556 The Council 
submitted a constitutional document declaring the system of government and legislative 
power of the country.557 
The Kuwaiti Constitution was formally adopted on November 11, 1962, providing for 
a hereditary monarchy based on popular sovereignty and certain restrictions on the power 
of the ruler. 558 The Constitution consisted of 183 articles and was the first such document 
in the Gulf region. It is a powerful resource that allows citizens to demand political 
participation, as Article 6 declares, “the system of government shall be democratic, under 
which sovereignty resides in the people, the source of all powers.”559 The Kuwaiti 
Constitution allows the people to exercise their power through a legislative branch, the 
National Assembly.560 
The Constitution stipulates that the system of Government is based on the 
principle of the separation of powers and that no power may relinquish all or 
part of its constitutional competence (Article 15). Legislative power is vested in 
the Emir and the National Assembly, while the executive power lies with the 
Emir, the cabinet, and the ministers. The Courts exercise judicial power.561 
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According to the Kuwaiti Constitution, the ruler recognises the citizens’ right to 
advise, criticise and even question the government’s policies. This is a significant step 
towards citizens’ participation in parliamentary politics. On the other hand, the 
constitution was presented to the Kuwaiti people as an initiative by the grace of the ruler: 
“The al-Sabah family was neither barred from nor limited in exercising total monopoly of 
all instruments of political and economic power and its symbols.”562 Therefore, “the 
Kuwaiti Constitution allowed citizens only to criticise the ruler’s methods of using the 
power he was holding, or the policies by which he did so. It was not intended to reshuffle 
the basic division of power by taking away power from the ruling family and the 
government and handing it to the citizens.”563 In practice, the Kuwaiti rulers have made it 
clear that there were limits to criticising and questioning government policies; the 
constitution has provided the ruler with the prerogative to dissolve the National Assembly 
should it become too troublesome. 
The Kuwaiti Constitution is regarded as a contract between the ruler and the people, 
who are represented by the National Assembly. As stated in the constitution, legislative 
power is vested in the Emir and the National Assembly. The National Assembly is a 
single chamber to be composed of fifty members elected directly by eligible citizens564 
through secret ballot, as well as up to fifteen ministers appointed by the Emir, making it a 
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unicameral parliament of up to 65 members.565 Ministers are automatically part of the 
National Assembly; however, their number should not exceed one-third of the number of 
parliament members. The Emir exercises his powers through his ministers. He appoints 
and dismisses the prime minister, who also chairs the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet 
of Ministers are also appointed and dismissed by the Emir upon the recommendation of 
the prime minister. The constitution stipulates under Article 58 that the prime minister 
and the Ministers are collectively responsible to the Emir for general state policy. 
Moreover, every minister is individually responsible to the Emir and the National 
Assembly for the affairs of his ministry. Until 2003, the Crown Prince took the post of 
Prime Minister; however, the most recent two prime ministers have not held the title of 
Crown Prince. 566 
The Emir is considered as the central figure in Kuwaiti political life; he is the Head of 
State and head of the ruling family. He is “immune and inviolable” according to Article 
54 of the Constitution. Thus, he is beyond any political criticism or accountability. He 
initiates laws and promulgates them; he may issue decrees that have the force of law, 
provided that they are not contrary to the constitution or to the budget law. He can also 
adjourn the National Assembly for a period not exceeding one month and may dissolve 
the National Assembly and call for new elections within two months. He further appoints 
and dismisses civil, military, and diplomatic officials. He has the sole power to declare 
defensive war and martial law by decree; such decrees are to be referred to the National 
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Assembly within fifteen days. Martial law may not continue unless a decision to that 
effect is made by a majority vote in the Assembly. He can conclude treaties by decree but 
must submit them to the National Assembly for ratification. He may also grant a pardon 
or commute a sentence; general amnesty can only be granted by law. 567 
The ruling family retains a strong direct involvement in government; for example, the 
post of prime minister is usually held by members of the Al-Sabah family along with 
other major posts in the government, such as the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, 
Defense, Information, Finance, and Oil.568 The constitution does not particularly demand 
that the ruling family monopolise these posts; however, it carefully allows it. The ruling 
family is composed of several hundred members, and they do not always hold the same 
political views. Prominent family members are associated with different political blocs, 
and rivalry is certainly apparent between the two lines of the Al-Sabah family (the Al-
Salim line and the Al-Jabir line). The Cabinet of Ministers, while usually composed of 
Al-Sabah members, also incorporates members from other social groups, “appointed on 
the basis of their experience or to help the government secure political support among the 
disparate parliamentary blocs”.569 The main role of the Al-Sabah family members in 
holding ministerial positions is to retain considerable influence for the Emir and blur any 
distinction between government and the ruling family. As such, the right of ministers to 
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be part of the National Assembly gives the Al-Sabah family a greater share of legislative 
power. 
Table 4: Cabinet Composition by Family Background 570 
  Al-Sabah family Asil families (original) Other families Total 
  # % # % # %  
All ministers (1962–1968)  18 24.0 34 45.3 23 30.7  
By cabinet (date of installation) 
17 January 1962 11 78.5 3 21.5 - - 14 
28 January  1963 10 66.7 4 26.7 1 6.6 15 
6 December 1964 4 28.6 7 50 3 21.4 14 
3 January 1965 4 30.8 5 38.4 4 30.8 13 
4 December 1965 4 33.3 4 33.3 4 33.3 12 
4 February 1967 4 25 6 37.5 6 37.5 16 
2 February 1971 2 15.4 5 38.5 6 46.1 13 
9 February 1975 4 26.7 5 33.3 6 40.0 15 
6 September 1976 5 27.8 6 33.3 7 38.9 18 
16 February 1978 5 27.8 6 33.3 7 38.9 18 
4 March 1981 6 37.5 3 18.8 7 43.7 16 
3 March 1985 6 37.5 5 31.3 5 31.2 16 
13 July 1986 6 28.6 9 42.8 6 28.6 21 
 
As the table above shows, the number of royal family members in the cabinet abruptly 
declined after the 1964 political crisis,571 from eleven to nine to five, and at the same time 
cabinet members from other families increased. Those recruited from outside the royal 
family were often men of high professional and academic standing and were brought in 
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for their particular expertise. This enabled the government to involve its brightest 
younger citizens in governmental affairs.572 
The National Assembly has the right to initiate legislation. Laws are passed by the 
Parliament by an absolute majority of members present; legislation must then be 
approved and promulgated by the Emir. If the Emir does not sanction the legislation 
within thirty days, it is considered automatically promulgated. The Emir may ask for 
reconsideration of a bill, in which case the Parliament must affirm it by a two-thirds 
majority for it to be passed. Given that up to 23% of the Parliament is appointed by the 
Emir (the cabinet ministers), it may be difficult to find a majority to overrule a request for 
reconsideration.573 The inclusion of appointed cabinet ministers to the Parliament is a key 
method of control by the executive, as they can block any initiative by members opposing 
the government. Elected officials may also serve in the cabinet, in which case the number 
of ex-officio members is reduced accordingly.574 
The National Assembly may overturn any of the Emir’s decrees that were made while 
the assembly was dissolved. It can also veto a law proposed by the government. No law 
may be promulgated unless the National Assembly has passed it and it has been 
sanctioned by the Emir. Decrees issued by the Emir are referred to the National 
Assembly within fifteen days following their issue if the Assembly is in session. If the 
Assembly does not confirm them, they retrospectively cease to have the force of law. The 
Assembly does not have the right to put a motion of no confidence in the government; 	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however, it has the right to question individual ministers and follow up with a motion of 
no confidence in those individuals. The concept of interpellation is borrowed from the 
European constitutional tradition, and is termed ‘grilling’ in the English language press of 
the Gulf region.575 While the constitution does not provide for a motion of no confidence 
in the prime minister, the parliament may decide that ‘it cannot cooperate with the Prime 
Minister’. 576 The Parliament can dismiss the prime minister only by a majority vote of the 
elected members amounting to a vote of no confidence in the government as a whole. If 
the prime minister loses this vote of confidence, the constitution dictates that the Emir 
dismiss either the prime minister or the Parliament.577 If the prime minister is dismissed, 
the Emir must appoint a new cabinet of ministers. If the Emir decides to dissolve 
Parliament instead, the new Parliament must decide whether it still cannot cooperate with 
the prime minister, and “he shall be considered to have resigned and a new Cabinet shall 
be formed”. 578 When faced with this scenario in 2006, the Emir decided to 
constitutionally dissolve parliament; he went on to do so four more times until 2012. 
While the constitution stipulates the separation of powers, the fact that the appointed 
cabinet ministers are part of the Parliament weakens the democratic nature of parliament. 
Furthermore, the absence of political parties makes it hard for voters to know what 
individual candidates stand for, making accountability difficult to ensure. Nonetheless, 	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there are several significant mechanisms of accountability, in particular the interpellation 
of ministers and no-confidence votes. These methods of challenge allow parliament to 
challenge the government on policy issues and exercise its constitutional right. However, 
in recent years the more parliament challenged the government, the harsher the 
government response appeared, with parliament being dissolved several times in response 
to the interpellation of the Prime Minster. Ultimately, the struggle between parliament 
and government comes down to each MP’s stake in the success of the government: 
This constitutional set-up has often led to a ‘co-habitation’ situation, where the 
majority of parliament tends to be opposed to government policies. A 
‘destructive’ attitude of parliament may result from the fact that no MP 
necessarily has a stake in the success of the government, in contrast to 
parliamentary democracies. Instead MPs have an incentive to increase their 
public profile, e.g., by confronting the government.579 
Hence, in the absence of direct accountability of the government through elections, the 
interpellation of ministers has become “unusually prominent in the executive-legislative 
relationship”.580 
The current electoral system provides that Kuwait is divided into five electoral 
constituencies, where each elects ten deputies to the legislature. In each district, the ten 
candidates with the highest number of votes win the seats, even though they may receive 
less than a majority of the votes cast.581 In July 2006, an electoral reform law was passed 
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that reduced the number of electoral districts from 25 to 5. From 1963 until 1975, 
elections were held in 10 election districts, with each electing five deputies. In 1981, the 
government changed the electoral system, whereby 25 election districts were established, 
with the top two scoring candidates in each being elected to parliament. This election 
system is more liable to vote buying, as there are fewer electors per constituency, and 
consequently localised patronage-based politics in non-election periods.582 
Due to the prohibition on political parties, parliamentary candidates must nominate 
themselves and run formally as independents.583 Article 43 of the Constitution does not 
specifically prohibit the establishment of political parties, yet it is often asserted by the 
government that it does.584 The constitution states that political parties should be allowed 
at some point in the development of parliamentary democracy.585 In order to legalise 
parties, a constitutional amendment would be required, which needs a two-thirds majority 
vote in parliament and the endorsement of the Emir. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti political 
groups act as de facto parties; some have organisational structures, while others are more 
loosely based parliamentary groupings of independents. Because each candidate is 
elected as an individual, it is difficult to determine the parliamentary strength of the 
various groupings. Further difficulty arises because some parliamentary members have 
dual identities (e.g. tribal and Islamist). The main political distinctions exist between 
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Islamists and non-Islamists or secularists, and between pro-government and opposition. 
Further distinctions lie between urban and tribal, and to an extent between Sunni and 
Shi’a (more on political groupings in the next chapter).586 
The constitution also provides for Kuwaiti citizens to enjoy the highest degree of 
respect for fundamental freedoms of all the Gulf states, in particular freedom of 
expression, freedom of the media and freedom of assembly. However, human rights are 
not completely guaranteed: freedom of association is not guaranteed as far as the 
operation of political parties is concerned, and voting eligibility might also be improved, 
as a large part of the population is excluded from voting rights.587 The most serious issues 
of human rights are reported in relation to the Bidoon and expatriate population; human 
rights groups contentiously report violations in relation to migrant workers in Kuwait, 
including wage exploitation, physical and psychological abuse, forced labour and 
confiscation of passports.588 
At the same time, Kuwait has enjoyed greater freedom of expression and the media 
since a new media law was introduced in 2006. Parliament approved the law by a 
unanimous vote of the 53 MPs present at the session. The law replaced the 1961 Press 
and Publications Law. It prohibits the closure of publications without a formal court order 
and bans the jailing of journalists for all but religious offences, criticism of the Emir and 
calls for overthrow of the government. The Ministry of Information runs the government 
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press, radio, and television broadcasting station. 589 The first privately owned Kuwaiti 
television station was sanctioned in 2004, and more followed (at present, Kuwait has 21 
privately owned stations).590 Residents have access to satellite broadcasting without 
government interference. The Worldwide Press Freedom Index ranks Kuwait as 63 out of 
169 countries (the index runs from 1 (most press freedom) to 169 (least press 
freedom)).591 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter presented a background on Kuwait’s political history, providing the context 
for the case study. Since independence from Britain in 1961 and access to massive oil 
wealth, the Kuwaiti leadership has established a unique political system. The Al-Sabahs 
ratified a liberal constitution that guarantees personal freedoms and participatory politics 
– while at the same time holding onto an authoritative style of leadership by accessing 
coalition groups to support their rule. This chapter highlighted the key historical 
transformations that shaped Kuwaiti politics in the twentieth century. The most crucial 
was the breakdown of the ruling coalition binding the ruler and the merchant families. On 
the eve of oil, the merchants were at the height of their political power. Within decades, 
however, they had almost completely withdrawn from formal politics in exchange for 
guarantees of prominence in the economic realm. The merchants’ withdrawal from 
Kuwaiti politics was accompanied by the leadership’s development of new alliances. 	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These included historically weaker non-merchant political groupings – Islamic groups, 
Sunni and Shi’a, tribal groups, and the progressive opposition. 592 The most important new 
ally, however, has been the ruler’s wider family – the leadership began to rely on and 
consult with family members in matters of governance. 
Providing an important foundation for the case study, the first part of the chapter 
explored the origins of the Kuwaiti political system. It examined the pre-oil relationship 
between the Al-Sabah rulers and the merchant families – the interdependence and 
unspoken rules surrounding this relationship shaped the future of participatory politics in 
Kuwait. It further examined the beginnings of popular demands for political participation 
during the 1938 Majlis crisis; and briefly touched on the impacts of the British–Kuwaiti 
relationship on the political system at the cusp of independence. The rise of the oil 
industry and the establishment of an extensive welfare system enabled the leadership to 
secure alliances with various social groups during the state-building process. The welfare 
system further cemented society’s dependence on the state, where the leadership ensured 
that the oil wealth was distributed among the Kuwaiti population as a way to dilute 
demands for popular participation in the political system. The chapter went on to explore 
the effects of the Kuwaiti Nationality Law of 1959 on the country’s demographics, 
arguing that the institution of citizenship created a dividing line among the population, 
ultimately ensuring that “each Kuwaiti citizen enjoys a measure of middle-class status 
and a feeling of empowerment”.593 It led to the creation of a unique national identity, 
where it might be expected that there was more to gain from accepting the status quo than 
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trying to challenge it. However, that was not to be the case. The welfare system and the 
status that came with Kuwaiti citizenship may have slowed down mass demands for 
political participation, but they did not discourage various opposition groups from 
fighting for a say in government decisions and challenging the monarchy. 
The last part of the chapter presented an analysis of the Kuwaiti Constitution and its 
electoral system, finding it increasingly vital to an understanding of the 2011 Arab Spring 
in Kuwait. The constitution is regarded as a contract between the ruler and the people, 
and defines the ground rules for the sharing of power between the parliament and the 
ruling family.594 This contract represents the basis of the demands during the Arab Spring 
demonstrations in Kuwait. 
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Chapter 3 
Kuwaiti Parliamentary Politics 
I. Introduction 
This chapter first examines three phases of parliamentary politics in Kuwait; the first was 
from 1962 to 1976; the second from 1980 to 1990; and the third from 1990 to 2002. It 
provides the history of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, the main events that led to its 
establishment and the main socio-political groupings that were formed within parliament. 
It presents the failures and achievements of the first parliaments in Kuwait, as well as 
how the Kuwaiti government was able to interfere in the process of parliamentary 
politics. It further presents the challenges the parliament faced from various external 
security threats, such as the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. This research portrays the struggle throughout these phases between the legislature 
and the executive, where the Kuwaiti parliament repeatedly used its constitutional rights 
to criticise state policies, while the ruling family managed to manipulate parliament by 
balancing different tribal and sectarian groups against each other. 
As the previous chapter has shown, the Kuwaiti constitution allows for 
parliamentarians to question or interpellate cabinet ministers, subjecting them to a vote of 
no confidence. However, during the first phases of parliamentary politics in Kuwait, 
interpellation was a rare procedure, especially if directed at ruling family members. 
According to Kuwaiti political analyst, Ghanem Al-Najjar, there were six cabinet 
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members questioned by MPs between 1962 and 1976; only one was from the ruling 
family. Between 1981 and 1992, eight cabinet members faced interpellation. The most 
striking change occurred during the period 2006 to 2011, when a total of 27 cabinet 
members had to face parliamentary interpellation, 21 of whom were members of the 
ruling family.595 This transition stemmed from the development of grass-roots 
mobilisation and cross-coalitional government opposition, both of which played a crucial 
role in empowering parliament throughout decades of Kuwaiti parliamentary politics. 
The chapter thus analyses the advancement of parliamentary politics in Kuwait, and 
details the main political groupings that dominated the political scene after the Gulf War 
in 1991. It concludes with Kuwait’s political challenges from 2003 until 2009, 
highlighting three key events: the separation of the post of the Crown Prince and the 
Prime Minister in 2003; the succession crisis after the death of Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-
Ahmad Al-Sabah; and finally, the emergence of a popular movement that successfully 
pressured the government to alter the electoral system in 2006. 
II.  Kuwaiti Parliamentary Politics (1962–2002) 
Since Kuwait’s independence from Britain and its becoming an oil-wealthy state in the 
1960s, the Kuwaiti leadership has ruled through popular rentierism atop a coalition of 
social groups that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while consolidating 
authoritarian power from above. 596 The Al-Sabahs have exploited their massive oil 
revenues to reorganise state institutions, serving the material and symbolic interests of 
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large constituent classes in return for support. They have also maintained an elected 
parliament with limited powers and granted significant civil liberties, thereby allowing 
citizens to express their political concerns and monitor state policies. The result is a rule 
that embraces popular rentiersm – that is, institutional arrangements that limit 
government autonomy and render its policies more accountable to popular groups. The 
reasons for which the Al-Sabahs have chosen to rule through ‘popular’ rentiersm rather 
than a ‘despotic’ rentierism can be found in the legacies of pre-oil social conflict. When a 
weak ruler is threatened by social and political opposition without access to extensive 
wealth, it has a strong incentive to bargain with those political dissenters in order to 
survive. This can be seen in Kuwait in the historical relationship between the ruler and 
the merchant class. During the late 1930s, the Al-Sabah dynasty nearly lost power due to 
the urban merchants’ demands for more political influence (culminating in the 1938 
Majlis crisis, discussed in the previous chapter). The leadership was also experiencing 
geopolitical obstacles, as Britain’s imperial mandate limited its economic resources and 
military ambitions. Hence, the leadership was forced to compromise rather than coerce, 
giving concessions to its merchant rivals and securing new urban allies across society in 
order to guarantee its survival.597 
The pre-oil relationship between the leadership and coalitional alliances shaped the 
Al-Sabah’s future use of oil resources to preserve a wide social base. In the 1960s, the 
leadership could have used its oil wealth and newfound independence to enforce a 
strategy of repression and exclusion by preventing organised groups from dominating the 
new political economy. Instead, the leadership sacrificed considerable resources to ensure 	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than each constituent class – the merchants, urban labour, the tribal community and the 
Shi’a minority – received economic and political side payments that maximised their 
prosperity. Due to the leadership’s commitment to protecting its interests, these social 
groups had little incentive to rebel. Conversely, there were powerful constraints that 
diminished the possibility of the leadership abandoning these commitments. 
Given its past experiences and available resources, Al-Sabah rulers perceived 
the maintenance of coalitional obligations as the most optimal strategy to 
foreclose radical dissent and guarantee future survival. In addition, Al-Sabah 
leaders were hesitant to overturn the inclusionary precedents set by their familial 
predecessors, and faced the additional obstacle of hostile public opinion should 
they reverse the course. 598 
Ruling through popular rentierism proved most beneficial to the Al-Sabah leadership 
during times of crisis; specifically during the 1982 financial crisis of Suq Al-Manakh and 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The leadership was able to draw upon the diverse 
coalitions it had been nurturing since the 1960s, shuffling out one unpopular group and 
incorporating new supporters. The Kuwaiti leadership further utilised tactics of control in 
the form of concessions offered to opposition groups in return for demobilisation.  The 
Al-Sabah ruling family has assembled a broad base of support by “anchoring its power 
with social forces through implicit pacts that trade power for loyalty”. 599 The diversity of 
social groups within Kuwaiti society plays a crucial role in the ability of the leadership to 
maintain and stabilise its mass support because of a fundamental reality: each group 	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prefers Al-Sabah rule over all the alternatives. The Al Sabah leadership has thus relied on 
the diversity of Kuwaiti society and its partial liberal policies to maintain its regime. 
Ultimately, the Kuwaiti leadership resembles a benign form of authoritarianism, where 
it engages within a somewhat liberalised political system that provides citizens with a 
legislature that limits its autonomy and a constitution that ensures their liberties. The 
Kuwaiti political system, although showing the potential onset of democratic inclinations, 
is still regressive in terms of true political liberalisation. The Emir is at the centre of the 
political system, not subject to electoral contestation, and can suspend parliament at any 
time. As the following sections will demonstrate, throughout decades of parliamentary 
politics in Kuwait, the leadership has not ceased to manipulate the political system and 
continues to apply a strategy of control. 
a. The First Phase of Parliamentary Politics (1962–1976) 
On November 12, 1962, the Electoral Law was promulgated and the right to vote and run 
in parliamentary elections was given to Kuwaiti males over the age of 21, thus excluding 
women, naturalised citizens and non-citizens. Military and police personnel were also 
denied the right to vote. The law basically limits the electorate, where the restrictions on 
the right to vote has elicited a very small percentage of eligible voters in comparison to 
the total population of the country. Such limitations give the government the upper hand 
by curbing the influence of citizens within parliamentary politics. The government further 
controls the process by drawing and redrawing electoral constituencies, which has been 
an issue of contention between the government and the opposition since the promulgation 
of the law in 1962. The districts were divided in such a way as to give strength to pro-
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government groups and to match the geographic distribution of the socio-political 
groupings.600 They were divided into ten districts, where each district corresponds to a 
particular social group (see table below). The Electoral Law of 1962 was later amended 
in 1980 to further the interests of the royal family following the shift in loyalties of 
various social groups (this will be discussed later in the chapter). Nevertheless, the law 
led to the first parliamentary elections in the Gulf region, and the emergence of the first 
phase of parliamentary politics in Kuwait. 
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Table 5: Kuwait’s old voting districts (based on the 1962 Electoral Law) and social groups 601 
 District Social Group 
1 Sharq Shi’a 
2 Qiblah Sunni merchants 
3 al Shuwaykh Tribes of Shamar, Daffier, ’Ajman and Aniza 
4 al Shamiyah Tribes of Mutair and Rashaidah 
5 Kayfan Mixed merchants and Utaybah tribe 
6 al Qadisiyah Sunnis and a minority of Shia 
7 al Dasma Shia and Sunni evenly divided 
8 Hawalli Sunni majority 
9 al Salmiyah Awazem tribe and a Shia minority 
10 al Ahmadi Tribes of Ajman, Awazem and Fudul 
 
The first phase of parliamentary politics saw the establishment of the Kuwaiti National 
Assembly, a representation system incorporating several strands of Kuwaiti society.602 
The National Assembly is a single chamber composed of 50 members elected directly by 
eligible citizens through secret ballot, as well as up to 15 Emir-appointed ministers (who 
make up the Cabinet of Ministers), making it a unicameral parliament of up to 65 
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members, who serve a four-year term.603 This unusual constitutional provision allows all 
Cabinet members seats in the Assembly along with the right to vote on most issues. The 
insertion of the appointed members of the Cabinet thus allows the government to enjoy a 
reliable loyal bloc of up to 15 additional voting members of the Assembly, most of whom 
belong to the ruling family.604 The election for the first National Assembly was held on 
January 23, 1963.605 The new Assembly faced its first crisis in 1964 when conflict within 
the legislature rendered difficult the formation of a consensus cabinet.606 Some of the 
Assembly members had “challenged the cabinet on the grounds that its composition 
violated the constitutional provision against conflict of interests”.607 By way of response, 
the prime minister requested the reigning Emir, Sheikh Abdulla, to dissolve the 
Assembly. Sheikh Abdulla refused and ordered the prime minister to form a new 
government (consisting of the Cabinet of Ministers). Sheikh Abdulla is widely respected 
in Kuwait and considered to be the father of the constitution. He had strongly supported 
the promulgation of the constitution and the concept of parliamentary democracy, and 
had thus kept in check those members of the ruling family that were opposed to the 
concept.608 “The crisis was contained by the Emir’s move to give concessions to the 
opposition …. By yielding to the pressure of the opposition, the Emir was making it 
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possible for the Assembly eventually to share control with him over the cabinet.” 609 
However, Sheikh Abdulla’s death in November 1965 unleashed the power-grabbing 
inclinations of several family members. Because many of the Al-Sabah family members 
hold cabinet positions, the Al-Sabah ruling elite has had ample representation in the 
legislature. From then on, the government would interfere in parliamentary politics,610 
whether it was through election rigging, changing the electoral boundaries, increasing the 
number of constituencies or dissolving parliament.611 
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Table 6: The Kuwait National Assembly: completion of its legislative terms 612 
No. Legislative Year Four-year Term 
1 1963 Completed 
2 1967 Completed 
3 1971 Completed 
4 1975 Unconstitutionally dissolved (1976) 
5 1981 Completed 
6 1985 Unconstitutionally dissolved (1986) 
7 1992 Completed 
8 1996 Constitutionally dissolved (1999) 
9 1999 Completed 
10 2003 Dissolved 
11 2006 Dissolved 
12 2008 Dissolved 
13 2009 Dissolved 
14 2012 Nullified 
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The 1963 Assembly went on to complete its four-year term, whereas the following 
Assembly in 1967 was chosen through election rigging. 613 The third Assembly that was 
elected in 1971 also completed its term; however, the fourth was dissolved 
unconstitutionally in its second year in 1976 (more details on the dissolutions later). Due 
to this pattern of dissolutions, it is clear that the Kuwaiti National Assembly has not 
enjoyed much autonomy and rarely initiated policy.  However, permanent parties of the 
electoral body emerged and gradually the parliament became the sole institution in power 
representing the people as a whole: 614 
It [the National Assembly] did discharge its function of criticising and exposing 
the government more effectively. Furthermore, it endowed the major political 
and social forces in the country-the Bedouins, the urban merchants and 
businessmen, and the nationalists, intellectuals and professionals-with 
institutionalized means of expressions. 615 
By law, the Kuwaiti government prohibits political parties; however, parliamentary 
politics has been able to thrive in Kuwait. “Blocs of like-minded candidates have long 
cooperated in Kuwaiti elections …”616 and such electoral and parliamentary blocs act as 
de facto parties. Various political and social forces have dominated the National 
Assembly over the years; these groups are formed on the basis of tribal, ideological, and 
ethnic backgrounds. From its establishment in 1963 until 1986, the Assembly consisted 
of three major forces: the prominent merchant families, the Bedouins, and the middle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Al-Najjar (2000). 
614 Karam (1993). 
615 Salih (1991). 
616 Herb (2009). Kuwait: The Obstacle of Parliamentary Politics, 136. 
 223 
class. The merchants were not demanding major reforms, as they were economically in 
an advantageous position. The Bedouins were often manipulated by the government to 
act as a “counterweight to the radicalism of the professionals and the nationalist 
intellectuals”. 617 It was mostly the middle class and the nationalist intellectuals who 
directed the more acute criticism at the political and social order, often playing the role of 
opposition within the parliament. 
Table 7: The Composition of Kuwait’s National Assemblies 1963–1985 618 
Legislative 
Terms 
Bedouins Merchants Middle Class Total 
1963 19 16 15 50 
1967 20 17 13 50 
1971 20 13 17 50 
1975 21 6 23 50 
1981 27 8 15 50 
1985 27 2 21 50 
 
As the sedentarisation process coincided with the state-building and modernisation 
processes of the state, the Bedouins were granted Kuwaiti citizenship and geographically 
clustered into bounded neighbourhoods, thus enabling their integration into the political 	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system.  “In order to change the electoral balance of power to the disadvantage of the 
urban commercial elite, the Kuwaiti government gave, in the 1960s and 1970s, a 
percentage of newly naturalised Bedouins the right to vote.”619 Their integration 
represented “a dominant conservative force-one that could mollify any dissent from 
liberal voices like the merchants”. 620 Through electoral gerrymandering,621 the monarch 
was able to install his Bedouin constituents into the National Assembly. The monarch had 
accomplished this goal by establishing ten districts for which citizens each elected five 
members, limiting the number of votes and thus making it easier to manipulate elections 
by buying votes and outbidding strong candidates that were disliked by the regime.622 As 
a result, tribal representatives became the largest single bloc in parliament, and for a 
period of time the most reliable mouthpiece for the monarchs. Evidently, voting results 
for parliamentary elections within the Bedouin constituencies from the 1960s to the 
1980s consistently showed support for pro-government candidates compared with the 
more mixed results in the Hadhar constituencies. 623 Out of the 300 seats represented by 
the six National Assemblies spanning1963–1985, the tribal deputies held 136 seats 
(around 45.3%) compared with the merchants who held 23 seats and the Arab nationalists 	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and liberals, with 71. Moreover, public service employment was available to all citizens 
and the tribesmen were especially attracted to military and police posts, which received 
large budgets throughout the state-building process.624 The Bedouins thus became the 
backbone of the army, police, and security forces. 625 The combined groups of Bedouins 
(those who began settling from the 1940s onwards and those who were brought in by the 
state from Saudi Arabia, beginning in the late 1960s, for political purposes) are currently 
estimated to constitute around 60% of the population.626 
The middle class comprised different strands represented by the politicised 
nationalists, the religious activists, and the politically uncommitted. The politicised 
nationalists were those who were strongly committed to promoting Arab unity and were 
against colonialism in the region. They were represented by two groups: the Democratic 
Bloc led by a prominent physician, Ahmed Al Khatib, and the National Bloc led by a 
member of a prominent family, Jassem Al-Qutami. The second strand, the religious 
activists, mainly comprised Muslim fundamentalist groups known as Jam’iyat Al Islah 
and Jam’iyat Al-Salafiyyn. These two groups seek to spread their conservative Islamic 
doctrine throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti professionals, who are 
categorised as the most educated, represent the politically uncommitted. They do not 
usually adhere to any particular political ideology and they tend to take an independent 
stance on most political and social issues.627 
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As the monarchy promoted tribal dominance within the National Assembly, it created 
a new division of labour by privileging them over the same merchant elites to whom they 
ceded the non-oil economy in order to retain state power.628 The monarch had in a way 
balanced two dominant political and social forces – the Bedouins and the merchants – 
with two other urban social forces – the Sunni labour and the Shi’a minority. The Sunni 
labour represented the urban Sunni males who were given government jobs – clerks, 
managers, and technicians in various state agencies. However, economic dependence on 
the state did not guarantee their loyalty in legislative initiatives; some urban Sunnis were 
moderate and would openly criticise the state when its policies failed. So, the monarch 
countered the unpredictability of the Sunni urban members by reaching out to the Shi’a 
minority. The Kuwaiti Shi’a had also benefited from the developmental stage of state-
building and had entered public employment. A few prominent Shi’a families enjoyed a 
close relationship with the monarch, and exploited government contracts rivalling the 
Sunni merchant elite. After independence, the monarch had reassured the Shi’a of their 
protection from Sunni predominance by pledging official state representation: the original 
electoral districts drawn in 1962 had deliberately encompassed Shi’a neighbourhoods, 
and the Kuwaiti Shi’a had participated in parliamentary politics. The regime had 
furthermore assigned at least one post to a Shi’a minister in most cabinets through the 
years, symbolising official state representation of the Shi’a community.629 
The main issues that dominated debate within the Assembly throughout the first 
decade of its existence (1963–1975) concerned oil policy. 
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The debates over oil policy were exemplified in the scrutiny of the following 
issues: the principle of royalty expensing, the utilization of natural gas, the 
participation agreement, [and] the nationalization of oil… The opposition 
members won credit for leading constructive debates over these issues which 
later culminated in the state undertaking the necessary measures aimed at 
preserving and safeguarding this strategic commodity.630 
Thus, in its first decade of its existence the Assembly performed its legislative 
functions, looking after the material interests and wellbeing of constituents by 
confronting the government in its plans and oil policies. In fact, the view is common to 
all opposition deputies, in particular the secular liberals, that the government must be 
watched closely, not least because of its tendency to appropriate oil resources which 
rightfully belong to the Kuwaiti people.631 However, despite the Assembly’s “superb 
record as illustrated by the debates over the oil policy, [it] tended, in the majority of 
cases, to abuse its authority of controlling the executive branch. This was apparent in the 
much too frequent use of such parliamentary devices as the interrogation of ministers and 
the passing of no-confidence motions”.632 
The first two dissolutions of the Assemblies were promulgated by royal decree; the 
first in August 1976, and a decade later in July 1986 (see chart 3.3 above). There are 
several reasons given for the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament in 1976. First, the 
Assembly failed to decide on a number of legislative proposals, leading to slow and 
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complicated parliamentary procedures. This resulted in the failure of hundreds of 
parliamentary bills, the majority of which were concerned with crucial details 
surrounding the livelihood of the individual citizen. Second, the Assembly wasted most 
of its time in unnecessary debate and often made unfounded allegations against ministers. 
Third, there was a lack of cooperation between the Assembly and the Cabinet of 
Ministers. Finally, the critical conditions in the region which threatened the Gulf 
monarchies dictated swift action by the Kuwaiti leadership to preserve the state’s 
security. Some members of the Assembly had become increasingly linked to opposition 
groups outside the state, leading to inter-Arab politics playing an important role. 
“Students regularly protested not only in solidarity with Palestinians (the largest 
expatriate group in Kuwait), but also with regional opposition groups in Bahrain, Oman, 
and elsewhere in the Gulf.”633 As Kuwait was experiencing its first phase of 
parliamentary politics and acquired a relatively free press, the government feared “that 
the uncontrolled or rather misguided freedom of expression in the National Assembly 
would cause more fragmentation in the society and could ultimately lead to total political 
anarchy and collapse.”634 
Even though the royal family allowed the establishment of a legislative assembly and 
accepted the representation of various social groups within the Assembly, it continued to 
place its own authority above parliamentary politics.635 The legislative debates 
demonstrated that parliamentary politics had unleashed forces that were considered a 
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threat to the hegemony of the ruling family. The legislature had attempted to control, 
criticise, and oversee the work and expenditures of the ruling family and the bureaucracy; 
more, it criticised the executive’s decisions in foreign policy. The Kuwaiti ruling elite 
were particularly sensitive to internal events that affected their relations with other 
states.636 An interesting initiative taken by the legislature before the 1976 dissolution was 
its censuring of Saudi intervention in the domestic affairs of Kuwait. A small group 
within the Assembly had suggested that the government needed to set certain 
requirements for the granting of citizenship to alien Arab residents. Such suggestions 
were considered inappropriate from the perspective of the royal family, and they began to 
fear that such opposition would create instability. Another conflict was over the role of 
the judiciary. The Assembly sought to pass a law granting the Supreme Council of the 
courts the right to review the constitutional status of any government administrative 
order. The Emir vetoed the law, but parliament attempted to obtain a vote during the 
parliamentary session by simple majority. Fearing an undesirable precedent, the 
government dissolved the Assembly.637 “Thus the dissolution of the legislature in Kuwait 
can be viewed as an indication of the importance it assumed and the serious threat it 
posed to the authority of the royal family.”638 
Another reason for the failure of the legislature that led to dissolution in 1976 was the 
structural weaknesses of the opposition. “The banning of formal political parties led to 
the growth of loosely knit opposition groups based on friendship networks. These groups 	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were powerful in mobilising protests and adopting rejection positions, but to retain their 
adherents they tended to outbid each other with extreme positions.”639 For example, the 
opposition within the Assembly “lost merchant support when it tackled stock market 
regulation, finance, planning, price controls and state corruption.”640 Thus, given that 
legislative politics requires collective action in order to make demands on the 
government, the disparate groups within the Assembly were incapable of mobilising 
effectively. This led to the polarisation of politics and the eventual dissolution of the 
legislative assembly. 
This research regards the first parliamentary phase of the Kuwaiti National Assembly 
as an effective period of legislative functioning due to its criticising and exposing of the 
government and the ruling family. Furthermore, between 1963 and 1976 parliament 
enacted 584 laws.641 It succeeded during that time to extend its authority over many areas 
of public policy and was adamant on using all the authority to which it was entitled under 
the constitution. The legislative experience unleashed oppositional forces through the 
election process, further creating a lively debate that was widely reported by the Kuwaiti 
press (thus extending participatory politics to the public). Lastly, its influence on policies 
had presented the ruling family with a serious threat. “The choices were clear – either the 
royal family would have to accept a reduced role and become more like the constitutional 
monarchies of Western Europe, or it had to clamp down on this budding and growing 
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power of the legislature.”642 Ultimately, the ruling family opted to dissolve the legislature 
and suspend the constitution with the encouragement of neighbouring countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. The country thus continued without a parliament for four years, 
until the government changed the electoral boundaries to increase the number of 
constituencies, and held a new election for the fifth parliament in 1981.643 
b. The Second Phase of Parliamentary Politics: 1980–1990 
The second phase of parliamentary politics in Kuwait coincided with the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979. The Kuwaiti ruling elite were wary of the revolution, fearing its 
influence on Kuwaiti politics. The revolution entered Kuwaiti politics through the 
Kuwaiti Shi’a, Iranian residents and several Sunni religious activists, who all supported 
the overthrow of Shah’s regime. The restoration of the National Assembly in 1980 was a 
crucial strategy by the government to contain the importation of regional ideologies. By 
restoring the National Assembly, the government provided a platform for dissidents to 
discuss domestic policies, as an attempt to shift the focus away from foreign policies. “It 
was a political risk. A more open system would make Kuwait still more permeable to 
foreign influences. The Assembly was an attempt to strike a deal with the public – to 
tolerate internal dissent in exchange for excluding discussion of foreign issues.” 644 
In September 1980 precautionary measures to ensure the formation of a pro-
government Assembly were taken by the government in preparation for the election of 
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the new Assembly. The first was the amendment of the 1962 Electoral Law, which 
originally divided Kuwait into ten constituencies with five deputies representing each. 
The amendment divided Kuwait into 25 constituencies, with two deputies representing 
each. The strategy of increasing the number of constituencies was designed to benefit the 
government by enabling it to exert its influence on fewer electors per constituency, thus 
making vote-buying more viable.645 The government sought to justify the change by 
claiming that the demographic structure of the country had changed dramatically due to 
the “opening of new residential areas as well as the shrinking of other areas”.646 In past 
elections, the government had sought domestic allies in order to counter the merchant 
opposition. With the government’s support, including redistricting, the Shi’a had won ten 
seats in the 1975 Assembly. However, in the 1981 elections, the government sought to 
reduce Shi’a representation in the Assembly to four candidates, mainly due to fear of 
their connection with revolutionary Iran.647 
The new (fifth) National Assembly was convened on March 9th, 1981. The elections 
produced an Assembly that included a majority of tribal leaders, a few Sunni Islamists 
and fewer Shi’a members.  The 1981 Assembly successfully completed its four-year 
term; one of its main tasks was to debate the constitutional amendment previously 
proposed by the government in its royal decree. “One group of members interpreted the 
proposal of amending the constitution as a step towards restricting democracy and 
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denying the Assembly its legislative and supervisory powers.” 648 On this basis, they 
declined to debate the issue. However, another group supported the proposal, claiming 
that the critical conditions faced by Kuwait at the time necessitated constitutional change. 
The vote on the motion resulted in the majority supporting the proposal, enabling the 
Assembly to open the debate on constitutional amendments. The debate was heated 
among Assembly members and the opposition was able to encourage the Kuwaiti press to 
wage a popular campaign against the constitutional amendments. Finally, the ruler 
accepted the demands of the majority of the Assembly and the constitutional amendment 
proposal was withdrawn.649 
Other debates that dominated the Assembly included the crash of the unofficial stock 
market, the Suq Al-Manakh, an over-the-counter exchange where the securities of 45 
companies registered in Gulf countries outside Kuwait were traded. It was established a 
few months after the official Kuwait stock exchange was founded in 1977. 650 As the rise 
of oil prices in the late 1970s had generated an unprecedented amount of wealth in the 
Gulf states, “noveau rich Kuwaitis turned to stocks as an investment vehicle to park their 
wealth”.651 The official stock market handled only a small number of government bonds 
and shares in companies registered in Kuwait; therefore, the Suq Al-Manakh had 
emerged due to the scarcity of companies in which to invest. “The nature of the trading in 
the official market and the old family domination through large blocs of privately traded 
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shares also encouraged Suq Al-Manakh.” 652 The Suq appealed to the small investor, since 
its minimum was less than half that of the official market. The government did not 
officially sanction the Suq, but neither did it close it. 
In 1982, the crash of the Suq Al-Manakh led hundreds of speculators into default, with 
unsecured debt causing the market to inflate and pop. 653 The government was slow to 
develop a policy to react to the crisis. The Cabinet of Ministers was split between the 
those who wanted to bail the investors out and others who called for criminal 
proceedings.654 Despite the decline of oil revenues, the government prepared a bailout 
plan and gave support to thousands of investors who lost heavily in the collapse. The 
state continued to cover the liabilities and by the mid-1980s the land acquisition 
programme had ended and civil service hiring had almost halted.655 The Suq Al-Manakh 
crisis gave the government an opportunity to re-establish its links with the older 
merchants. This group played a crucial role in resolving the crisis by supporting the 
government in negotiating settlements within the Chamber of Commerce.656 “At the end 
of 1986, the government announced that it would resume high levels of expenditure on 
land purchases, earmarking an additional $340 million a year in an effort to stimulate the 
economy.”657 
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The Suq Al-Manakh crisis was increasingly overshadowed by the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979 and the Iran–Iraq War in 1980. The Iranian Revolution had an inevitable impact 
on Kuwaiti domestic politics. Ayatollah Khomeini declared that it was his nation’s policy 
to encourage Islamic uprisings “with the directive of replacing the Western-oriented 
regimes of the Gulf with Iranian-oriented, preferably Shia, theocracies”.658 Iran’s policies 
impelled Kuwait into joining the coalition of Arab states supporting Iraq in its war with 
Iran. In 1983, “a series of six car bomb attacks occurred at the US and French embassies, 
the airport, a residential area, two ministries and the industrial area …”659 The attacks 
were linked to a Tehran-based Iraqi Shi’a opposition group with the name of the ‘Islamic 
Da’wa Party’.660 Another incident included a failed assassination attempt on the reigning 
Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh Jaber, by foreign pro-Iranian militants in May 1985. “The regime 
interpreted these attacks as evidence that Iran was manipulating foreign organisations and 
Kuwaiti Shia citizens to punish Kuwait for supporting Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War.”661 
These incidents prompted the Kuwaiti government to reassess its relationship with the 
Kuwaiti Shi’a community. It is important to note that the security issues emanating from 
the Iranian revolution and the war only became truly domestic issues as a result of 
previous political decisions made by the Kuwaiti ruling elite.662 During Kuwait’s first 
phase of parliamentary politics, the government had relied on the Shi’a to balance the 
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Sunni opposition and merchants, who would openly criticise the states when its policies 
failed.663 By developing an alliance with the Shi’a, the leadership had inadvertently 
politicised them. This was not the first politicisation of the Shi’a community; Shi’as had 
joined the Majlis Movement in 1938 with full force and were outspoken about concerns 
at their disenfranchisement from the electorate that voted for government department 
committees in the early 1950s. “But when Shias demonstrated in 1938 and at other times, 
they were under the control of established Shia leaders, large merchant families like al-
Kazimi, Marifi, Behbehani, [and] Qabazard.” 664 During the 1960s and 70s, the 
government felt secure enough in its control to encourage sectarianism as a 
counterbalance to the radicalism of the merchant class. When the Iranian Revolution 
erupted in 1979, the government failed to anticipate the mass appeal of revolutionary Iran 
and the domestic consequence of encouraging sectarianism. Once the dangers of the 
revolution became apparent, the government overreacted.665 There was no evidence that 
the Shi’a community as a whole was less than loyal to the regime; however, the Kuwaiti 
government began to perceive them as an extension of the external threat of the Iranian 
Revolution.666 It began to distance the Shi’a community from the state and “shuffle the 
margins of its coalition”.667 In 1981, the government raised the number of electoral 
districts from 10 to 25 as a way to dilute Shi’a voting enclaves, dropping their Assembly 	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participation from ten seats in 1975 to four seats in 1985 (see above). An unofficial 
policy of discrimination against Shi’as in key state positions was in effect, where high 
ranking Shi’as were eased out of key military and police posts. “Shias complained of 
tight security surveillance in Shi’a neighbourhoods, of tightening quotas at Kuwait 
University, of vanishing job opportunities in both the public and private sectors, and of 
growing restrictions on communal and religious life.”668 However, the Kuwaiti 
government did not intend to permanently disenfranchise the Shi’a: “even during this 
period, it kept close ties with Shi’a families and parliamentary deputies … it [only] 
sought to ride out the Iran–Iraq war by playing off Sunni fears, gambling that it could win 
back Shi’a trust through royal entreaties and political compensation afterwards.”669 
While the Shi’a coalition within the Assembly was being quietened, a new political 
bloc was beginning to emerge: Sunni Islamist groups who were popular in the tribal areas 
and the lower income communities. As a consequence of electoral redistricting in 1981, 
the Sunni Islamists manifested into a new force in parliament by securing five seats in 
1985. They allied themselves with the conservative tribal parliamentarians and endorsed 
the regime’s policies. In return, the regime accommodated their positions on social issues 
such as advancing religious education and supporting Islamic financial regulations.670 
However, the 1985 Assembly also included a large bloc of liberals, resulting in one of the 
most combative assemblies the regime had ever faced. The stock market crash and 
regional security threats had generated heated debates within the Assembly that 
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ultimately led to the forced resignation of an Al-Sabah member from a ministerial post. 
The resignation was a political first and had the Emir believing that the Assembly had 
overstepped its boundaries; thus, in July 1986, he suspended parliament indefinitely,671 
citing security concerns, excessive division and the need for unity in the face of the Iran–
Iraq War.672 
The truth was that the dissolution of the 1986 Assembly was prompted by repeated 
collisions between the government and the parliament over cases of corruption by various 
ministers. Immediately after its election in February 1985, the Assembly confronted the 
government over the alleged improper use of government funds by the justice minister 
during the Suq Al-Manakh crisis. The minister was a member of the royal family, and 
was accused of procuring personal financial gain during the crisis; evidence was gathered 
and the opposition within the Assembly organised a motion of no confidence in the 
minister. Due to the widespread support for the motion, the minister submitted his 
resignation in advance, and the Emir promptly accepted it. The confrontation between 
parliament and government continued even after the minister’s resignation, the Assembly 
focusing on the financial sector. The Assembly invoked its right to appoint a special 
investigation committee to examine internal documents at the Central Bank; the 
committee submitted a report with investigative details of a KD150 million loan granted 
by the Commercial Bank to the Industrial Bank of Kuwait. Sensing an encroachment on 
its executive authority, the government rejected the report and passed the issue to the 
Constitutional Court. The State Audit Bureau’s alleged mismanagement of the country’s 	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reserves caused a heated reaction within the Assembly. The Assembly, citing 
misappropriation of funds, reprimanded both the finance minister and the oil minister. 
Other ministers were exposed to severe criticism by the Assembly, which prompted the 
government to submit its resignation on July 1, 1986 citing “the impossibility of 
cooperation between the cabinet and the Assembly.”673 
Most of the factional groups in Kuwait welcomed the dissolution of the Assembly in 
1986. The merchant community accepted the government’s decision to dissolve the 
Assembly, as the confrontation between the legislature and the government had been a 
main obstacle to a thriving economy. The middle class welcomed the dissolution as a 
way out of the deadlock within parliament, which was blamed on overambitious deputies. 
The Islamic bloc was compensated with the removal of the education minister, who was 
the focus of their complaints over the years due to his anti-Islamic reforms. This left the 
progressive group (liberals) as the only group opposed to the dissolution; they believed 
that the experience of the previous 25 years (since independence) had proven that Kuwait 
was capable of handling democratic elections and procedures. As the country was facing 
severe security threats due to the spillover of the Iran–Iraq war, the dissolution of the 
Assembly was accepted by Kuwaiti society because most believed that the Kuwaiti 
parliamentarians had abused their authority in order to control the executive and bring 
down a government minister.674 The competing behaviour of the deputies had raised 
alarms as to the need for national unity at times of crisis, leading the regime to view the 
parliament as a liability and to completely dissolve a democratic institution in the name 
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of national security. After the dissolution of the Assembly in 1986, the government took 
further security measures: for the first time since independence, a government-appointed 
censor was assigned to every newspaper and publication. “The government justified its 
actions by citing the increasingly violent pressures emanating from the Iraq–Iran war, the 
parliamentary crisis, and the developing militancy expressed by sections of the Shi’a 
community.” 675 The government went further, limiting public meetings. 
It was not until 1988 that a coalition was formed demanding the return of 
constitutional life and condemning the restrictive security measures taken by the 
government.676 The Constitutional Movement or, as many would call it, the ‘Diwaniyah 
Movement’, included the merchant elites, the liberals, and a few Sunni Islamists and 
tribal leaders. The movement was mainly led by secularist liberal Sunnis.677 Their 
demands were simple and non-confrontational as regards the regime: they reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of Al-Sabah rule and aimed for the restoration of parliament and civic 
freedoms.678 The movement organised huge rallies and former Assembly members began 
to sponsor diwaniyahs, weekly meetings in private homes or privately owned halls – they 
are considered the quintessential institution of Kuwait civil society.679 As the movement 
still largely supported the Al-Sabah regime, the government’s initial reaction was 
restrained. However, as the opposition went on to demand their rights the regime turned 
to the Kuwait State Security police, which responded with force, using stun grenades and 	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tear gas. Ultimately, the government announced the unprecedented closure of the 
diwaniyahs. Since the movement mainly consisted of the Sunni merchant elites, the 
government’s use of force against them in 1988 was quite unsettling for the Sunni ruling 
family. The liberal Sunnis had always been a loyal opposition to the regime; however, 
their participation in the Diwaniyah Movement represented a direct challenge to its 
authority. Nevertheless, the government did not have the political will to respond to their 
insubordination with the same level of force that it willingly used against the Shi’a, and 
in February 1990 the regime opened private negotiations with the opposition coalition in 
hopes of a compromise. In April of that year, the Emir extended an offer: a new National 
Council that was to be partly elected and partly appointed. The opposition largely 
rejected the offer; however, before the regime could respond, external forces had 
intervened.680 
c. The Third Phase of Parliamentary Politics (1990–2002) 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The crisis ended with the liberation of Kuwait 
and the defeat of Iraq in February 1991. The Iraqi invasion and the events that followed 
brought an important turning point in the political development of Kuwait.681 In October 
1990, at the height of these events and before the liberation, a conference was held in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While in exile, the reigning Emir, Sheikh Jaber, met with the 
opposition forces and agreed to demands for greater democratisation, provided they stood 	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by him during his exile.682 The conference in Jeddah was a rare opportunity for the 
Kuwaiti people to reject the Al-Sabah regime and call for revolutionary democratic 
alternatives. Instead, Kuwaiti social groups demanded the restoration of their 
monarchy;683 and in return, they expected a commitment by the Emir to constitutionalism 
and the return of parliamentary politics. This agreement was more like a renewal of the 
old political contract between the ruler and the ruled.684 Acknowledging the importance of 
political stability to the preservation of his regime, Sheikh Jaber responded by honouring 
his assurances on restoring civic freedoms and holding parliamentary elections after the 
liberation; elections were scheduled for October 1992. 
After years of limited political activity, the election campaign for the 1992 Assembly 
was lively.685 To ensure that the Al-Sabah ruling family kept its promises, Kuwaiti 
intellectuals invited U.S. politicians to advise them on campaign techniques and public 
lobbying. They also called for international observers to monitor the polls.686 The 
majority of the elected parliamentarians were from the opposition, and independent 
candidates. Opposition factions united within the Assembly, where they had the 
opportunity to participate in forming the government. During its term, the Assembly 	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initiated a series of investigations, including inquiries into the events leading to the Iraqi 
invasion, government responsibility for the Kuwaiti defeat, alleged corruption and 
mismanagement in the Kuwait Investment Office (which manages the country’s overseas 
capital), and the cost-effectiveness of arms deals with Western powers. The Assembly 
thus opened the door to criticism on the government’s policies and its role in the Iraqi 
invasion. The investigations touched on sensitive issues and required confrontations with 
top government officials, including members of the ruling family. “It was the first time in 
the history of the GCC countries that such people were publically questioned, strongly 
criticised and forced to take responsibility for their actions.”687 Kuwaiti opposition groups 
accused the leadership of misuse of power, corruption and an array of flawed foreign 
policy decisions that led to the occupation of their country. 
During the Iraqi occupation, almost all Kuwaiti groups (Bedouins, Shi’a, naturalised 
citizens, etc.) supported the Kuwaiti monarchy and rejected the imposed provisional 
government that was set up by the occupying Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The national unity 
of the Kuwaiti population during the Iraqi invasion was thus a key motivator for both the 
government and the opposition to find a peaceful solution to their political impasse. 
“Invasion and occupation created a sense of solidarity and eroded social cleavages”688 to 
the point where the government began to adapt to demands by the younger generation of 
naturalised citizens for political equality (the right to participate in parliamentary politics, 
i.e., voting and candidacy). In 1994, the Assembly passed a political rights law that stated 
that every male born to a Kuwaiti father, whether that person was naturalised or not, was 
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a Kuwaiti by origin, thus granting him the right to vote and to run for office.689 
Participatory politics was therefore extended to a certain percentage of the population, 
and social divisions were somewhat minimised. Nevertheless, the ruling elite continued 
to interfere in parliamentary elections, mostly by shifting coalition alliances and vote-
buying. 
The 1996 Assembly was not as confrontational as the previous one.690 The opposition 
had dropped seven seats from their 1992 level, leaving them with 14 seats. Meanwhile, 
there was an increase in seats held by the pro-government, or “service” candidates, those 
seeking to work with the government in return for patronage in the form of services for 
their constituents. 691 The government had encouraged this trend by promoting tribal 
primaries (preliminary elections to determine which candidate will represent the tribe in 
the parliamentary election), thereby increasing the political weight of the tribes in the 
electorate. This arrangement between the government and the tribes has led to a sharp 
increase in the number of tribal parliamentarians over the years, and consequently, a loyal 
pro-government support group within the Assembly.692 However, tensions between the 
government and Islamist groups in the Assembly arose when the Ministry of Information 
permitted books critical of Islam to be displayed at the international book fair in 
Kuwait.693 On May 3, 1999, the Emir constitutionally dissolved parliament due to the 
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Islamists’ attempts to grill the interior minister, Sheikh Saud Nasser Al-Sabah, for 
allowing the publication of material that was considered contrary to Kuwaiti and Islamic 
cultural values.694 The Emir viewed this interpellation as a violation of his powers, 
especially coming from the Islamists who had an unwritten agreement with the leadership 
never to attack members of the ruling family. The Crown Prince and Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Sa’ad al Abdullah Al-Sabah, warned the Islamists that criticising the ruling family 
jeopardised the security of the country, and that this security would always be prioritised 
“over and above democracy”. 695 In an attempt to defuse the crisis, then, the Emir 
dissolved parliament and called for new elections to be held in July 1999. 
The election campaign for the 1999 Assembly was again characterised by intense 
activity on the part of various political groups (more details on the different groups later). 
“During traditional political meetings in diwaniyas, candidates openly charged the 
government with conspiracy, interference in the elections, incompetence, [and] 
corruption.”696 Demands for greater political participation and reform were central, 
including women’s political rights and the (suspended) right to hold tribal primaries, 
whose results had significantly impacted previous parliamentary elections. The resulting 
Assembly had fewer pro-government members, and there were gains for Islamists, who 
undertook a number of actions to widen the role of the Islamic law within society – for 
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example, they managed to force the government to reintroduce gender segregation at 
Kuwait University. 697 
Tensions between parliament and the government developed again in 2002 when 
Assembly members grilled the finance minister on the matter of misappropriation of 
public funds. Recurring crises between parliament and the government followed between 
1999 and 2009, which typically ended in the dissolution of parliament or the dismissal of 
government (see chart 3.4 above for a list of Assemblies that completed their terms). 
Overall, while the previous decade of the 1980s had demonstrated the regime’s ability to 
modify and adjust its coalition preferences in response to various crises, the post-Gulf 
War 1990s revealed how the coalition groups themselves were also able to shift 
allegiance in line with their own interests.698 After liberation, tensions between the 
government and opposition groups were mainly due to structural shifts within the social 
classes. The government was attempting to rebuild its coalitions in order to maintain its 
authority in the context of parliamentary politics and secure its legitimacy in the running 
of the country. The regime began by rekindling its relationship with the old merchant 
elites in order to better coordinate economic policy, providing them with more 
institutionalised access to policymaking in exchange for technocratic expertise. This 
created a schism between the government and the younger merchant class, who became 
more sympathetic to the traditional liberal opposition. The Kuwaiti liberals, in the 
meantime, gained ground within parliament and spearheaded new reform demands, such 
as female suffrage and electoral redistricting. Despite the government’s attempts to win 
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back the support of the Shi’a coalition, the Kuwaiti Shi’a tended to align with the liberal 
opposition due to harboured resentment for their treatment during the 1980s.699 The Sunni 
labour class had also deviated from the monarchy, the promise of government wages no 
longer being sufficient to dictate their political loyalties. The Islamists within the 
Assembly also proved to be less than reliable allies of the ruling elite and would join 
other opposition forces in challenging state policies and instigating corruption charges.700 
Finally, the tribal community became less dependable due to generational turnover, 
where some of the younger tribesmen had not inherited their elders’ aversion to 
progressive urban politics.701 These shifts in coalitions and the emergence of new blocs 
continued to dominate Kuwaiti politics and contribute to the ongoing struggle between 
parliament and government in the decade following, ending with the Arab Spring in 
2011. Overall, recent decades of parliamentary politics demonstrate that even though 
Kuwait’s political system has an active legislature, the ruling elites have perpetually 
fought for the upper hand, witness the repeated dissolution of parliament, a crucial 
weapon by which the government continues to exert its influence in order to preserve its 
sovereignty. 
III. The Advancement of Parliamentary Politics 
In examining the past four decades of parliamentary politics, this research outlines the 
various challenges that face its advancement in Kuwait. These challenges may be divided 
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into two categories: structural and political. The non-partisan nature of parliament and the 
process of government formation represent structural challenges that restrict the 
development of an effective parliament. The illegality of political parties in Kuwait 
creates an imbalance in parliament’s functioning as between the government and the 
elected members. The government (represented by the Cabinet of Ministers) is allowed to 
speak and be represented as a united bloc, making it the only de facto political party 
permitted to operate in parliament. Meanwhile, the elected members are not allowed to 
function collectively, or to mobilise a coalition with its own representative within 
parliament. Hence, the government enjoys a stronger position in lobbying for votes on 
key issues. “The government ministers move among the elected members as a unified 
body; while elected members can speak only as individuals.” 702 
In addition to the Cabinet of Ministers (who make up one-third of the Assembly), 
around 50% of elected members would not have been elected without the support of the 
government, making the government capable of winning a majority vote on any 
legislation being passed. The government’s support of candidates takes the form of 
financial incentives and the facilitation of various types of services for the candidates’ 
electoral constituency. Having a large presence of unelected members in parliament 
dilutes the democratic process and remains a major structural weakness in Kuwaiti 
parliamentary politics. The manipulation of the electoral process by the government has 
led to several elected Assemblies that were favourable to government positions. This 
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government interference in the electoral process represents a key challenge to the 
advancement of parliamentary politics in Kuwait. 703 
Another structural restraint within Kuwait’s parliamentary system is the process of 
government formation. The government is represented by the Cabinet of Ministers, which 
is appointed by the prime minister and approved by both the Emir and parliament. If 
parliament does not approve of the government, the prime minister takes up the matter 
with the Emir, who then decides whether to ask the prime minister to form a new 
government, or dissolve parliament and call for a new election. The constitution allows 
the concept of appointed ministers as de facto members of parliament. Conversely, the 
government has to include at least one elected member of parliament in order to be a 
constitutional government. If an elected minister disagrees with the Cabinet on an issue 
and decides to resign, the government is then rendered unconstitutional. As a 
precautionary measure, the government has increased the number of elected ministers to 
two, and sometimes four or five. The issue of how many ministers should be elected 
parliamentarians is fiercely debated; as the constitution limits the size of the cabinet to 16 
ministers, including the prime minister, the government should not constitute more than 
one-third of the parliament in order not to dominate voting. 704 
Meanwhile, there are three main political challenges that restrict the development of 
an efficient parliament: a disparity in the balance of power; internal divisions within the 
opposition; and leadership competition within the ruling family.705 The disparity in the 
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balance of power is derived from the vast resources that are at the disposal of the 
government and which give it a dominant position in any balance of power. The Kuwaiti 
government controls all major economic resources in the country. Since 1975, it has 
owned 100% of the oil industry, the main source of income for Kuwait.706 The massive 
oil resources are at the direct political and bureaucratic disposal of the government, 
leading to an increase in government influence within the political system “... to the 
extent that no other socioeconomic players could challenge it”. 707 Another major source 
of power in the hands of the government is land. The government owns 97% of the land 
in Kuwait, and its distribution, preservation and use are entirely at its discretion. Lastly, 
the government employs 95% of the labour force, making it the main source of income 
for most Kuwaiti citizens. 
Another challenge to the advancement of parliamentary politics is internal divisions 
within the opposition in parliament.708 The main divisions lie between liberal and Islamic, 
urban and tribal, and in terms of sectarian tension, between Sunni and Shi’a. These 
divisions provide the ruling elites with the ability to play off one group against the other, 
until the end result accedes to their authority. As such, the Arab Spring in 2011 was 
alarming to the ruling elite because these political and social divisions came together in 
mass demonstrations calling for political reform. Such unity among the opposition and 
the population as a whole created panic within the ruling elite and led to the heightening 
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of internal security and an increase in cooperation efforts with fellow GCC members (see 
Chapter 4). Overall, despite an array of government advantages, the Kuwaiti parliament 
makes repeated challenges, and the threat inherent in its purpose and function has 
prompted the Emir to use his constitutional rights to dissolve the legislature on numerous 
occasions. This research subscribes to the idea that the Kuwaiti parliament may not be 
efficient in passing laws and enacting real political reform, but it nevertheless fulfils the 
particular function of confronting the government and keeping it in check. 
Despite the challenges, it is important to highlight the positive elements of Kuwait’s 
parliamentary politics. For example, differences of opinion within the ruling family have 
greatly influenced the advancement of parliamentary politics in Kuwait. Political 
differences among members of the ruling family have proved to be of benefit in terms of 
a more open society and a more participatory form of governing. In fact, one of the major 
factors that led to the establishment of the 1938 Legislative Council was the sharp 
differences between the reigning Emir, Sheikh Ahmad and another member of the family, 
Sheikh Abdulla, who became the Chairman of the Council and later Emir (in 1950). As 
noted above, Sheikh Abdulla is known as the father of the constitution, and had strongly 
supported the concept of parliamentary democracy, keeping in check those members of 
the ruling family opposed to the concept. Moreover, differences of opinion within the 
ruling family surfaced during the 1976 Assembly dissolution, where two members of the 
family withdrew from parliament in order to limit the power of the wider ruling family 
due to their commitment to the constitution. “Since Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, 
differences over the level of commitment to democracy and the constitution, and over the 
way the country is being administered, have been clear, with public statements and 
 252 
resignations from public office used as expressions of such differences.”709 A historical 
difference of opinion was publically aired between members of the ruling family on July 
13, 1997, when 17 junior members of the family signed a petition to the Emir demanding 
political reforms and a clear commitment to the constitution. The leader of the group 
made the petition public and went further by meeting with various political groups to 
discuss their concerns. Thus, differences among the ruling family have proved to be 
helpful in the advancement of parliamentary politics.710 
Another key positive element of parliamentary politics in Kuwait is the emergence of 
political groupings. While the Kuwaiti constitution does not specifically prohibit the 
formation of political parties, there is no mechanism for their registration as legal entities. 
In order to legalise parties, a constitutional amendment would be required, which needs a 
two-thirds majority vote in parliament and the endorsement of the Emir. However, the 
constitution does state the political parties should be allowed at some point in the 
development of parliamentary democracy in Kuwait.711 In the meantime, political 
groupings do exist, and act as de facto parties. In recent years, the main political 
distinctions have been between Islamists, the liberals/secularists, the tribalists, and the 
Shi’a. The emergence of these political groupings has played an important role in 
confronting the government on various issues. They have continued to transform and 
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shift positions over time; however, ultimately, they infuse lively discussion into the 
political process and help shape and influence government decisions.712 
a. Political Groupings in Parliament: 
1) The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM): The ICM is represented by the 
Sunni Islamic Brotherhood Movement, one of the strongest political movements 
in Kuwait. It “has had links with the Muslim Brotherhood and supports a 
revolutionary pan-Islamic message that calls for an essential reorganization of 
society’s institutions”. 713 This group is characterised as being highly organised, 
and has a hand in the operation of important economic institutions and charities 
throughout the country. It maintains a presence in the Coalition of Universities, 
the teachers’ association, trade unions, ministries, the Islamic Zakat centre and the 
Islah society. It also owns a number of effective media outlets. Through its non-
governmental organisation, the Social Reform Society, it issues a monthly 
periodical that calls for the application of Islam as the sole source of legislation in 
the state.714 The secretary-general of the movement is Nasser Al-Sane; its 
representatives include prominent opposition figures such as Osama Shaheen, 
Jamaan Herbish, Hamad Al-Matr, Mohammad Dalal and Falah Al-Azami.715 
2) The Popular Islamic Bloc: This group consists of the religious fundamentalist 
Sunnis who are otherwise known as Salafis. They have links to the Wahabbis and 	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pursue a very conservative agenda that focuses on maintaining the traditional 
power structures of society. Politically, it runs parallel to the ICM, but with a 
much stricter ideology.716 Unlike the ICM, its activities are more spontaneous than 
institutional. Although the political agenda of the ICM and the Salafis differ, they 
are still able to unite on social issues such as gender segregation and “raising the 
standards of public morals”.717 Its first two leaders were Jassim Al-Aoun and 
Khaled Sultan.718 
3) The National Islamic Alliance (NIA): This is the largest political grouping 
representing the Shi’a community. It is largely composed of Shi’a Islamists; 
however, it supports both liberal and Islamist candidates.719 Affiliates include 
former MPs, Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmad Lari.720 
4) The National Democratic Alliance (NDA): The NDA consists mainly of secular 
liberals. It supports the constitutional arrangements but generally advocates 
further democratisation. In 2005, it firmly supported granting women full political 
rights.721 Its current leader is Khaled Al-Fadhala, a prominent opposition figure.722 
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An affiliate of the alliance is former parliamentarian, Mohammed Jassem Al 
Saqer.723 
5) Kuwait Democratic Forum (KDF): The KDF was formed after the liberation of 
Kuwait from Iraq in 1991. It consists of a nationalist-leftist stream which 
comprises former Arab nationalists who represented the traditional opposition 
movement. It had a strong presence in the 1985 parliament, and has recently 
joined forced with the NDA.724 
6) The Popular Action Bloc (PAB): Formed in 2001, this is more of a parliamentary 
faction than a unified political group. It is a coalition of like-minded MPs 
pursuing populist economic policies and committed to strong parliamentary 
oversight of public money and constitutional safeguards. Its members are strongly 
oppositionist and rally around a populist agenda. It includes nationalists, tribal 
deputies, Islamists and, on occasions, Shi’a MPs.725 Its two leading figures are 
prominent opposition figures, Ahmed Al-Saadoun and Mussalam Al-Barrak, both 
former parliamentarians. In 2006, the PAB threw its support behind the new 
transgressors of political boundaries in Kuwait: reform-minded youth 
movements.726 In 2011/2012, the group and its members had a key role in the 
Arab Spring demonstrations in Kuwait. 
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7) The Constitutional Bloc: This bloc represents the country’s powerful merchant 
families. It comprises prominent businessmen who have close ties to the Kuwaiti 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which enjoys great political and economic 
power in state affairs. Its members have always called for giving way to the 
people’s participation in parliamentary politics.727 
8) The Tribalists: The tribalists represent the outer constituencies of Kuwait. The 
largely tribal population was brought into Kuwait’s political sphere by the ruling 
family in the 1960s and 1970s as a counterweight to the more politically 
sophisticated and demanding urban population (see above). They were the last of 
the Kuwaiti population to benefit from the 1970s oil boom, making them more 
susceptible to economic incentives from the government.728 They thus make up 
what was described above as the majority of the “service deputies” within the 
Assembly; that is, intermediaries in patron-client relationships between the ruler 
and the people. Once elected, the service deputies provide tangible benefits to 
their constituents. “The government is happy to oblige because such 
representatives do not challenge its right to rule as long as benefits continue to 
flow to their constituents through themselves.”729 However, their allegiance to the 
government is not always solid due to generational variations (mentioned above), 
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and has continued to fluctuate through the years. These tribal forces include the 
Al-Mutair, Al-Rashaida, Al-Awazem and Al-Ajman tribes.730 
IV. Kuwait’s Political Challenges (2003–2010) 
Before the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, Kuwait was experiencing a cycle of 
parliamentary dissolutions and snap elections due to a struggle between the government 
and opposition groups. This section aims to present the events that led to this struggle: the 
separation of the post of the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister in 2003; the succession 
crisis after the death of Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah; and the emergence of a 
popular movement that successfully pressured that government into altering the electoral 
system in 2006. The consequences of these events culminated in the Arab Spring 
demonstrations in 2011–2012, where various socio-political groupings in Kuwait joined 
forces to peacefully demonstrate against government corruption. This research highlights 
these events as being among the political challenges that led Kuwait into political 
deadlock. 
a. Limited Political Reform and the Succession Crisis (2003–2006) 
The results in the parliamentary election for the 2003 Assembly were highly influenced 
by the political situation in the region. The U.S. invasion of Iraq that led to the end of the 
Saddam regime had removed the “Iraqi threat” on which the Kuwaiti government had 
relied to secure public support for its pro-government candidates.731 The Shi’a expected to 	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gain more seats due to developments in Iraq, where the Iraqi Shi’a gained power after 
years of discrimination under Saddam. The liberals also expected to gain; they were 
pushing for the modernisation of the country that went along with President’s Bush 
initiative to bring democracy to the region.732 However, their expectations proved wrong. 
The liberals suffered a setback, with the number of independent liberals in parliament 
going from six to four. Their defeat had to do with U.S. policies in the region, where 
American democratic initiatives were perceived as hypocritical due to their occupation of 
Iraq. The Assembly thus saw a majority of Islamist candidates, both Shi’a and Sunni, 
taking 21 out of the 50 seats. The service candidates represented by the tribalists also 
gained a good number of seats, leading to an Assembly that was almost equally divided 
between pro-government lawmakers and an Islamist-dominated opposition.733 
Immediately after the elections of July 2003, the reigning Emir, Sheikh Jaber, decided 
to separate the posts of Crown Prince and Prime Minister for the first time in Kuwait’s 
political history. The post of Crown Prince had held the position of Prime Minister since 
the inauguration of the constitution, stipulating the right of the Emir to select his own 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister. The constitution does not specify that the same person 
should hold both posts. According to sources, the Emir yielded to pressure by the U.S. 
government to introduce political reforms after the fall of the Iraqi dictator. “Kuwait’s 
ruling family has been under intense pressure – particularly from the US – to loosen its 
grip on power.”734 Following the Iraqi invasion in 1990, Kuwait had difficulty gathering 	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international support for military intervention due to its being perceived as a non-
democratic nation, and the Kuwaiti leadership has been conscious of its image within the 
international community ever since. As former GCC Secretary-General, Abdulla Bishara, 
explains it: “Kuwait needs to be worth saving and respecting, and becoming more 
democratic is one way to accomplish this goal.”735 The separation of the posts of Prime 
Minister and Crown Prince was thus a decision taken by the Emir in an attempt to 
implement political reform. He considered political reform a matter of national security, 
and pertinent to the preservation of his regime. 
The first to hold the post of Prime Minister as a separate entity to the Crown Prince 
was the Emir’s brother, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed Al-Sabah (the current Emir). As with the 
post of Crown Minister, the new post of Prime Minister that was created in 2003 was 
exclusively assigned to members of the ruling family. Nevertheless, the separation of the 
two posts was considered a major step towards political reform in Kuwait. The possibility 
of appointing someone outside the royal family as prime minister is more realistic now 
that the positions have been separated. Moreover, since the prime minister assumes the 
role of head of government, the separation of the two posts allows parliament to question 
the prime minister on potential corruption without implicating the Crown Prince. A 
leading political consultant, Jassem Al-Saadoun, states: “Separating the posts of prime 
minister from crown prince is very important. It will enhance the power of parliament. 
You are at least potentially able to change the prime minister if he fails.”736 Although 
members of parliament do not have the power to confirm cabinet nominees (the Cabinet 
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of Ministers is appointed by the Emir), they are allowed no confidence votes by simple 
majority, enabling them to remove individual ministers. This step is usually taken after 
parliamentary questioning of that minister, referred to in Kuwait as ‘grilling’. The 
constitution stipulates that this may also be applied to the prime minister, where the 
Assembly is allowed to remove the prime minister by voting on a motion citing “inability 
to cooperate with the government”.737 Accordingly, the Emir is authorised to use his 
constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it threatens to grill government 
ministers. 
Following the decision to separate the two posts, the Emir asked parliament, as a token 
of respect for him, to grant women the right to vote. “The parliament acknowledged that 
it respected the Emir, but did not grant his wish.”738 The Emir nevertheless appointed 
women to cabinet positions, despite the objections of Islamists within the Assembly. In 
response, the Islamists mounted campaigns against the women, demanding that all female 
ministers wear the veil. Their demands were ignored by the ruling family, who became 
the main institutional force behind women’s political rights in Kuwait. The government 
initially changed its position from indifference to a more positive view of women’s 
political rights after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, where women had demonstrated 
their patriotism by joining resistance groups against the Iraqi invaders. External pressures 
emanating from U.S. policies in the region had also impacted the ruling family’s support 
for women’s rights. In addition, the government was faced with increasing internal 
pressures from domestic women’s movements. By 2005, women’s rights had become a 
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dominating topic within parliament and Kuwaiti society, complete with street 
demonstrations and lively debates in the popular press. The government thus employed 
the full range of its power by providing material incentives for some members of the 
Assembly to pass a law allowing political rights for women. 
In addition, a clever parliamentary maneuver forced the body to vote on a new 
version of the law, which was introduced as an act of emergence, requiring only 
one vote in the same session for passage. This meant that the opponents of the 
bill would have no time to offer counter-incentives to vulnerable members or use 
the normal two weeks’ interval to mobilize citizens against it. 739 
Political rights for women was achieved on May 16, 2005, around eight months before 
Sheikh Jaber’s death.740 Allowing women to vote and run for parliament significantly 
changed Kuwait’s electoral system and parliamentary politics. The number of eligible 
voters almost doubled in the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2007. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of women in the electoral base increased pressure on the 
government to legalise political parties. Lawmakers began to approach the prime minister 
“to amend Kuwaiti law to explicitly permit the functioning of political parties”,741 
emphasising pluralism and the peaceful rotation of power. The speaker of parliament, 
Jassim Al-Khorafi, called for the legalisation of political parties as part of the process of 
democratic reform: “Democracy in Kuwait cannot continue without political organisation 
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based on parties.”742 However, legalising political parties was deemed risky by the 
government, which believed that the domination of particular groups (such as the 
Islamists) might backfire and destabilise the country. 
In January 2006 the death of the Emir led to a succession crisis. “For many years, both 
the reigning Emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, and the Crown Prince, Sheikh 
Sa’ad Al Abdulla Al-Sabah, were too frail to perform the duties of their respective offices 
– indeed they were almost incapacitated.”743 The Emir’s brother, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad 
Al-Sabah, had thus taken over many of the responsibilities of both the Emir and the 
Crown Prince. Due to heir-designate Sheikh Sa’ad’s incapacitation, his assumption of 
power was contested both within the ruling family and the Assembly. Within the ruling 
family, a majority had publicly invited Sheikh Sabah to lead the nation; however, Sheikh 
Sa’ad insisted that he was fit to rule and wished to take the oath in front of parliament, as 
required by the constitution. The failure of the ruling family to resolve the succession 
crisis paved the way for parliament to intervene and play a decisive (and constitutional) 
role in settling the dispute. The parliament moved to depose the heir-designate and opted 
for Sheikh Sabah. In order to avoid a direct parliamentary deposition, Sheikh Sa’ad 
issued a letter of abdication, leading to the appointment of the acting Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Sabah, as the new Emir on January 29, 2006. 744 
Kuwait’s succession crisis was complicated by a stipulation in the constitution that 
restricted the right to rule to one branch of the Al-Sabah family: the descendants of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742 Ibid. 
743 Khalaf, A. & Luciani, G. (2006). Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf. Dubai: 
Gulf Research Center, 46. 
744 Salem (2007). 
 263 
Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah. The stipulation was designed to put an end to factional strife 
within the family; however, in practice, it translated into a complex and informal 
procedure to regulate the alternating of power between the descendants of Sheikh 
Mubarak’s two sons, Salem and Jaber.745 The consequence of the appointment of Sheikh 
Sabah (who is from the Jaber line) in 2006 was the favouring of one branch of the royal 
family, which now held all the important posts.746 Sheikh Sabah further sidelined the 
Salem branch of the family when he appointed his brother, Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad, as 
the new Crown Prince, and his nephew, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmad, as 
prime minister, both from the Jaber branch.747 
The allocation of posts to members of the royal family inevitably created 
dissatisfaction among the sheikhs, who began to use parliamentary interpellation to attack 
the government and try to force redistributions of cabinet posts.748 “… (Royal) rivals have 
used members of the National Assembly as proxies, encouraging parliamentary 
challenges to weaken the other’s position within the cabinet.”749 Interestingly, popular 
demands for the removal of the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser, that culminated in the 
Arab Spring in 2011, derived from a seed planted by members of the royal family who 
were excluded from key ruling positions. They belong to the Salem branch, and have the 
right to become Emir (more details in the next chapter).750 Overall, the succession crisis 
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and its resolution highlighted the role of parliament in the political system, underlined a 
key fragmentation within the ruling family, and led to the tumultuous events of 2006. 
b. The Orange Movement and the Electoral Law (2006) 
In the spring of 2006, less than six months after the Emir’s accession, there was an 
important political development: a group of lawyers challenged the constitutionality of a 
law banning public gatherings that had been uncontested for two decades. The case went 
to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that the law was unconstitutional.751 This 
emboldened a number of Kuwaiti youths to organise an escalating series of public 
gatherings and demonstrations calling for the amendment of the electoral system to 
reduce the number of constituencies from 25 to five in order to eliminate vote buying and 
unfair representation. The Electoral Law was altered in 1992 to increase the 
constituencies from ten to 25: “opposition leaders alleged that the constituencies were 
gerrymandered in such a way as to favour allies of the government and were small 
enough so as to enable the easy buying of votes to decide the outcome.”752 In this way the 
government was able to manipulate the results in smaller districts and make it more 
difficult for politically or ideologically motivated groupings to form.753 
In the first demonstration, around 200 men and women wearing orange t-shirts and 
waving orange flags gathered in front of the Saif Palace, where the Cabinet of Ministers 
were meeting. “Press coverage and word of mouth ensured that news of the 
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demonstration would spread, sparking another rally the following week where more than 
500 people gathered.”754 The protestors, who became known as the ‘Orange Movement’, 
were the first reform-minded youth movement in Kuwait. The Orange movement of 2006 
represented a new means of political organisation and activism, as Kuwait’s internet-
savvy youth staged public rallies and mobilised popular pressure for the reform of 
Kuwait’s electoral districts.  By 2009, their tactics had diffused into new youth 
movements, more tribal and Islamist in composition, and led to a new political 
environment that was further energised by the street politics of the Arab Spring in 
2011.755 
The Orange movement proposed a five-district constituency as a template for 
expanding direct representation of political minorities. Minorities would have a better 
chance of being elected in bigger constituencies because each voter would have only four 
votes, limiting the power of any one political group or trend to gain an entire district.756 
They quickly garnered the support of members of parliament, where the majority 
supported the five-district concept because it represented a step towards political reform 
and would lead to less interference by the government in parliamentary elections. 757 The 
government responded to the demonstrations with an offer to compromise, suggesting the 
restoration of a ten-district constituency, which the National Assembly rejected. A 
cabinet minister then suggested putting the ten-district plan to the Constitutional Court. 
This was seen as a delaying tactic, and 29 MPs supporting the five-district plan stood up 	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and left the session without a quorum. The following morning, demonstrators gathered in 
front of the parliament building to find it surrounded by police and special forces in riot 
gear. In solidarity with the Orange Movement, several MPs joined the protestors. Another 
rally took place the following night, at which some MPs pledged to interpellate the prime 
minister in parliament; questioning a sitting prime minister was unprecedented in 
Kuwait’s political history.758 
Faced with growing tensions within the Assembly and among the protestors, the Emir 
exercised his constitutional right to dissolve the Assembly and call for new elections on 
the basis of the old 25-district electoral system, hoping to realign parliament in his 
favour.759 According to the constitution, once the Emir dissolves parliament, an election 
should ensue within 60 days. The elections were held on June 29, 2006 – the last to 
follow the 25-district law. The 2006 elections were also the first in which Kuwaiti 
women were given full political rights to vote and run for office. Election campaigns by 
parliamentary candidates centred on the issue of electoral districts and political 
corruption. Voters had the opportunity to choose between three main camps: the group of 
MPs who advocated the five-district plan, another in favour of a redistribution formula, 
and a third group (i.e. government supporters) who argued for keeping the 25 districts 
and maintaining the status quo.760 In the end, government supporters did not win enough 
seats and a loose opposition alliance supporting the five-district reform won more than 
two-thirds of the 50 seats in parliament. After the elections, the government capitulated 
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and a reformed electoral law was passed reducing the number of districts to five.761 The 
government’s yielding to the electoral law changes was a huge victory for the members 
of the Orange Movement. The youth group that organised the movement gained 
recognition as a powerful tool in initiating demands for political reform, and key 
members of the opposition began to realise the potential of engaging Kuwaiti youth in 
parliamentary politics.762 
The impact of the Orange Movement on the government’s decision to alter the 
electoral system in 2006 represents a key transformation in the political history of 
Kuwait. The collaboration of youth groups and opposition members within the Assembly 
led to the motivation for a wider range of Kuwaiti citizens to be more involved in 
Kuwaiti politics. During the election campaigns, various non-profit voting committees 
emerged with the sole purpose of spreading knowledge among ordinary citizens on the 
election and voting process.763 The 2006 election recorded one the highest voting turnouts 
in the history of Kuwaiti parliamentary elections (91.9%),764 not only because of the 
inclusion of women, but also because of the vigorous election campaigns that targeted 
Kuwaiti youth. The percentage of the total citizen population under 25 is as high as 
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37.7%; 765 thus, the participation of Kuwait’s youth in parliamentary politics has a huge 
impact on election results. Their inclusion meant that opposition forces in the Assembly 
gained momentum in their efforts to confront the government and demand further 
reforms of the political system, leading to a cycle of crisis and confrontation between 
government and parliament. 
c. Cycle of Parliamentary Elections and Dissolutions (2008–2010) 
On March 17, 2008, sectarian confrontations inside and outside parliament prompted the 
entire Cabinet of Ministers to resign. Sectarian ill-will exploded in reaction to Shi’a 
citizens’ public mourning for the death of senior Hezbollah figure, Imad Mughnieh.766 
The Kuwaiti government charged the Shi’a activists, including two former MPs 
belonging to the parliamentary bloc, the NIA,767 with “belonging to a secret Kuwaiti 
branch of Hezbollah bent on overturning the regime”. 768 Meanwhile, two serving Shi’a 
MPs were the subject of a parliamentary inquiry. In addition to the upheaval in 
parliament, inflammatory charges were made in anti-Shi’a television broadcasts by two 
stations owned by a faction of the ruling family.769 Some Kuwaiti newspapers published 
leaders calling for revocation of citizenship for those who took part in the Mughnieh 
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mourning rally, and suggested they “be deported to Iran”.770 The arrests, and anti-Shi’a 
sentiments in the media, triggered two demonstrations by hundreds of Shi’a claiming the 
existence of a sectarian campaign by security agencies against prominent figures of the 
Shi’a community.771 “The issue has snowballed from an action against the Mughnieh rally 
into a major crackdown on a political grouping known for its bold national positions,” 
said the chairman of the Kuwait Society for the Advancement of Democracy, Nasser al-
Abdali.772 In order to reduce sectarian tensions the Emir suspended parliament and called 
for new elections, which were scheduled for May 2008. 
The May 2008 election was the first held under the new system. The results led to an 
increase in opposition representation to 36 seats in the 50-seat assembly.773 The Sunni 
Islamists emerged as the main winners, doubling their presence to become the single 
largest bloc in parliament. Despite making up more than half the electorate, women failed 
to enter the 2008 parliament. The Shi’a increased their presence by one seat to five, while 
the liberals and their allies almost maintained the strength they enjoyed in the previous 
parliament.774 In November 2008, members of the Assembly spearheaded by the Islamists 
attempted to question the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser Mohammed al-Ahmed Al-
Sabah, on the issues of mismanagement of the country’s affairs, undocumented 
expenditure by the Prime Minister’s Court and the demolition of illegally constructed 	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mosques on public property. The Emir refused to allow the prime minister, his nephew, 
to be questioned, leading to the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers in March 2009 
and an Emiri decree suspending of the shortest-lived parliament in Kuwait’s history (it 
lasted a mere 10 months).775 “It was the fifth occasion on which Sheikh Nasser 
Mohammed has resigned since he was first appointed prime minister in 2006, and the 
third time that the emir has reacted by dissolving parliament.”776 The Emir announced his 
decision to dissolve parliament in a speech in which he stated that “the parliament had 
overstepped the boundaries between it and other authorities, and that it had debased the 
concept of dialogue by hounding its interpellation targets and casting doubt on their 
personal integrity”.777 
Elections for a new parliament were held on May 16, 2009. The 2009 election 
produced three notable outcomes. First, voter turnout significantly dropped to around 
55% from the average of 80% before the cycle of parliamentary dissolutions began. The 
pattern of dissolutions followed by snap elections had compromised the legitimacy of the 
elections themselves: 
Candidates disliked the hassle and expense of running so often just to serve for a 
year or two…Citizens found the frequent elections both disruptive and annoying 
regardless of when they were scheduled and many voters just stayed home. 778 
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Second, the election produced seats for four women MPs for the first time. Their 
ascendance to parliamentary politics was a huge victory for women generally, not only 
because of the intensive political and social debates that surrounded the issue of women’s 
rights in Kuwait, but also because most of the female MPs finished among the top 
contenders in their districts. 779 The third notable outcome was the significant increase of 
pro-government MPs, mainly at the expense of the Sunni Islamists.780 The setback for 
organised Islamist groups was mainly due to the individualistic nature of the election 
campaign: “in contrast to the last election, the organised political groups and blocs 
deliberately abandoned the affiliation of their candidates, who were asked to run mainly 
as independents.”781 The shift away from group affiliation was apparent both by the 
number of candidates who declined to run as representatives of a group and by the voters 
who opted for independents in higher than usual numbers. “The smaller influence of 
political groups could have been another facet of the voters’ desire to elect a parliament 
sufficiently different from its predecessors that it would take a new tack on policy.”782 
However, despite the change in the composition of parliament in the 2009 Assembly, 
the same parliamentary discourse and debates continued. A political analyst at the time 
commented: 
There is…a preponderance of opinion, within both the state and society, that 
parliamentary questioning of government officials is proper. Therefore, the 
possibility that MPs will resume their efforts to pin down the Prime Minister and 	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that the parliament will be dissolved again, possibly unconstitutionally continues 
to loom on the horizon.783 
As such, the 2009 Assembly continued to press for the interpellation of the prime 
minister and three other ministers. Finally, after receiving a statement in support of the 
prime minister signed by 30 of the 50 elected members, the Emir agreed to let him be 
questioned, but demanded that the interpellation be conducted behind closed doors. On 
December 8, 2009, Sheikh Nasser was forced to submit to interpellation in a closed-
session grilling where he would respond to allegations of corruption and bribery in the 
earlier 2008 elections.784 The subsequent vote of no confidence was held the next day; 
only 13 members voted against him, one abstained, and the rest, including all four 
women, voted in his support.785 
The interpellation of the prime minister represented a crucial moment in Kuwait’s 
political history, where for the first time in the Gulf region, a head of government had 
appeared before an elected body.786 However, the Emir had only allowed the questioning 
to occur when he was able to gather enough support in parliament to win the vote of no 
confidence, thus ensuring that the prime minister and the three other ministers that were 
questioned would survive. So, in practice, the interpellation did not elevate the institution 
to become a more powerful or influential legislature. Furthermore, although the 
interpellation of the prime minister was undoubtedly a significant step in the history of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 Alshayji (2009). 
784 Tetreault, M. (2012). Kuwait’s Impending Elections: How did we get here? Middle East Research and 
Information Project. 
785 Tetreault (2013), 4. 
786  Katzman, K. (2013). Kuwait: Security, Reform and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress. 
 273 
the Assembly, the incident highlighted the relative weakness of parliament in relation to 
government. It reflected the Kuwaiti leadership’s traditional strategy of manipulating the 
opposition and securing its authority over parliament.787 On the other hand, the 
interpellation set a precedent for allowing prime ministers to be questioned by 
parliament. Although some members of the 2009 Assembly had to forego any satisfaction 
they might have received from ousting a disliked prime minister, the interpellation paved 
the way for future parliaments to question the head of government and at some future 
time, vote him out of office.788 Overall, the incident led to an increase in the number of 
ministerial interpellations in 2010; and with each interpellation of a minister, the 
mechanism of questioning became redundant, and in many ways a political tool in the 
hands of both the opposition and the government. 
Such developments were a cause of dismay for many in parliament, not simply 
because the interpellation mechanism suddenly looked far less effective, but also 
because of the way in which the tool was being used by politicians … they were 
being used in what one MP described as an increasingly ‘frivolous’ fashion. 789 
Although the interpellation of the prime minister had led to a superficial stability 
between the Assembly and the government, this was soon disrupted in 2011, when the 
familiar cycle of “parliamentary obstruction, ministerial resistance, government 
resignation, and looming constitutional crisis” returned.790 
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Overall, the Kuwaiti cycle of parliamentary elections and dissolutions reflects a 
historical struggle between the executive and legislative arms of government; where the 
legislature demands its constitutional right to share political power and the executive 
continues to assert its authority over parliament. Elections became instruments of 
authoritarianism, where they “can elide issues that aggravate social divisions and confirm 
executive autocracy rather than beat it back”. 791 The 2009 election campaign, for 
example, portrayed a regression from the prospect of legalised political parties when 
candidates began running as independents in order to increase their chances of winning. 
The employment of new IT practices was another key development in the election 
process, where media-savvy candidates would use social media outlets such as YouTube, 
Twitter and Facebook, as well as text messaging, to disseminate information and 
marketing material to voters in their districts. At times, media outlets played a negative 
role, targeting some MPs with smear campaigns and leading to ‘corrupt media’ and an 
increase in divisions within society. Social divisions have always provided the ruling 
family with the ability to manipulate and shift coalition alliances to bolster their 
position.792 
Meanwhile, the most effective political reform came from grass-roots movements 
applying pressure on the regime to extend political rights. This was demonstrated by the 
fight for women’s rights and the Orange Movement in 2006. “… [T]he assembly of youth 
from all over the country in front of parliament … show that highly focused movements 
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entirely rooted in domestic politics can [also] be effective.”793 The regime demonstrated 
its vulnerability to broadly based, highly public, civil society action; in response to grass-
roots outbursts from below, it utilised the legislative process to impose strategic sabotage 
from above. The frequency of parliament dissolutions and the subsequent election of new 
ones is a mechanism by the leadership tantamount to narrowing civil rights and 
liberties.794 
The Emir’s strategy of calling election after election, with the effect of alienating 
Kuwaiti voters, depressing voter turnout, and delegitimising the entire electoral 
enterprise and the parliament it produces, shows how elections become 
instruments of authoritarianism. 795 
The leadership’s assault on representative institutions has thus led to a continual 
struggle between parliament and government. The struggle was highlighted during the 
events of the Arab Spring in 2011, where popular pressure from below, opposition 
groupings within parliament, and a leadership competition within the ruling family all 
contributed to the challenges that faced the Kuwaiti monarchy. 
V. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the gradual transformations that occurred throughout the development of 
parliamentary politics in Kuwait form the basis of the dynamics of Kuwaiti politics today. 
Each historical leadership decision, from engaging with various social coalitions, 	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refraining from repression, providing economic benefits, and overall, installing an (albeit 
imperfect) inclusive political system, has led to the political issues that emerged during 
the Arab Spring. This chapter briefly examined the three phases of parliamentary politics 
in Kuwait, beginning in 1963 until 2010. It highlighted the mechanisms which the 
Kuwaiti government mobilised to respond to internal and external crisis, usually 
involving the shuffling of domestic (and by that time politicised) coalitions and 
interfering in parliamentary politics to quell demands for reform and restore the 
sovereignty of the regime. Even though these mechanisms have been largely successful, 
new problems are emerging as a consequence of earlier political manoeuvring.796 
Accordingly, the region-wide impact of the Arab Spring led to the intrepidity of some 
political dissenters including parliamentarians, and even individual youths through social 
media, who questioned and, in some cases, insulted the Emir. The consolidation of a 
cross-coalition that included all social groups within Kuwaiti society was also extremely 
alarming to the ruling elite. To respond to the domestic turbulence of the Arab Spring, the 
Kuwaiti leadership thus turned to external support in the form of the GCC. As this 
chapter has shown in its analysis, the Kuwaiti leadership has utilised several mechanisms 
throughout decades of parliamentary politics to preserve its regime, including 
manipulating coalitions and impeding parliamentary elections. However, as the case 
study will prove, the intensity of the Arab Spring demonstrations prompted the leadership 
to turn to outside support and strengthen its alliance within the GCC, using the 
organisation as another mechanism for regime preservation. 
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Chapter 4 
Kuwait, the GCC and the Arab Spring (2011–2012) 
Case Study 
I. Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study on Kuwait in the context of the GCC and the Arab 
Spring. Kuwait experienced unprecedented street demonstrations in 2011/12, where the 
emergence of a cross-coalition that included various social groups within Kuwaiti society 
echoed regional aspirations for political reform. The case study aims to answer why and 
how the Kuwaiti leadership was able to overcome the political turbulence of the Arab 
Spring, and how it began to engage the GCC as a vital participant in securing its regime 
against internal dissent. It highlights the extent of the role of the GCC in the Kuwaiti 
leadership’s response to its demonstrations and portrays how the threat of regime change 
in the region reinforced an existing logic of unity among GCC member states. The case 
study corroborates this research’s hypothesis that argues that the Gulf monarchies have 
utilised their alliance, the GCC, as a vehicle to preserve their regimes during the Arab 
Spring. This chapter examines the Arab Spring in Kuwait between early 2011 and late 
2012, the research basing this period on the beginning and end of the timeline of street 
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demonstrations and government responses in Kuwait.797 The last set of demonstrations 
took place towards the end of 2012; this was followed by a period of stability and, 
according to this research, marks the end of the Arab Spring in Kuwait. It goes on to 
provide details on the demands of the demonstrators, and their ethnic/religious/social 
backgrounds. Kuwaiti citizens from various social and ethnic backgrounds came together 
in mass demonstrations demanding government accountability and an end to the political 
stagnation that had set the country back in terms of economic prosperity and opportunity. 
The chapter proceeds to explore the Kuwaiti leadership’s response to the 
demonstrations and its utilisation of three tactics under the wider GCC strategy for 
regime preservation: enhancing its legitimacy, heightening its internal security, and 
collaborating in a defence scheme. The first tactic, of enhancing legitimacy, involved 
providing financial incentives to its citizens and reinforcing government-sponsored youth 
programmes to engage Kuwaiti youth. The second tactic, of heightening internal security, 
meant various restrictions applied by the Kuwaiti leadership during the Arab Spring, 
ranging from police violence to media censorship and arrests. The third tactic engaged 
Kuwait in a collaborative defence scheme along with fellow GCC member states by 
signing the GCC Internal Security Agreement in November 2012. The employment of 
these tactics indicates that the Kuwaiti government felt threatened by the Arab Spring and 
feared the complete destruction of its regime structure. Overall, the case study proves that 
by utilising tactics under the broader GCC strategy for regime preservation, the Kuwaiti 
leadership allowed unprecedented GCC interference in its domestic affairs and thus 
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engaged the organisation as a vital participant in preserving its regime during the Arab 
Spring. 
II. Kuwait and the Arab Spring (2011–2012) 
The popular demonstrations that occurred in Kuwait in 2011 were the result of previous 
domestic mobilisation in a country with a long history of public debate and political 
mobilisation.798 Although the Emir is at the top of the hierarchy of political power, 
Kuwaiti citizens are engaged in the political system through an elected parliament with 
legislative powers. In addition to the 50 elected members of the National Assembly, the 
15 appointed (by the Emir) cabinet members have the right to vote in parliament. This 
gives a tremendous advantage to the government and reflects a political system where 
conflicts between parliament and government are inherent. According to Shafeeq Ghabra, 
“Kuwait’s partial democracy breeds crisis.” 799 The Emir also has legislative powers and 
all bills must be approved by both parliament and the Emir, which leads to recurring 
stalemate.800 
As the previous chapters in this research have demonstrated, the Kuwaiti leadership 
utilised its oil resources in preserving a wide social base, providing economic and 
political benefits to all Kuwaiti citizens in return for their loyalty to the regime. As a 
primary strategy in preserving its regime, it maintained coalitional alliances in order to 
discourage the emergence of political dissent among its citizens. The diversity of social 	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groups within Kuwaiti society plays a crucial role in the ability of the leadership to 
maintain and stabilise its mass support.801 
The cross-coalition opposition that formed during the Arab Spring demonstrations in 
Kuwait put an end to the leadership’s reliance on mass coalitional support. It included a 
youth movement mostly hailing from the tribal periphery and was joined by the 
traditional urban middle class. The shift from allegiance to opposition among major parts 
of the tribal population over a decade significantly transformed the balance of power in 
Kuwaiti politics. 802 The key element of the Arab Spring in Kuwait is the emergence of a 
cross-coalition opposition inside and outside parliament. In the past, the Kuwaiti 
leadership had been able to shift its coalition alliances within parliament in order to 
manipulate and control the political system. However, the new broad-based opposition 
became a main destabilising factor and impacted the leadership’s ability to maintain its 
grip on power. Another key element of the Arab Spring in Kuwait is the nature of the 
demands made by the opposition: the demonstrators were not calling for regime change 
like other Arab Spring demonstrators in the Middle East region. Rather, they emphasised 
their commitment to the Emir, and called for “activation of the constitutional monarchy” 
with the aim of securing an elected government.803 These demands might not echo the 
chants of regime removal heard in other Arab countries; however, they did call for a 
complete transformation of the Kuwaiti political system. Thus, the Kuwaiti leadership 
perceived the opposition and the Arab Spring demonstrations as threats to its regime. 
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Throughout 2011 and 2012, parliamentary sessions were dominated by outspoken 
opposition members pressing for their constitutional right to question ministers and 
members of the ruling family on alleged corruption charges. A key turning point in the 
Kuwaiti Arab Spring was in October 2012, when the Emir issued a decree changing the 
electoral system by limiting voters to the choice of one candidate, in contrast to the 
previous four candidates per district. In the absence of political parties, having only one 
vote in a district with around 70 to 100 competitors, “stood to fragment votes and 
promote electoral corruption, such as vote buying”.804 The opposition argued that by 
minimising the voting power of each person, the new voting system would consistently 
produce pro-government legislatures. It orchestrated a massive boycott of the following 
elections (in December and July 2013), resulting in the lowest level of participation since 
the establishment of parliamentary elections in 1963: approximately 38% of voters went 
to the polls in the July 2013 election. 805 The elections thus produced pro-government 
parliaments and excluded the opposition from parliamentary politics. 
By issuing an irreversible decree that was to take effect immediately; the Emir opened the 
door to further dissent from among the citizen population. Criticism by a myriad of 
opposition figures, activists and bloggers began to spread to not only government 
ministers and the ruling family, but the Emir himself. This important transitional shift in 
the tone of the opposition, from demanding constitutional rights to publically insulting 
and criticising the Emir, led to an explosion of police violence and repression and a 
clampdown on freedom of expression by the Kuwaiti authorities. Interestingly, it also led 
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to the disenfranchisement of the cross-coalition opposition, where it lost substantial 
public support due to unclear goals. Throughout 2012, the opposition organised large 
demonstrations calling for the boycott of parliamentary elections; however, it did not 
have a specific agenda after the July 2013 elections. The boycott manoeuvre ultimately 
led to the end of the Arab Spring, weakening the opposition and making it strategically 
obsolete. 
a. Who are the Opposition? 
The Arab Spring generated a new coalition of government opposition represented by 
groups inside and outside the Kuwaiti National Assembly. The opposition consisted of a 
mix of Sunni Islamists, liberals, tribalists, trade unions, student unions and youth 
coalitions. The parliamentary blocs that joined the opposition during the Arab Spring 
are:806 the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM, affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood), the Popular Islamic bloc (the Salafis), the National Democratic Alliance 
(the liberals), the Popular Action bloc (PAB) and a few tribalists and independents.807 
Leading opposition figures include Mussalam Al-Barrak, a former independent MP; 
Ahmad Al-Saadoun, a former parliament speaker; Jamaan Herbash, a former MP and 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood; Mohammed Hayef Al-Mutair, an independent 
Islamist and former MP; another Islamist and former MP, Khaled al-Sultan; and Khaled 
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Al-Fadhala, the spokesman for the National Front for the Protection of the Constitution 
and secretary-general of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).808 
The most prominent face from among the opposition is former MP, Mussalam Al-
Barrak; in the 2012 election, he garnered more votes than any politician in Kuwait’s 
history.809 He became a symbol of dissent when he was charged with “insulting the 
emir”,810 and was sentenced to two years in prison (more on his arrest later in the 
chapter).811 Al-Barrak, the son of a former MP (Mohammed Al-Barrak), made his debut 
in parliament in 1996, and gradually rose to prominence as a member of the 
parliamentary grouping, the PAB.812 On entering the National Assembly, he followed the 
path of his father and relied on the support of his powerful Al-Mutair tribe. The Al-Mutair 
is one of the tribes that were naturalised by the government in the 1950s, and politically 
empowered as a counterweight to the more demanding political force of Kuwait’s urban 
core (the 1950s era was much concerned with Arab nationalist politics). Since the 1950s, 
however, “this politically quiescent population became more educated, more exposed to 
the outside world, and less content with their parliamentary ‘service candidates’ which 
faithfully brought jobs and benefits in exchange for their political loyalty”. 813 The 
strength of the Arab Spring coalition stems from widespread social and political change 
among the tribes’ younger generation. The politicised tribal movement, mainly 
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comprising well-educated youth, has contributed to a change in the “traditional” practices 
of tribal opposition, which mainly consisted of campaigning to obtain additional 
resources from the state.814 Al-Barrak represented this new generation, embodying the 
significant social changes taking place in Kuwait’s tribal constituencies.815 He refused to 
participate in the tribal primaries (preliminary elections to determine which candidate 
will represent the tribe in the parliamentary elections),816 which are illegal in Kuwait but 
widely held by tribes in order to maximise their presence in parliament. His 
independence, along with his rhetoric against government corruption, won him supporters 
among the second generation members of his tribe and beyond his tribe as well. 
Within parliament, Al-Barrak sought a partnership and consulship with a notable 
opposition leader and former speaker of parliament, Ahmed Al-Saadoun. Al-Saadoun is 
known for his “staunch defense of the parliament against the executive and for his 
detailed knowledge of parliamentary procedure”.817 In 2001, the two figures played a 
central role in the formation of the PAB, a cross-coalition of “like-minded MPs pursuing 
populist economic policies and committed to strong parliamentary oversight of public 
money and constitutional protections”. 818 The bloc was an innovate grouping among 
Kuwait’s parliamentary blocs; it incorporated a variety of MPs from both tribal and urban 
constituencies, and from both Shi’a and Sunni Islamist backgrounds. The prominence of 
tribal MPs among an explicitly oppositional and national parliamentary coalition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 Dazi-heni (2015). 
815 Diwan (2013). 
816 Smith (1999), 7. 
817 Diwan (2013). 
818 Ibid. 
 285 
reflected the increasing political maturity of Kuwait’s tribes, and their growing political 
weight. 
According to political analyst, Kristin Diwan, Al-Barrak is an important political 
figure in Kuwait: “[F]or the past two decades Mussalam Al-Barrak has shown a talent for 
transgressing the rules of Kuwaiti politics. His ascent to the leadership of Kuwait’s 
diverse opposition movement reflects not only a shifting political order, but also a 
changing society.”819 In October 2012, Al-Barrak had a leading role in the demonstrations 
resisting the Emiri decree that amended the Electoral Law (more details later in the 
chapter). He shocked many observers by publically challenging the Emir in a speech he 
gave at an opposition rally against the amendment. In his speech, he addressed the Emir, 
saying: “In the name of the nation, in the name of the people, we will not let you, your 
Highness, practice autocratic rule.” 820 He further reminded him that like his ancestor, the 
first Sabahi Emir, whom the people chose to be their leader, he was chosen by the 
National Assembly (referring to the succession crisis in 2003). Al-Barrak stressed that it 
was the Kuwaiti constitution and the role of the National Assembly that brought the Emir 
to the throne in 2003; because of this, the Emir should respect the constitution and 
safeguard the law. He further alleged a suspicious alliance between the “merchants of 
corruption and the merchants of power, adding that Kuwait is being destroyed and its 
wealth stolen”.821 He was detained a couple of days after his speech on a charge of 
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“undermining the status of the Emir”. 822 Al-Barrak was not the only opposition member 
who was indicted for criticising the Emir during the Arab Spring: among many, three 
former MPs, Falah Al-Sawwagh, Bader Al-Dahum and Khaled Al-Tahus, were also 
detained for three days for criticising the Emir at an opposition rally on October 10, 
2012.823 
Not everyone agreed with the opposition during the Arab Spring; many urban 
Kuwaitis questioned Al-Barrak’s motives in leading demonstrations against the 
government and blamed him for driving the country further into crisis.824 Moreover, the 
broad-based opposition coalition had united several groups with differing beliefs on how 
the country should proceed.825 Al-Barrak’s tribal and Islamist support base raised 
suspicions among secular Kuwaitis, who were wary of the Islamists’ agenda. One of the 
ICM’s primary demands as part of the opposition coalition was the amendment of Article 
2 of the Constitution to proclaim Islamic (Shari’a) law the sole source of legislation.826 
Liberals and nationalists have thus accused the ICM of conspiring to create a new 
caliphate under the orders of the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.827 A 
member of a liberal political bloc, Bassam Al-Asoussi, declared: “Yes, the government 
has many shortcomings indeed, but [the opposition leaders] aren't the people who will 
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save the country. They are regressive, not progressive.” 828 Another liberal MP, Safa’ Al-
Hashem, disagreed with the tone of the opposition, claiming that the opposition was 
“obsolete” and their protests vulgar. She stated: “My views have shifted from left to right. 
I am against the way the opposition is behaving. I understand why they are against the 
one-man-one-vote but this country is still being run by a tribal mentality. The law is only 
enforced selectively.”829 
Nevertheless, while government supporters were outspoken against the opposition, 
many recoiled at the interventionist police tactics that were deployed by the authorities 
during the Arab Spring demonstrations.830 The government used police violence and 
arrests as key tactics in suppressing the demonstrations during the Arab Spring, to which 
many liberals took offence. In protest against the arrest of a liberal opposition figure, 
Khaled Al-Fadhala, for criticising the prime minister in December 2010, Abdulrahman 
Al-Anjari, a liberal former MP stated: “I remember during the time of previous emirs and 
previous prime ministers, the opposition in Kuwait used to criticise the government, the 
prime minister in so many things. Nobody took anyone to court.”831 Many Kuwaitis were 
shocked at the mass arrests that occurred during the demonstrations of the Arab Spring, 
and perceived the clampdown on freedom of expression in the country as a violation of 
the ruler/ruled relationship. A prominent writer who was gaoled for his criticism of public 
officials, Mohammed Al-Jassem, expressed it thus: “It seems the government is losing 
focus and they don’t know what they are doing. I think they are destroying the country 	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one way or another. And they are badly affecting the relationship between the Al-Sabah 
family and the Kuwaiti people. This is all new.” 832 
The Kuwait government’s violent and restrictive response to the opposition during the 
Arab Spring mirrored the response of other GCC leaderships; the Bahraini and Saudi 
leaderships both used harsh measures in suppressing their own demonstrations. This 
research thus argues that due to the threat of the Arab Spring demonstrations, the Kuwaiti 
leadership had to choose between maintaining its citizens’ rights under the Kuwaiti 
constitution, or following its own interests by aligning its strategy for regime preservation 
with fellow GCC members. The emergence of a broad-based coalition that included 
members from various political, ethnic and religious backgrounds created a huge threat to 
the leadership, where it no longer had the ability to manipulate coalitions as a way to 
control parliament. Furthermore, public allegations and accusations by the opposition of 
corrupt government officials and in policymaking discredited the leadership in the eyes of 
the Kuwaiti public. The Arab Spring demonstrations thus prompted the Kuwaiti 
leadership to join forces with its more conservative Saudi and Bahraini neighbours, and 
apply a GCC strategy for regime preservation through the tactics of police violence, mass 
arrests, and restricting freedom of expression. It further signalled its increased 
commitment to cooperation by signing the contested GCC Internal Security Agreement, 
which many Kuwaitis rejected on the basis of its infringement of the Kuwaiti constitution 
(more on this later in the chapter). 
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b. The Role of the Kuwaiti Youth 
Kuwait’s youth (taken in this research as the 18–30 age group) represent 60% of the total 
citizen population.833 Throughout 2011 and 2012, Kuwaiti youth joined forces with 
parliament opposition members and planned mass demonstrations that matched the spirit 
of the Arab Spring in the wider region. The importance of the union between youth and 
opposition is in the crosscutting coalitions that surfaced: during the demonstrations, the 
youth represented citizens from various ethnic, religious and social backgrounds within 
Kuwaiti society, providing the opposition with a broader base. Youth groups succeeded 
in creating a new political dynamic within the Kuwaiti political scene. Their main goal 
was to promote political mobilisation across all segments of Kuwaiti society, focusing on 
a call for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy where citizens would be equal.834 
During the 2012 election campaign they gathered under the name “Fifth Fence” (al-Soor 
al-Khames) in support of the liberals running for parliament.835 The name refers to a road 
(the fifth ring road) which divides the old urban city and the new districts, often referred 
to as the “outlying areas”, where the bulk of the tribal population has been living since 
the urbanisation wave that began in the late sixties.836 It thus symbolises the social 
segregation that exists in Kuwaiti society between “urban” (Hadhar) and “tribal” 
(Bedouin) Kuwaitis.837 The Fifth Fence brings together activists from various ideologies 
and sects, and was the first broad-based coalition group established after riot police beat a 	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number of MPs at a rally in December 2010. Since then, several youth groups like Kafi 
(Enough), Youth for Change, September 16 Youth, the Civil Democratic Movement 
(CDM) and others were established and began working in close coordination to call for 
political reform and to fight against corruption.838 These youth groups were using social 
networking sites such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook to inspire followers to 
demonstrate on the streets.839 
In a region where so many young people have poor prospects and are underemployed, 
Kuwaiti youth are granted scholarships, secure jobs and generous salaries by the 
government.840 Yet, thousands of young Kuwaitis took to the streets in protest against 
government policies during the Arab Spring. Kuwaiti youths have repeatedly said they 
are not against the Al-Sabah ruling family, but do want radical changes.841 According to 
this research, the demands of Kuwaiti youth revolved around three main issues: wanting 
an active voice in government and their overall future; unemployment or lack of 
economic opportunities; and social issues. A journalist, Sylvia Westall, while reporting at 
a demonstration in Kuwait in November 2012, asked the crucial question: Why are 
Kuwaiti youth so dissatisfied? 842 The answer, for Abdullah Ashkanani, who like more 
than half of Kuwaitis is under the age of 25, is about fairness and the freedom to speak 
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out. Despite the many benefits that accrue to all Kuwaitis, the authorities do not seem to 
distribute the country's wealth and power fairly. He states: 
One day we will get married and have children and we want them to have a fair, 
equal life. It is not about money. It is also about freedom and freedom of speech. 
Do not think you can give us money and we will sit at home and shut our 
mouths.843 
Kuwait’s youth want a voice in government decisions and to become agents of 
change. The cycle of parliamentary dissolutions followed by snap elections that began in 
2006 had led many Kuwaiti youth to believe that they could not seek change through 
elections. As one youth protestor stated: “The problem in Kuwait is that the people do not 
feel like they run the country. We don't have an elected prime minister and the 
government is appointed. It is always someone else making the decisions.” 844 
Many of Kuwait’s youth were also protesting about the future of their country, which 
while it may currently be fiscally sound, depends on oil for more than 90% of its 
revenues and has struggled to diversify its economy for years. The official unemployment 
rate in Kuwait is around 3% (2010).845 Kuwait’s youth made up a significant percentage 
of the total unemployed population during the decade 2001 to 2009. In 2008, Kuwait’s 
youth made up 53% of the unemployed population.846 The reason for the low 
unemployment rate is a government policy of securing employment in the public sector; 	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this might be considered a form of welfare policy.847 The public sector employs over 80% 
of the Kuwaiti workforce. The overcrowded public sector provides higher salaries and 
less work hours than the private sector, leading Kuwaiti citizens with little incentive to 
seek employment in the private sector.848 However, the random selection and hiring and 
the practice of favouritism due to a bloated public sector has led to several reports of 
mismanagement of public funds. Government efficiency is thus hindered by the lack of 
professionalism in public administration and a large portion of government expenditure 
goes on the cost of employing an overcrowded public sector. 849   
A key argument made by government opposition and youth participants of the mass 
demonstrations of the Arab Spring is the image of economic stagnation in comparison to 
the more vibrant economies of neighbouring Gulf states such as Qatar and the UAE. This 
image of stagnation is mainly due to delayed spending on capital infrastructure projects, 
augmented by a lag in foreign direct investment in Kuwait in comparison to other GCC 
states.850 Finally, some among the Kuwaiti youth are frustrated by social restrictions, 
where men and women are segregated in universities and there is a lack of places for 
them to socialise outside the home. Some even voiced their concerns at Kuwait’s strong 
social and political ties to Saudi Arabia, its more conservative neighbour. In Westall’s 
article, a young Kuwaiti woman states: “We don't like the very strict Muslims, the 	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Salafis, they want to make Kuwait like Saudi Arabia and restrict women, to stop us from 
being able to drive.” 851 
III. The Arab Spring Demonstrations in Kuwait (2010–2012) 
This research divides the events of the Arab Spring in Kuwait into three sets of 
demonstrations: the Bidoon demonstrations; those targeting the removal of the prime 
minister; and demonstrations calling for democratic reforms within the Kuwaiti political 
system. All three sets of demonstrations occurred within the timeframe of January 2011 
to 2012. Each revolved around specific issues; two out of the three attendant demands 
have not been resolved or accepted by the government, while one demand, the removal of 
the prime minister, succeeded in prompting the leadership to make a change. The reason 
for the distinctions made between these three sets of demonstrations that occurred during 
the Arab Spring in Kuwait is twofold: first, the demonstrations are presented 
chronologically and it is presupposed that each set of demonstration set the precedent for 
the next to occur; second, each set of demonstrations highlights deep grievances within 
the Kuwaiti political system. The link between the Bidoon demonstrations and the 
demonstrations targeting the removal of the prime minister lies in the solidarity displayed 
between the Bidoon and the Kuwaiti political activists and parliament members. A key 
lesson of the Bidoon demonstrations for the next two sets of demonstrations in Kuwait 
was the necessity to publicise demands by attracting media attention and highlighting the 
cause. The Bidoon demonstrations prompted extremely violent reactions from the 
Kuwaiti government; the use of police violence and mass arrests were first seen during 	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these demonstrations, regardless of the peaceful intentions of the protestors. The reaction 
of Kuwaiti citizens, as shown by the media, to the government’s harsh response to the 
Bidoon demonstrations also became a silent trigger for the events that followed, when 
Kuwaiti political activists began to use the platform of street protest as a way to demand 
change from their government.   
Another reason for the distinctions made between the three sets of demonstrations are 
the particular issues at the centre of each: key issues with deep roots within the Kuwaiti 
political system. The Bidoon demonstrations issue highlighted the social and economic 
divisions within the population and called attention to the discrepancies of the Nationality 
Law of 1959.  The demonstrations demanding the removal of the prime minister 
highlighted the importance of the historical social contract between the Kuwaiti leader 
and society. And the demonstrations demanding democratic reforms represent the 
significance of the Kuwaiti constitution and its impact on the Kuwaiti political culture. 
Thus, the three sets of demonstrations are not only linked to each other, but are also 
linked to the origins of Kuwaiti politics. The following sections aims to describe the 
details of each set of demonstrations, the demands of the protestors, and finally the 
Kuwaiti government’s response. 
a. The Bidoon Demonstrations 
In January 2011, the Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, announced that all 
Kuwaiti citizens would be given 1,000 KD (around $3,000) and a free food grant for an 
entire year to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Kuwait’s liberation from Iraq in 1991 
and the 50th anniversary of Kuwait’s independence from the British protectorate 
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system.852 The food grant would be effective from February 2011 until March 2012, 
costing the government 230 million KD ($818 million). Excluded from these cash and 
food grants were the Bidoon community, long-time residents who have been denied 
Kuwaiti citizenship and are rendered stateless. The Bidoon account for almost 6% of the 
total population of Kuwait – around 150,000 to 180,000 people. The Kuwaiti constitution 
does not officially recognise statelessness, and so the Bidoon find themselves 
discriminated against in many ways: they are “barred from employment, denied 
education for their children, restricted in their movements, and living under the constant 
threat of arbitrary arrest and deportation.”853 They “cannot obtain marriage licences, 
driver’s licences, or birth certificates, which resultantly makes owning property, traveling 
outside the country, or legally establishing a family, fairly impossible. Over time, their 
precarious position has contributed to increasing prejudice, poverty, and growing 
hopelessness for the future.”854 
The case of the Bidoon has been a primary issue with regard to human rights in 
Kuwait, and is closely monitored by international human rights organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), UNHCR and the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor.855 In 2004, the Kuwaiti government took a positive step to address 
access to education for Bidoon children. The Ministry of Education approved free 
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education for all Bidoon children; however, this right was limited in many cases due to 
the lack of birth certificates. Many Bidoon children are still only able to access private 
schools. Although members of the Bidoon community are not eligible to be members of 
the National Assembly, their case has been discussed and debated by MPs who support 
their rights. In 2006, the National Assembly created a committee to deal with the Bidoon 
issue; however, the Assembly has otherwise failed to be an effective platform for the 
Bidoon. Any laws that were proposed on concerning Bidoon rights were never passed. A 
new agency was thus formed, the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status, a 
government body tasked to oversee the Bidoon’s situation and address their grievances.856 
The Bidoon began their first set of demonstrations in Kuwait on February 18, 2011, 
where they called for access to healthcare, education, employment and their right to 
Kuwaiti citizenship. According to local activists, approximately 300 to 500 people 
participated in the demonstration, in the outskirts of Kuwait City (the areas of Taima’, 
Sulaibiya and Ahmedi). The demonstration was peaceful at first, ending, however, in 
extreme police violence, where “security forces used water cannons, teargas, smoke 
bombs and concussion grenades to break up the demonstration.” 857 Human Rights Watch 
stated around 30 people sought treatment for injuries in hospital, while around 120 
individuals were arrested by the state authorities. However, the Kuwaiti Interior Minister 
announced to HRW that his forces had arrested 42 individuals on charges of assembly 
without seeking prior permission, as required by Kuwaiti law.858 
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Wary that the Bidoon protests would spiral out of control, the government quickly 
promised meagre reforms, including access to a few basic rights. In March 2011, the 
government granted the Bidoon benefits and services such as free healthcare and 
education, as well as registration of births, marriages, and deaths. However, these 
benefits do not provide a path to citizenship. Furthermore, some Bidoon complained that 
bureaucratic processes prevented many from accessing those benefits.859 On March 11, 
thousands of Bidoon took to the streets once again, “chanting that they love their country 
and their Emir, and that they want their rights”.860 They began to organise the protests on 
Fridays, “making a concerted effort to maintain peaceful protest by handing out flowers 
to the special forces guarding the demonstrations, offering tea and coffee to the police, 
and cleaning up garbage after the gatherings”.861 Nonetheless, the government responded 
with excessive force, “advancing with armoured vehicles and riot police, employing tear 
gas and flares to break up crowds, then arbitrarily running after, beating, and detaining 
random people.”862 A number of protestors and organisers were arrested on charges of 
illegal assembly, intent to commit crimes, and assault of security forces.863 The Ministry 
of Interior accused protestors of committing “shameful acts” such as trying to burn tyres 
and block roads. However, local rights activists insisted that the gatherings were 
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peaceful.864 The detained Bidoon were subsequently freed after nearly two weeks. Bidoon 
demonstrations declined until December 2011, when the trial of 52 Bidoon and other 
Kuwaitis detained earlier in February and March re-energised the Bidoon community and 
inspired them to return to the streets in full force.865 
On December 23, 2011, around five hundred Bidoon gathered in Taima’866 demanding 
access to basic services and their right to Kuwaiti citizenship. 867 This particular 
demonstration came a day after government officials restated promises to grant the 
Bidoon citizenship. One of the protestors, Bidoon activist Nawaf al-Bader, insisted that 
the protests were peaceful and did not call for the removal of the government. Rather, he 
said, they were about “reasserting nationality and dignity, inspired by the winds of the 
Arab Spring.” 868 The vast majority of the protestors were male, and predominately from 
the younger generation. They would chant “peaceful, peaceful,” referring to their 
intentions and many held the image of the Emir, chanting “God, Nation, and the Emir” 
and “We are Kuwaiti.” 869 There were a number of women protestors, most in the black 
niqab, also holding either a banner calling for citizenship, or an image of the Emir and 
the Kuwaiti flag. A woman protestor stated: “I have six children with no hope. I can’t 
educate them and I can’t afford the price of bread. You [those who are not supporting 
Bidoon rights] have ruined the country by ignoring us! Where can we live? We are 
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calling you our Father [the Emir], solve the Bidoon problem!” 870 Because the Bidoon do 
not qualify for government jobs, most can only find irregular work that typically brings in 
around $600 a month or a little over $7,000 a year. In a country where the median income 
is $81,000 a year, before taking into account subsidised housing and electricity that the 
government offers citizens, the Bidoon are among the poorest in the country.871 
Images and videos posted on social media sites such as Twitter had played a major 
role in encouraging Kuwaitis and others to join the Bidoon in the protests at their plight. 
During the demonstration, “on the sidelines, blood was donated to emphasise solidarity 
and unity between the Bidoon and Kuwaiti society.”872 A Kuwaiti woman present at the 
demonstration spoke out in solidarity with the Bidoon protestors, stating: “They should 
demonstrate as long as it’s peaceful and they are not hurting anyone. They have every 
right. This has become a third generation problem. The new agency said [it would take] 
five years [to solve], a year has already passed and nothing.”873 By midday, the police 
increased their presence, and they ended up using tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons 
and smoke bombs to disperse the protest. The authorities further arrested around 30 men. 
A Kuwaiti activist present at the protest in Taima’, Khaled Al-Fadala, reported through 
Twitter: “@Alfadala: Tens of arrests, protesters getting beaten with batons and attacked 
with gas.”874 Another Kuwaiti citizen tweeted: “@AlSaibie: I’m Kuwaiti & I refuse to see 
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any one oppressed or disrespected in my country. This is a land of freedom & dignity.”875 
Parliamentarians also spoke out against the police violence during the Bidoon 
demonstrations; former MP, Jamaan Al-Harbash was quoted as saying: “We call for 
dealing peacefully with the Bidoon demonstration and warn against the use of force or 
arresting the protesters.”876 Another former MP, Daifallah Buraima, said, “The protest of 
the Bidoons is legitimate and the government is responsible for this because it has failed 
to resolve the problem.”877 Despite this sentiment, shown by many Kuwaitis, the police 
crackdown continued. 
In January 14, 2012, police again used excessive force against peaceful demonstrators 
in Sulaibiya and Jahra; Bidoon activists claimed that the demonstrators were protesting 
“against the excessive and unnecessary use of force by police against the demonstrations” 
a day earlier.878 Human rights activists claim dozens of protestors were wounded; and 68 
Bidoon were arrested. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior had said that 21 security men 
were wounded in the clashes, five of whom were hospitalised.879 Later in the month, the 
Ministry of Interior issued statements threatening the deportation of any Bidoon – or 
Bidoon family members – who were caught demonstrating. The government also 
threatened to dismiss any Bidoon protestors who served in the military or police, and 
evict them from public housing projects.880 These threats led to the halt of Bidoon 
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demonstrations in Kuwait; however, the Bidoon issue remains a contested one and 
resolution has yet to be found by the government. In March 2013, the National Assembly 
adopted a proposal to pass a law granting Kuwaiti Nationality to 4,000 Bidoons; however 
the proposal was never pursued.881 In November 2014, the Ministry of Interior announced 
that all Bidoons would be given economic citizenship in the Comoros, an island republic 
in the Indian Ocean.882 According to the authorities, this measure should become effective 
upon the opening of the Comoros Embassy in Kuwait, scheduled for 2015. It should also 
be noted that the granting of Comorian nationality to the Bidoons had been initiated by 
the United Arab Emirates in 2012.883 
b. Demonstrations for the Removal of the Prime Minister 
Other sets of demonstrations during the Arab Spring involved demands for the removal 
of the prime minister, and political reform. The interpellation of the prime minister in 
December 2009 had prompted a short-lived period of stable relations between parliament 
and the government; however, contention, and specifically demands to remove the prime 
minister, resumed in December 2010.884 On December 28 a broad-based opposition 
(comprising both Islamists and liberals) in parliament filed a motion to question the 
Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser Mohammed Al-Sabah, accusing him of being responsible 
for a police crackdown at a house where MPs and supporters had gathered twenty days 
earlier. On January 5, 2011, Sheikh Nasser survived a no-confidence vote; 25 MPs voted 	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884 See previous chapter on details of the first interpellation of the prime minister. 
 302 
for, 25 against, and the motion required a majority to pass.885 In February 2011, a 
scheduled interpellation of the Interior Minister prompted his resignation a week before a 
street rally against him was due to take place.886 “Following a motion to question the 
Prime Minister and other ministers on a range of issues, including Kuwait’s participation 
in the Bahraini government’s efforts to crush Arab Spring protesters there,”887 the Kuwaiti 
government resigned on March 1, 2011. 
The interference of the GCC in the domestic affairs in Bahrain generated heated 
debate in the Kuwaiti media and parliament. On March 14, 2011, the GCC Peninsula 
Shield Force entered Bahrain to support the Al-Khalifa monarchy in accordance with the 
GCC Joint Defense Agreement. The Bahraini monarchy stated that the reason behind the 
GCC Peninsula Shield Force mission was “the common responsibility of the GCC 
countries in maintaining security and stability”.888 The GCC force consisted mostly of 
Saudi troops, along with Emirati police and Qatari troops.889 The Kuwaiti government 
refused to send troops, offering, however, an unidentified number of Kuwaiti naval units 
to engage with the force. The Kuwaiti government was facing different sets of 
questioning from different groups within parliament over the interpretation of Kuwait’s 
role in Bahrain: the Salafist Islamic bloc strongly criticised the prime minister and the 
foreign minister for not fully participating in the GCC military force in Bahrain by 
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sending troops on the ground.890 Meanwhile, the Shi’a bloc – specifically, Shi’a 
parliamentarian Saleh Ashour – asked to question the foreign minister about Kuwait’s 
dispatch of naval forces as part of the GCC military intervention to support Bahrain’s 
government; a decision many Kuwaiti Shi’as opposed as unjustly supporting the Sunni 
Bahraini monarchy.891 The strength of various opposition groups and the interpellation of 
various government officials had triggered the resignation of the government in March 
2011. The resignation appeared to be an attempt by members of the ruling Al-Sabah 
family to avoid being questioned over why Kuwait did not contribute to the Saudi-led 
ground force that was sent to Bahrain.892 
After the government resigned, the Emir reappointed his nephew, the standing Prime 
Minister Sheikh Nasser, and a new cabinet was sworn in in May.893 To protest the Emir’s 
decision to reinstall Sheikh Nasser to the prime minister post, several members of 
parliament walked out and another motion of interpellation of the prime minister was 
submitted.894 An influential parliament member, Ahmad al-Saadoun,895 had submitted one 
of the motions of no confidence against the prime minister, stating: “[I]t is wrong to 
monopolize the post of prime minister in a democratic regime like Kuwait, especially 
since Sheikh Nasser has formed six failed governments.”896 Sheikh Nasser had held the 
post of Prime Minister since 2006 – a man perceived as ineffective and politically corrupt 	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by MPs. His leadership in government witnessed 11 parliamentary interpolations, six 
resignations of the cabinet and the dissolution and early election of parliament three 
times.897 Meanwhile, the Emir perceived these motions of no confidence in the prime 
minister as a rebellion against his authority. The Emir’s concession on the Electoral law 
in 2006 (where, due to popular demand, he approved the redistricting of the electoral 
districts from 25 to 5) played a major role in the Emir’s determination to dismiss popular 
demands for his nephew’s removal years later. In giving in to the opposition in 2006, a 
mere three years after his ascension to the throne, this research asserts that the Emir 
perceived that he had lost the upper hand with the opposition. “Sheikh Sabah protected 
Sheikh Nasser, refusing to accept any of his pro forma resignations every time a new 
government was formed, regardless of the desires of elected members of the parliament 
and eventually of many Kuwaiti citizens for Sheikh Nasser to leave.”898 
On June 3, 2011, around 500 Kuwaiti citizens marched in Erada Square in front of 
Kuwait’s parliament building calling for the resignation of the prime minister, Sheikh 
Nasser Mohammed Al-Sabah.899 Protestors sought to force the resignation of the prime 
minister and other ministers from the ruling family, such as Economy Minister Sheikh 
Ahmad al Fahad, accused of corruption in awarding $900 million in government 
contracts.900 Echoing the chants from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the crowd’s slogans included 
the phrase, “The people want to overthrow the head of government,” referring to the 
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country’s prime minister.901 Among the protestors were youth groups and representatives 
from professional societies who wanted government corruption to be curbed, and “some 
declared their aspirations for a constitutional monarchy that subscribes to the rule of 
law”.902 One young activist, Mohammad al-Hamlan, told the cheering crowd: “The people 
are the only source of legislation … The young people are capable of overthrowing the 
head [of government].”903 A poster read: “Nasser, step down for the sake of Kuwait.” 904 
These initial sets of demonstrations were peaceful, without any police violence. 
In September 2011, a political corruption scandal erupted involving the transfer of 
payments or bribes to up to 16 parliament members who supported the government of 
Sheikh Nasser.905 Reports were leaked alleging that two of Kuwait’s largest banks had 
deposited $92 million into the accounts of two parliament members, as well as further 
transfers to seven other parliamentarians. These transfers suggested that the government 
had sought to buy the loyalty of parliamentarians.906 The corruption scandal highlighted 
the fact that the Al-Sabahs’ approach to managed reform depended to a large extent on 
their ability to manipulate members of parliament. Because parliamentary elections do 
not necessarily provide the government with a natural majority, the regime has always 
sought to control the increasingly disparate elements within the institution, with varying 
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degrees of success.907 It is important to note that the government’s ability to manipulate 
parliament is partly due to the lack of political parties, where even though parliamentary 
blocs exist, “they lack the discipline and cohesion to organise parliament effectively.” 908 
Election candidates can be easily influenced by government bribes, especially if they are 
dependent solely on local opinion for their re-election, rather than a party platform. The 
scandal had changed that dynamic, at least for the time being, as well as the complexion, 
of parliament itself.909 It provided the opposition with proof of corruption habits and led 
thousands of Kuwaiti protestors to the streets on September 21–23, 2011, calling for the 
resignation of the prime minister. Possibly as a direct response to the allegations, on 
September 25, 2011 the cabinet adopted an anti-corruption draft law.910 
Nevertheless, hundreds of people continued protesting outside parliament every week, 
leading eventually to what the Emir described as the “black day”911 in the history of 
Kuwait: on November 16, 2011, oppositionists in and outside the Assembly, including 
leading opposition figure Mussalam Al-Barrrak and the ‘Fifth Fence’ youth group, forced 
their way into the parliament building, demanding the prime minister’s resignation.912 
According to media reports, the demonstrators broke open the gates to the parliament 
building and managed to enter the main chamber, where they sang the national anthem.913 
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The protestors clashed with police, leading to 45 arrests that night.914 Five security 
personnel and countless demonstrators were reported as wounded.915 The protestors were 
later acquitted on charges relating to the storming of parliament, the defendants having 
argued that they had no criminal intent but were compelled to protest over alleged 
corruption.916 The storming of parliament came a day after the cabinet and parliament 
voted against a request by opposition parliamentarians to question Sheikh Nasser on 
allegations of corruption involving the bank deposit scandal. 
The Emir denounced the opposition, saying: “What happened was abnormal … the 
day when MPs (and dozens of protestors) stormed parliament … breaking the doors to 
get into the assembly of which they are members and taking in 150 people: that's what I 
call a black day.”917 He further insisted that he would not bow to demands to sack the 
prime minister or dissolve parliament, and that it was not their right to decide whether he 
be dismissed: “Dissolving the parliament and the government – these are my powers … 
Even if I had the intention to ask him [Sheikh Nasser] to resign, I will not do so under 
pressure from these people (opposition) … We are the ones who protect the constitution 
and they distort it.”918 Subsequently, on December 4, 2011, Sheikh Nasser finally 
resigned from his post and the Emir accepted his resignation;919 in his resignation letter to 
the Emir, Sheikh Nasser blamed unnamed opposition lawmakers for Kuwait's political 
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instability and the government's inability to perform.920 The corruption scandal played a 
crucial role in the removal of the prime minister – the Emir was cornered into conceding 
to popular demands for his removal. State television in Kuwait quoted Sheikh Nasser as 
saying the decision of the government to step down was “to comply with the national 
interest and due to the danger the situation had reached”.921 After the resignation of 
Sheikh Nasser, the Emir appointed another member of the royal family in his place, 
Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak Al-Sabah. Two days later, the Emir dissolved parliament and 
called for new elections, which were set for February 2, 2012. 
Interestingly, the popular demands for the removal of the prime minister, Sheikh 
Nasser, may also be based on a seed planted by members of the royal family from the 
Salem branch who were excluded from key ruling positions (details in Chapter 3). 
Considering the fact that some of the members of the royal family have 
significant economic, political and social weight, they have begun to wage fierce 
campaigns against the Prime Minister with the aim of finishing his political 
career in order to clear path to rule for themselves. This conflict between parties 
of the royal family is played out in the Kuwaiti parliament, media outlets owned 
by members of the royal family, and through some Twitter accounts.922 
Prior to the demonstrations in front of the parliament building in November 2011, 
official newspaper sources revealed that Sheikh Nasser had prompted members of 
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parliament to summon a member of the royal family, Sheikh Ahmad Al Fahad923 for 
questioning, “in order to compromise his political career”. 924 The threat of parliamentary 
inquiry into suspected corruption led Sheikh Ahmad to resign from his government post. 
Subsequent to Sheikh Ahmad’s resignation, the financial scandal involving the prime 
minister was revealed in all the major news outlets. The scandal had implicated the prime 
minister in bribing several parliament members with extensive financial incentives; the 
scandal was allegedly brought about as a vengeful response by Sheikh Ahmad against the 
prime minister.925 
Nevertheless, overwhelming public anger at the bribery allegations against Sheikh 
Nasser, and his weakness as head of government, had culminated in demands for his 
removal. The Emir was adamant in securing Sheikh Nasser’s position to prove his upper 
hand against the opposition; however, he had to defuse the crisis and contain popular 
anger, and thus accepted the prime minister’s resignation. An important aspect of the 
removal of the prime minister is the encouragement and incentive it provided for the 
youth groups who participated in the demonstrations. “Kuwaiti youth groups buoyed by 
their success in helping to bring down the previous government and parliament are 
playing an active role in a general election to achieve their goals for change.” 926 The 
youth groups were emboldened by their power, and thus became more involved in the 
election campaigns for the next parliament. Islamist candidate and human rights activist, 
Adel al-Damkhi, commented on the power of the youth activists: “Youths now are more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923 He is a member of the Salem line, an opposing branch of the Al Sabah family. 
924 Alwuhaib (2012). 
925 Ibid. 
926 Hurriyet Daily News. (2012).  
 310 
powerful than parliament. They have been moving and monitoring mistakes and their 
reaction will be stronger than anyone can imagine.” 927 However, the youth activists insist 
that their activities are not linked simply to elections, and indicate that they would return 
to the streets if the next parliament failed to produce comprehensive reforms. A leading 
activist from the Fifth Fence youth group, Abdullah al-Shallahi, said that his group was 
actively taking part in the election campaign, and helping around 30 candidates who 
“accept [their] ideas for comprehensive democratic reform”. 928 He further stated: “Our 
goals go far beyond the election period. We want fundamental reforms including a 
constitutional monarchy, reforming the election law and legalising political parties.” 929 
c. Demonstrations for Democratic Reform 
After the resignation of the prime minister, demonstrations continued in Kuwait City and 
were mainly organised by pro-democracy youth activists and Islamist opposition 
parliament members. While the prime minister’s political opponents primarily based 
demands for his removal on corruption charges, there was the deeper ambition of 
advancing the country’s constitutional monarchy. “Having already forced the concession 
of separating the prime minister position from the office of the crown prince, the 
opposition now seeks to establish the principle that the prime minister can be dismissed 
by parliament.”930 
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Inspired by the Arab Spring events and fed up with stalemated and corrupt 
politics, Kuwaiti youth, students and members of parliament have increased their 
concentration on ousting the prime minister. Their goal was to make the prime 
minister the democratically elected leader of the parliament rather than the 
Emir’s appointed proxy. 931 
The youth leaders announced they would support parliament deputies who would 
press for a fully elected government, in which the prime minister is selected by 
parliament, as well as the legalisation of political parties and changes to election laws. 
“Such announcements confirmed the fears of the royal family that dissolving the 
Assembly and holding new election would empower oppositionists sympathetic to the 
2011 Arab uprisings.”932 At the start of the election campaign, youth activists launched 
the “Kuwait Charter 2012”, an internet petition that calls for wide-ranging political and 
economic reforms. Enthusiastic young speakers became regular guests at evening election 
rallies, urging voters to elect reformists and to shun pro-government candidates.933 
Ultimately, the elections on February 2, 2012 resulted in a pro-opposition Assembly, 
with an increase of Islamist (both Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist) representation. Pro-
government candidates were defeated for allegedly taking government bribes (the 
September 2011 scandal), while the liberals lost support.934 The new parliament lifted the 
immunity of MPs previously accused of corruption so that they could be prosecuted. 
Furthermore, it made a significant constitutional gain when the new Prime Minister, 	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Sheikh Jaber, was questioned by parliament in public for the first time, in March 2012. 
The Assembly questioned the prime minister on the handling of the corruption scandal 
linked to the previous government. Since the interpellation occurred so early in the 
legislative period, it stopped short of calling for a no confidence motion.935 However, the 
February 2012 parliament faced its end sooner than expected. On June 20, 2012, 
Kuwait’s Constitutional Court ruled that the December 2011 suspension of parliament by 
the Emir was not conducted in accordance with the constitution on the basis that a new 
cabinet had not been sworn in before the suspension was ordered. Hence, the court 
moved to dissolve the elected February 2012 parliament and reinstate the May 2009 
Assembly (which consisted of a majority of pro-government members).936 
Demonstrations exploded on June 26, 2012, when thousands of Kuwaitis rallied to call 
for democratic reform, particularly for the formation of a government based on election 
results.937 It was widely believed that the Emir had aimed to dissolve the opposition-
dominated parliament in order to reinstate a more flexible parliament that included more 
pro-government members.938 The government added further fuel to the flames when it 
decided to refer the Electoral Law to the Constitutional Court in August due to its 
suspicion that it contradicted the constitution.939 In 2006, a reformed Electoral Law was 
passed reducing the number of electoral districts from 25 to five. The law was adopted 
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after popular rallies were initiated by the Orange Movement. The Information Minister, 
Sheikh Mohammad, told a press conference that the decision was taken after “all 
constitutional experts asked by the government said that the law is in breach of the 
constitution.”940 He further stated that the aim was to “immune the law against possible 
future challenges that many nullify any elections”.941 However, it was clear that the 
government had asked the Constitutional Court to rule on legality to further its attempt to 
dilute the strength of opposition victories in future elections.942 In response, opposition 
members and youth activists met in the office of former parliament speaker, Ahmed Al-
Saadoun, one of the opposition leaders, and agreed that the government was instigating a 
“coup against the constitution”.943 They further accused the government of involving the 
Constitutional Court in the ongoing political crisis in order to create a “legislative 
vacuum” leading to its monopoly over the country’s decision-making process. They thus 
called for the “activation of the constitutional monarchy” with the aim of securing an 
elected government.944 
A day before the ruling, on September 24, 2012, “around 10,000 people, who filled the 
seaside square opposite the parliament building, cheered loudly as opposition figures 
called for an elected government and warned against what they called a politicized 
ruling.”945 On September 25, the Constitutional Court rejected the government’s request 
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to revise the Electoral law, demonstrating a rare example of the court overruling the 
Emir’s wishes.946 The court declared the Electoral Law to be constitutional, clearing the 
way for new elections based on the five districts.947 The government’s plan to manipulate 
a way out of the country’s political deadlock by involving the Constitutional Court had 
failed. The court ruling that rejected the government’s case sent a strong message to the 
opposition: the Constitutional Court is not a biased arm of the executive,948 and it solely 
exists to protect the Kuwaiti constitution, and thereby the citizens’ political and social 
rights. The court ruling also sent an important political message to neighbouring Gulf 
leaderships: “It reaffirms the judicial independence and the separation of powers in 
Kuwait”, a unique condition that set Kuwait apart from neighbours whose freedoms were 
more restricted.949 
On October 19, the Emir set a new election date of December 1, 2012, and 
simultaneously issued an Emiri decree amending the electoral constituency law to limit 
voters to the choice of one candidate, in contrast to the previous law of four candidates 
per district.950 “The edict appeared in a special edition of the official gazette Kuwait al-
Yawm [Kuwait Today], making it effective immediately.”951 The Emir explained that his 
decision to change the voting system was “to preserve national unity”,952 but he was 
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criticised for being both unfair and unconstitutional by leading opposition members.953 
The opposition believed that this step aimed to manipulate the elections results and 
produce an “obedient” parliament; and they threatened to boycott the elections.954 
Meanwhile, the regime rallied support for the Emir’s decision and endorsed a statement 
signed by a list of Kuwaiti notables that condemned boycotting the election.955 
Nevertheless, public protests against the revised election ruling ensued, followed by an 
electoral boycott.956 
On October 21, 2012, Kuwait experienced its largest demonstration at Erada Square, 
dubbed the “March of Dignity”, attended by an estimated 100,000–200,000 citizens.957 
The March of Dignity protest was organised by an anonymous Twitter account that 
appealed to Kuwaitis to gather “to protect their constitutional and political freedoms 
against perceived governmental assault”958 and declared the wish “to preserve a degree of 
independence from opposition politicians, whom they suspect of manipulating the 
protests for their own narrow political interests”. 959 The anonymity of the organisers had 
helped create a more inclusive atmosphere surrounding the protests. An activist, Mona 
Kareem, stated: “Last year people protested against the prime minister in protests that 
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were organised by the opposition, but the opposition is perceived to be Islamist and 
extremist, so young, left-wing and secular Kuwaitis did not want to get involved.”960 At 
first, the demonstration was peaceful; however, it became violent when riot police 
surrounded some groups and used teargas and stun grenades to disperse them.961 The 
wounded were estimated at around 100 activists and 11 police officers; 962 a medical 
source told Reuters that at least 29 people had been admitted to hospital, most suffering 
from tear gas inhalation or from baton bruises.963 The Interior Ministry justified the use of 
force to disperse protestors by saying they “rioted and used violence”, “threw stones at 
police forces” and “blocked traffic”.964 At least 15 people, including two former MPs and 
a reporter, were detained.965 The arrests of parliamentarians and activists led to further 
demonstrations calling for the release of leading opposition figure, Musallam Al-Barrak, 
who was arrested for allegedly insulting the Emir during a speech he gave at a previous 
opposition rally on October 19. Al-Barrak directed a part of his speech to the Emir, 
saying: 
 Your Highness, in the name of the nation we shall not allow you to engage in 
 autocratic rule […] Your Highness, how do you want to go down in history? 
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Do you want it to be recorded that under the rule of Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed, 
opinion formers [leaders] were imprisoned?966 
According to the Kuwaiti constitution, Article 54, the Emir is “immune and 
inviolable”.967 Thus, government authorities arrested Al-Barrak days after the rally, and 
prosecutors charged him with “encroaching on the pillars of the emirate, insulting the 
Emir and infringing his authorities”;968 he was later sentenced to two years in prison.969 
Around 21 people, including nine former parliamentarians, were also convicted and given 
two-year prison terms for repeating his speech in social media and in front of large 
crowds.970 The imprisonment of Al-Barrak was a major attempt by the government to 
discredit his message and stigmatise him as a threat to national security. 
This was the first such challenge from a Kuwaiti or even Gulf politician against a 
sitting emir, and went against Kuwaiti law, which dictates that the emir should 
not be criticised directly or even indirectly. Al-Barak broke an old tradition so 
openly that it encouraged hundreds of young men and women to follow suit.971 
On October 31, around 200 of Al-Barrak’s supporters gathered outside the Central 
Prison where he was held, calling for his release.972 Witnesses say that the riot police used 
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tear gas and stun grenades to suppress the demonstration.973 The demonstrators also 
demanded the removal of a recent ban by the government on public gatherings and the 
royal decree ordering changes to the Electoral Law. 974 The clash between demonstrators 
and police was so intense that Kuwaiti authorities allegedly considered bringing troops 
into the capital to contain the gathering and any future demonstrations.975 An unnamed 
source within law enforcement made a comment to a daily newspaper, Al-Anbaa: “The 
army and national guard may be called in if needed to deal with any breach of public 
order … The country’s interior ministry maintains it will use all means necessary to 
prevent illegal processions.” 976 Similar threats and defensive language were used by 
neighbouring Gulf governments in response to their own domestic disturbances during 
the Arab Spring. Fortunately for the Kuwaiti population, the government did not go to the 
extreme of engaging its military. 
There were some individuals who opposed the opposition and sided with the 
government and the Emir as to his right to alter the Electoral Law and dispense police 
force at the March of Dignity demonstration on October 21. A former minister, Sami al-
Nusif, commented in As-Safir newspaper: “[W]hat happened on [Sunday] was erroneous, 
without any doubt [in reference to the police using violence]. But the demonstration had 
no grounds … The emir has every right to issue an emergency decree in the absence of 
parliament. He did so about 1,054 times, during one of which the electoral constituencies 	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law was modified.”977 He added that one man, one vote allows for the representation of 
marginalised groups, thus taking democratic procedures into account more than the 
current Electoral Law. Another government supporter, Hussein Abdul Rahman, a 
political science professor and specialist in the affairs of the National Assembly, stressed 
the right of the opposition to demonstrate and boycott elections; however, he did not 
share their view of the decree as “a coup against the constitution”.978 
On November 11, 2012, another rally was held at Erada Square. The authorised979 rally 
coincided with the 50th anniversary of the Kuwaiti constitution. It was the first in a series 
of protests against the voting amendment to take place without police violence.980 The 
rally was peaceful and opposition members delivered speeches highlighting the glory of 
the Kuwaiti constitution. The participants were a mix of Islamist supporters, tribal 
groups, youth activists, and former parliament opposition members.981 Prior to the rally, 
the Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh Sabah, had announced that there would be no leniency towards 
threats to “the security of the homeland”.982 He further stated: “Today we are required to 
choose between the rule of law and the constitution and stick to it, to the road of safety, 
or to pursue chaos and infringe on the powers of the responsible constitutional 
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authorities.”983 He renounced “sedition” and asked citizens to cast their ballots as a 
national duty. 
On December 1, 2012, the opposition boycotted the elections, along with a majority of 
the Kuwaiti electorate. Despite the opposition’s vehement calls for boycotting the 
upcoming polls, a total of 387 candidates registered for election.984 The voter turnout, 
however, was 40% among eligible voters. Some opposition figures contested the 
government’s percentage of voter turnout, and insisted that the turnout was at most 
33%.985 The boycott led to an overwhelming pro-government Assembly on the strength of 
the 17 pro-government Shi’a elected, including five Islamist Shi’a of the National Islamic 
Alliance (NIA). The number of Shi’a elected was the highest of any Assembly to date. 
On December 5, 2012, the Cabinet of Ministers was formed, and despite repeated 
demonstrations by the opposition, “the government tried to move forward on long stalled 
legislation with a solidly supportive Assembly.” 986 
Even though the December 1 elections took place, the Emir’s election decree remained 
under legal challenge at the Constitutional Court. On June 16, 2013, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the Emir’s decree – to reduce four candidates to one – was indeed 
constitutional, yet it ordered the Assembly to be dissolved on the basis of technicalities 
improprieties. The government therefore set new elections, to be held on July 27, 2013. 
The election produced another pro-government Assembly, yet less reliant on Shi’a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983 Ibid. 
984 Gulf News. (2012). Kuwait rally coincides with statute jubilee.   
985 Bandow (2012).  
986 Katzman (2016). 
 321 
candidates than the previous Assembly (Shi’a-held seats had decreased from fifteen to 
eight) .987 
Overall, opposition boycotts of parliamentary elections benefited the regime in 
producing pro-government Assemblies and eliminating the opposition from 
parliamentary politics. A former MP, Nasser Al-Sane’, explained the logic behind the 
boycotts as an attempt to expose the government as the source of political gridlock. He 
stated, “the more we stay away, the more we show it’s the government that cannot 
perform.” Shafeeq Ghabra further explains: “this parliament realises the problem is the 
decision-making structure; the problem isn’t the street.”988 The latest election, on July 27, 
2013, had produced a pro-government Assembly “more amenable to working with the 
ruling family, ushering in a period of renewed legislative and governmental action on 
long-standing issues and an end to most public protest”. 989 However, Kuwait’s political 
crisis is far from resolved. Demands for democratic reform continue, where “most people 
appear to want more than an improved status quo.”990 A former MP and leading 
opposition member, Faisal Al-Muslim, summarised the demands of the opposition as an 
elected prime minister, fully independent courts, and financial disclosure for government 
officials and MPs. 
The end of the Arab Spring in Kuwait is represented by the end of the cycle of 
parliamentary dissolutions and the halt of mass demonstrations. Since the July 2013 	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elections, there have been no major public demonstrations. Reasons to the halt of mass 
demonstrations in Kuwait may rely on a more regional perspective: as the violent unrest 
in Egypt and Syria tarnished the appeal of revolutionary change and highlighted the 
dangers of national disunity, the public’s tolerance for street protests declined. Protests 
retreated into Kuwait’s more tribal neighbourhoods, and their national appeal began to 
diminish. Meanwhile, the government began to utilise legal mechanisms to prevent 
further dissent: “Throughout 2012-2013 reports of protests were replaced by dockets of 
court hearings as dozens of activists and former politicians faced charges for their street 
actions or for the … charge of offending the Emir.” 991 
Almost two years into the Arab Spring the Kuwaiti leadership was able to fend off 
demands for reform by allowing opposition figures to speak their mind in parliament, and 
their supporters to demonstrate in the protest zone at Erada Square, in front of the 
parliament building.992 Although the number of opposition MPs has increased in the past 
couple of years, the opposition still largely confines its demands to limiting the ruling 
family’s power rather than ending its rule.993 However, the use of harsh policing and 
restricting freedom of speech has discredited the leadership in the eyes of many Kuwaitis. 
The following sections examine the details of how the Kuwaiti ruling elite responded to 
the demonstrations, and highlights the role of the GCC in its survival of the Arab Spring. 
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IV. Case Study Analysis: Surviving the Arab Spring 
While Kuwait was experiencing its own version of the Arab Spring, its neighbouring 
GCC states were also facing popular mobilisation among their citizen populations. Mass 
demonstrations erupted in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia in 2011, prompting the Gulf 
states to strengthen their cooperation under their GCC alliance. The hypothesis of this 
research is that the Gulf monarchies utilised the GCC as a vehicle to preserve their 
regimes during the Arab Spring. The threat of regime change fully engaged the six 
member states to consolidate their response to street demonstrations and allow 
unprecedented interference into the domestic affairs of individual members. The 
hypothesis also indicates a strong correlation between support of the GCC alliance on the 
one hand, and the Kuwaiti leadership’s capacity to maintain its regime status during the 
Arab Spring on the other. 
This research builds its hypothesis on the notion of a broad GCC strategy for regime 
preservation; arguing that the Gulf leaderships have utilised similar tactics involving the 
GCC in surviving the Arab Spring. It bases the GCC strategy for regime preservation on 
the Riyadh Declaration; a document introduced by the Saudi monarchy during the GCC’s 
32nd summit in Riyadh on December 21, 2011. The declaration was a proposal to explore 
the transformation of the GCC organisation from cooperation to union.994 It marked the 
beginning of the adoption of a broad strategy for regime preservation by all six members 
of the GCC. The Riyadh Declaration presented a plan of action that listed several 
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objectives and policies that ultimately ensured the survival of the Gulf monarchies during 
the Arab Spring. 
From these objectives, this research derived three main tactics: enhancing members’ 
monarchical legitimacy, heightening their internal security, and collaborating in a defence 
scheme. The Gulf leaderships have utilised these tactics to suppress organised dissent and 
maintain their hold on power; and the involvement of the GCC alliance is clear within 
each tactic. The first tactic, of enhancing the leadership’s legitimacy, involved the 
provision of financial incentives for citizens in return for support of the ruler. The second 
tactic, of heightened internal security, revolves around the various restrictions applied by 
the ruling elite during the demonstrations, ranging from police brutality to media 
censorship and arresting key opposition members. The third tactic – collaborating in a 
defence scheme – highlights the significance of the signing of the GCC Internal Security 
Agreement in November 2012. As this research will prove in the following sections, the 
Kuwaiti ruling elite utilised all three tactics in its response to the demonstrations, and 
ultimately in surviving the Arab Spring. 
a. GCC Strategy for Regime Preservation: Enhancing Legitimacy 
The tactic of enhancing legitimacy includes the distribution of financial incentives as a 
way to placate demands for political participation, and the reinvigoration of government-
sponsored youth programmes as a way to engage the youth population in the nation’s 
political and economic development. The involvement of the GCC within this tactic is 
highlighted by the GCC economic package to Oman and Bahrain and its increasing 
efforts of combining GCC youth programmes within the six member states. Moreover, 
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the GCC announced its commitment to the aim of interaction with the political, 
economic, social and security changes and challenges of each member state as laid out in 
the Riyadh Declaration and reiterated in the Sakhir Declaration in December 2012.995 The 
Kuwaiti leadership certainly engaged in this tactic during the Arab Spring, even prior to 
the signing of the Riyadh Declaration. Appeasing the population with welfare packages 
has been an ongoing tactic of regime preservation among all GCC monarchies.  In 
February 2011, the Kuwaiti Emir announced the distribution of cash and free food grants 
for a year for all citizens, as an attempt to pre-empt any discontent influenced by the 
events of the Arab Spring in neighbouring countries.996 The state further increased civil 
servant salaries by 115%, costing the nation more than $1 billion.997 The total subsidies 
would cost the government around $17.7 billion a year. Analysts assert that if such 
government benefits continue at their current rates, it would likely put Kuwait’s budget 
into deficit starting from between 2017 and 2020. “Recent Kuwaiti budgets appeared 
intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up for long-term growth.” 998 
Consequently, in October 2013, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Jaber, publicly stated that the 
current subsidies system had produced an “unsustainable” welfare state, and pledged to 
work to reduce them.999 
The Saudi, Bahraini, Omani, and Emirati governments had also granted their citizens 
higher wages and benefits during 2011, indicating a unity in financial decisions and an 	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alignment in strategy for regime preservation among GCC members. Even though each 
Gulf government established its own variety of packages, all six countries found it crucial 
and expedient to provide financial incentives to their citizens to ensure loyalty, hence 
creating a modus operandi common to all member countries of applying financial 
leverage to secure their regimes. A collective GCC effort also materialised in the $20 
billion financial assistance package to Bahrain and Oman. The foreign ministers of the 
GCC states announced an economic package to support the Bahraini and Omani 
populations by improving their economic and social conditions, creating job 
opportunities for the unemployed, and overall by raising their standard of living.1000 John 
Sfakianakis, chief economist with the Riyadh-based Banque Saudi Fransi, commented on 
the GCC package: “This is a very important message sent to markets inside the region, 
and globally, that the GCC countries will be unified and will stick together to support 
those in need. They have the commitment and the willingness to do so, and of course, the 
money.” 1001 
In the Kuwaiti case, however, financial accommodations were accompanied by reports 
of corruption among government officials and parliamentarians, leading to thousands of 
Kuwaiti protestors taking the streets in September 2011 to call for the resignation of the 
prime minister.1002 The tactic of financial appeasement during the Arab Spring failed and 
in some ways, perhaps, enticed the Kuwaiti public to protest against government 
corruption. “The issues of corruption, power struggles and representation recently came 
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together when it became known that the government had deposited millions of Kuwaiti 
dinars in the bank accounts of some members of parliament.”1003 These deposits were 
perceived as bribe money allocated by the prime minister to win parliamentarians’ 
support in forthcoming votes of no confidence that were expected from the opposition. 
The scandal galvanised citizens to protest about wider issues, such as corruption, the 
accountability of government ministers and elected officials and a lack of infrastructure 
development due to a legislative deadlock. 
A main accusation by the protestors was of government interference in parliamentary 
elections through bribery and vote buying, which dates back to the 1960s. “These 
undermine parliament’s legitimacy, as MPs are sometimes seen as representing vested 
interests rather than voters’ interests; the perception of corruption among politicians was 
one of the main factors driving the protests of 2011.”1004 Furthermore, political disputes 
between the legislature and the executive had prevented movement on several major 
projects, such as the Kuwait Development Plan which was approved by parliament in 
February 2010. It was a five-year plan intended to “turn Kuwait into a regional trade and 
financial hub for the northern Gulf through economic development, diversification, and 
GDP growth.” 1005 In addition to the plan, Parliament approved a detailed expenditure 
budget1006 for the period, devising how the government was to spend its resources in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1003 Shultziner and Tetreault (2012). 
1004 Kinninmont (2012). Kuwait’s Parliament: An Experiment in Semi-democracy.  
1005 Hvidt, M. (2013). Economic diversification in GCC countries: Past record and future trends. Kuwait 
Programme on Development, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
1006 The budget included total spending of US$125 billon (Global Investment House Report 2010). 
 328 
to develop the country and, further, to pull Kuwait out of the recession that it had 
experienced along with the rest of the world since September 2008.1007 
However, the structure of the Kuwaiti political system is inclined to encourage 
political deadlock.1008 The development plan has become a topic of heated debate within 
parliament, with some parliament members accusing the Cabinet of Ministers of allowing 
the plan to fall behind schedule.1009 The parliament has the ability to impede government 
actions “without the responsibility for rule that would come from the formation of the 
government by parliamentary parties.” 1010 If the government were to allow the 
appointment of a commoner prime minister, it would lead to a reliable majority in 
parliament; as such, it would result in an easing of paralysis in large-scale projects. The 
developmental plan focused on such projects as had direct and immediate benefit for 
Kuwaiti citizens (such as the construction of new housing), and might have curtailed the 
Arab Spring demonstrations in 2011. However, a year after its announcement, it was 
apparent that the development plan was behind in reaching its goals;1011 the lack of a 
strong administration to insist on achieving targets was a key obstruction that ultimately 
forestalled projects and created more tension between parliament and the government. 
Hence, political and economic reform became key demands among demonstrators. 
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i. Engaging with the Youth 
In the light of the Arab Spring, the ruling elite are taking Kuwaiti youth and their issues 
more seriously. At the opening session of parliament on February 15, 2012, the Emir, 
Sheikh Sabah, called on citizens to “focus on developing and nurturing youth, providing 
them with job opportunities, respectable living conditions, and galvanising their positive 
and constructive participation in serving and developing society, as they are our hope.”1012 
The Ministry of State for Youth Affairs is the main governmental body responsible for 
youth in Kuwait. Through the Ministry of Youth Affairs, a government-sponsored youth 
programme, the National Youth Program, was set up with the aim of engaging the 
country’s youth in a variety of social and national issues and encouraging them to 
eventually become leaders.1013 As part of the National Youth Program, a youth council 
was established, whose role was “to create mechanisms to engage Kuwaiti youth, and to 
create partnerships between government, civil society and private sector for the benefit of 
youth development. Recent initiatives include projects to promote volunteerism, 
entrepreneurship, and to combat communal violence.”1014 The council is mandated by the 
Emir, and made up of representatives from public service organisations, student 
federations and youth volunteer groups, who were asked to nominate three persons each. 
The youth are encouraged to submit recommendations on how to improve the 
country’s overall performance by capitalising on its human resources, at an annual 
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national youth conference. In November 2012, Kuwait held its first conference of the 
National Youth Project (NYP), a national consultation project where young Kuwaitis 
were asked to submit policy recommendations concerning young people.1015 The result 
was a National Youth Document that includes recommendations in areas such as 
citizenship, education, economic development, housing, and health. This document was 
presented to the Emir and the Council of Ministers for consideration. In March 2014, the 
Ministry of State for Youth Affairs held a youth forum to discuss the implementation of 
some of the recommendations, however it is unclear what role the youth council will play 
in influencing policymaking.1016 
The Kuwaiti slogan in its National Youth Programme is “Kuwait is listening”, 
indicating that the government is aware of their troubles and is willing to listen to their 
proposed solutions.1017 The programme allows the youth to voice their opinion, negative 
or positive, as long as it is in a respectful manner, because their criticisms are seen as 
constructive rather than destructive. However, some of Kuwait’s youth perceive this 
government initiative as a ruse to engage youth and make them feel important, while in 
actuality the government is using the youth to promote its legitimacy. In other words, the 
ruling elites are enhancing their legitimacy by creating the illusion that they are 
encouraging the country’s youth and listening to them. These sentiments have been 
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expressed by bloggers, and this research drew together some comments made in response 
to a blogger who wrote about the initiation of the National Youth Program in 2012: 1018 
Face reality, those youth are only a front, a mask, a cover, a packing, a layer… 
something different you put on something old … they are not expecting them to 
voice, they are not expecting them to reflect … they are only expecting them to 
lobby. (3azeez says: March 14, 2012) 
The government is an expert in creating a facade and nothing more … There is 
no improvement. They are doing this just for SHOW.” (Jasim says: March 14, 
2012) 
This is just another redundant government committee. (Sami says: April 4, 2012)  
These sentiments are not shared by all Kuwaiti youth – there were several posts that 
offered support for the council and optimism as to the function and role of Kuwaiti youth 
in the future of Kuwait. 
Ultimately, the National Youth Programme website1019 provides the youth with an 
outlet to engage with the government, and also presents useful information specifically 
about youth in Kuwait: statistics, laws concerning youths, representation and more. 
Whether the government is serious about implementing a youth policy based on the 
recommendations of the youth programme has yet to be confirmed; in the meantime, the 
government is continuing its efforts to engage with the youth by setting up casual 
meetings between government officials and active Kuwaiti youth. An example was on 
January 22, 2013, when three government ministers met with a group of bloggers at a 	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coffee shop in Kuwait City. The Education Minister, Nayef al-Hajraf, the Commerce and 
Industry Minister, Anas al-Saleh, and Sheikh Mohammad al-Mubarak Al-Sabah, a 
member of the ruling family who is Kuwait's Minister for Cabinet and Municipal Affairs 
(all three ministers are in their 40s), had set an informal meeting with around 30 Kuwaiti 
bloggers and online journalists to discuss issues that concern young people. The major 
newspapers praised the meeting as an attempt to encourage a dialogue between the 
government and Kuwaiti youth, especially since the youth were more engaged in social 
media, as opposed to state-run televised speeches made by government officials. “It is a 
breakthrough from the formal address, filled with courtesies and empty promises, which 
state departments’ offices routinely spew out,” columnist Iqbal al-Ahmad wrote.1020 
In its attempt to further enhance its legitimacy and secure its regime, the Kuwaiti 
monarchy agreed to the Riyadh Declaration during the GCC 32nd summit in Riyadh in 
December 2011. From among the points agreed upon by the six-member organisation, the 
GCC states agreed to improve the status of GCC young people, highlighting their 
importance within Gulf society. The stated aim was “deepening the common belonging 
of the GCC youths, improving their identity and protecting their gains by intensifying 
communication, cooperation and convergence among them and employing educational, 
media, cultural, sports and scout activities for the service of this goal.”1021 The Arab 
Spring had prompted the GCC leaders to redirect their efforts in invigorating various 
individual youth programmes sponsored by the state. Most youth programmes in the Gulf 
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region focus on entrepreneurship projects, such as the Omani SANAD Program1022 and 
Bahrain’s Tamkeen programme.1023 The Saudi government also partnered with the UNDP 
to develop its own National Youth Strategy. 1024 The establishment of these programmes 
and the increased efforts in engaging the youth population among GCC states is a tactic 
designed to enhance the monarchs’ legitimacy, but this research also recognises it as a 
genuine attempt to mobilise the Gulf youth in national projects in order to develop their 
skills in leadership and other areas. Either way, the involvement of young people in all 
areas of government must surely have a benefit in terms of increasing their national 
loyalty and patriotism. 
Given the fact that the youth and the unemployed were the prime instigators of the 
Arab Spring demonstrations throughout the Gulf countries, the GCC organisation has 
taken steps to establish a committee to study and identify various youth activities and the 
issues most important to them. In the 33rd GCC Summit in Bahrain in December 2012, 
the Supreme Council showed its interest in the aspirations of GCC youth by ratifying the 
views of the consultative body pertaining to youth strategy: “boosting … the spirit of 
citizenship, the strategy of employment in the GCC states in the governmental and 
private sectors and referring these views to the relevant ministerial committees in order to 
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set up implementation mechanisms for this purpose.”1025 The Supreme Council has further 
stated its intention to establish a process of joint cooperation in youth programmes 
throughout the Gulf region. The GCC Secretary-General, Abdullatif Al-Zayani, launched 
a conference the following year, in November 2013, entitled “Youth in Council 
Cooperation: Increasing Growth”,1026 where he declared the importance of Gulf youth in 
the context of collaboration of the Gulf countries within the GCC. The GCC Youth 
Conference invited a large number of selected youth leaders from the Gulf states, as well 
as several researchers and experts, in order to discuss the transformation of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council from cooperation to a union. The Gulf youth were encouraged to 
present recommendations on implementing the initiative by the Saudi leadership in 
December 2011 calling for the transformation of the GCC into a union.1027 
The initiatives represent the aspirations of the people of the Gulf and their 
demands for strategic plans that would support among others their educational 
and scientific needs required by the Gulf markets to guarantee them jobs … The 
union will work to increase employment opportunities for young people of the 
GCC and ease movement of people between the countries.1028 
One of the recommendations was aimed at securing the transition of the GCC from a 
state of cooperation to a state of union by building a strong defensive entity, able to meet 
all external threats. Participants also urged the need for each state to strengthen its 
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existing political systems and create new institutions to consolidate the federal process 
itself and increase political participation. 
As each GCC member state has established forums for youth affairs within their 
interior ministries, a collective GCC measure enhancing youth aspirations is not far from 
becoming a reality. The engagement of youth on an individual and collective level is a 
strategy which enhances the Gulf leaderships’ legitimacy. By stressing the importance of 
youth in the development of their nations, the Gulf leaderships are attempting to instil a 
sense of patriotism that ensures loyalty to their monarchical regimes. Hence, this research 
asserts that since all GCC members have declared their interest in engaging their youth 
populations individually and collectively, this tactic is considered to have been a key 
attempt to enhance monarchical legitimacy during the Arab Spring. Whether the tactic 
has been successful or not, the government is certainly attempting to engage the voice of 
Kuwaiti youth and provide them with better economic opportunities. However, the 
government’s coercive tactics during the Arab Spring, including police violence and 
restriction of the freedom of speech, have also ostracised Kuwaiti youth. 
b. GCC Strategy for Regime Preservation: Heightening Internal Security 
The second tactic, of heightening internal security, concerned the various restrictions 
applied by the Kuwaiti leadership on its population during the Arab Spring. Ranging 
from police violence to media censorship and arrests, the leadership tightened its internal 
security policies and restricted the country’s freedom of expression. This research 
highlights three main government actions under this tactic: excessive force by police 
during peaceful demonstrations, restrictions on freedom of expression through systematic 
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legal harassment of activists, journalists, bloggers and political opponents; and the 
emergence of the practice of revocation of citizenship as a method of punishing any 
criticism of the government.1029 Kuwait is obligated to protect rights to freedom of 
opinion and expression based on Article 36 in the Kuwaiti constitution; however, it has 
violated its obligations under the constitution, as well as under international treaties, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed in 
1996.1030 Following the Arab Spring in 2011, the government prosecuted people for 
criticising the government or its institutions, insulting the Emir, insulting Saudi Arabia or 
its ruling family, insulting the UAE leadership, and insulting religion. 
“Judicial harassment of activists, journalists, bloggers and political opponents 
continued and was made possible thanks to a myriad of laws criminalising the right to 
freedom of expression.” 1031 The Kuwaiti government’s restrictions are thus enforced by 
invoking provisions of the constitution and penal code. A new media law imposes severe 
penalties on people “who create or send immoral messages”.1032 Another law was 
introduced in 2013, the National Unity Law, which criminalises publishing and 
broadcasting content that could be deemed offensive to religious sects or groups, or 
misusing mobile phones to disseminate objectionable comments.1033 These new laws 
present the Kuwaiti leadership with legal mechanisms to supress citizens’ constitutional 
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rights of freedom of expression and counter the opposition’s attempt to limit authoritarian 
rule.1034 
Kuwait’s crackdown on freedom of expression involved indicting people due to their 
criticism of GCC leaderships; during 2012 and 2013, Kuwaiti authorities convicted 
several citizens for insulting the leaderships and policies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the 
UAE.1035 Another new practice by the Kuwaiti authorities was the revoking of citizenship, 
mainly from political and human rights activists, as a method of repression; a practice 
that its neighbours – notably the UAE and Bahrain – have used since 2012 to suppress all 
forms of political opposition. In 2014, the Kuwaiti authorities revoked the citizenship of 
33 individuals. They utilised the 1959 Law on Nationality, where Article 13 provides for 
the withdrawal of nationality by decree of the Interior Ministry if a person “has promoted 
principles that will undermine the social or economic system of the country, belongs to a 
foreign political party” or “threatens the higher interests of the State or its security.” 1036 
Additionally, decisions to revoke citizenship cannot be appealed legally or 
administratively because there is no competent body to assess questions of nationality. 
The Kuwaiti National Assembly was a key collaborator in the passing of new laws 
that enabled the Kuwaiti authorities to enforce these restrictions on freedom of 
expression. On 14 June 2014, a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers was held to discuss 
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the recent protests in the country. The Cabinet ordered relevant ministries to take all 
necessary measures to fight actions that “undermine the country’s security and stability, 
bringing harm to its institutions.”1037 It notably called upon, firstly, the Interior Ministry to 
ensure that the conditions of citizenship are met, especially those related to practices that 
aim to harm the country’s stability; secondly, it called upon the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labour to confront all organisations whose objectives lie outside the scope set by the 
Law on Societies, reminding them of their role to raise public awareness through non-
political activities and to abstain from inciting riots; and thirdly, all media outlets were 
reminded of the patriotic role that they ought to fulfil in denouncing acts of rioting.1038 
Following this decree, the Interior Ministry ordered the revocation of citizenship of 
several political opponents (more on this later in the section). 
i. Police Violence 
This research highlights the government’s use of police violence in several 
demonstrations carried out by various groups in Kuwait during the Arab Spring. Police 
violence includes the use of various instruments such as armoured vehicles, tear gas, 
rubber bullets, water cannons and smoke bombs; it also implies the use of force through 
beatings and arrests. Kuwait’s government has made clear that it is willing and able to 
suppress unauthorised street protests, and justifies police violence by asserting its duty to 
protect public safety. It is important to note that while the Kuwaiti authorities utilised 
police violence in several protests, they also allowed for peaceful demonstrations to occur 	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(see graph below). Protest marches are illegal in Kuwait without prior approval from the 
Ministry of Interior. Erada Square in front of the parliament building was allocated by the 
Ministry as an approved area for gatherings. The Ministry of Information states: 
“Citizens are entitled to demonstrate in the square next to parliament or by application to 
the district governor. Those that wish to protest have the right to do so, but they have to 
be aware of both their rights and responsibilities under the law.”1039 However, the issue of 
licences for protests is just a formality introduced by the Kuwaiti government; the real 
reason for the crackdown is to maintain the stability of the regime, and control the tone of 
the demonstrations. 
This research argues that through its use of police violence, the Kuwaiti government 
risked provoking further dissent by taking a hard line. Political analysts claim that the 
Kuwaiti government did not want political turbulence to escalate as it had in 
neighbouring GCC country Bahrain, where the monarchy had requested the deployment 
of the GCC Peninsula Shield Force to suppress its own protests in March 2011. However, 
tensions between the Kuwaiti government and the broad-based opposition increased at 
the height of the Arab Spring demonstrations in Kuwait in October 2012. In an emailed 
statement to Reuters, the Ministry of Information wrote: “We are no strangers to open 
and frank debate amongst our people …That said, the primary duty of any state is to 
maintain the safety and security of its citizens; as such, the police and other security 
forces will be used as necessary to maintain law and order exactly as they were last night 
[referring to the Nov. 4 protest; see chart below].”1040 
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The Kuwaiti government has more readily enforced the ban on unlicensed protests 
since the March of Dignity demonstration on October 21, 2012, where protestors 
marched in Kuwait City demanding protection of the constitution among other things. A 
Gulf research specialist, Kristian Ulrichsen, commented on the government’s reaction to 
these protests: “The events of the past two weeks have crossed so many red lines and we 
now are seeing acts of mass civil disobedience as tens of thousands of people defy 
government warnings… Each protest is a further challenge, so the authorities are trying 
to stop them from taking place.” 1041 
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Table 8: Kuwaiti authorities’ use of police violence on Arab Spring demonstrations (2010–2012) 




1 Dec. 8, 2010 Democratic reform Private residence Yes 
2 Feb. 18, 2011 Bidoon rights 
Taima’, Sulaibiyya, and 
Ahmedi	   Yes 
3 March 11, 2011 Bidoon rights Jahra; 50km west of the capital	   Yes 
4 June 3, 2011 Removal of the prime minister Erada Square	   No 
5 Sep. 21-23, 2011 Removal of the prime minister Erada Square No 
6 Nov. 16, 2011 Removal of the prime minister Parliament building Yes 
7 Dec. 23, 2011 Bidoon rights Taima’; Jahra Yes 
8 June 26, 2012 Democratic reform Erada Square No 
9 Sep. 24, 2012 Democratic reform Erada Square No 
10 Oct. 15, 2012 Democratic reform 
Erada Square (preceded by a 
march) 
Yes 
11 Oct. 21, 2012 Democratic reform; dubbed 
‘March of Dignity’ 
March through Kuwait City Yes 
12 Oct. 31, 2012 Release opposition member 
from prison 
The square facing the Central 
Prison in the al-Salibiya 
region.	   Yes 
13 Nov. 4, 2012 Democratic reform Mishref; 20km from the 
capital.	   Yes 
14 Nov. 11, 2012 Democratic reform Erada Square No 
15 Nov. 30, 2012 Boycott the elections March through Kuwait City No 
16 Dec. 4-6, 2012 
Dissolve newly elected 
Assembly 
Various areas around Kuwait Yes 
17 Dec. 8, 2012 Dissolve newly elected 
Assembly 
March through Kuwait City No 
18 Dec. 15, 2012 
Dissolve newly elected 
Assembly 





As the chart above shows, during the Arab Spring the Kuwaiti government gave 
permits to certain demonstrations and allowed several peaceful protests to take place. For 
example, on November 11, 2012, at least 50,000 supporters of the Kuwaiti opposition 
were allowed to rally in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the constitution and 
demand the repeal of a disputed Electoral Law. Even as the crowd began chanting, “The 
people want the repeal of the law,” the protest remained peaceful.1042 However, the chart 
also shows that the government utilised police violence in most of the demonstrations, 
where a large number of citizens were arrested and detained throughout 2011and 2012. 
On October 26, 2012, Amnesty International issued a public statement calling on the 
Kuwaiti government to respect the right to peaceful assembly, in accordance with 
Kuwait’s obligations under international law and its own constitutional provisions (under 
Article 44). “Amnesty International is … concerned that increasing restrictions on 
freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression in Kuwait, including the rising frequency 
with which riot police have used unlawful force in response to peaceful demonstrations, 
signal a disturbing trend in the country.” 1043 The Prime Minister, Sheikh Jaber, assured 
the organisation that the authorities would uphold the right of protestors to peacefully 
assemble, although he emphasised that while the government allows demonstrations to 
take place, it does not allow demonstrators to undertake marches. However, Amnesty 
pointed out that both gatherings and marches are permitted under Article 44 of the 
Kuwaiti constitution.1044 
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On November 1, 2012, opposition forces gathered at a meeting house of former MP 
Waleed al-Tabtabai, where they issued a statement calling for “an end to the 
unprecedented repressive security practices, the release of all detainees and an end to all 
security prosecutions of dissidents and young people participating in peaceful 
protests”.1045 
The statement was signed by opposition groups including the ICM, the Salafist bloc, a 
few youth movements, the National Union of Workers and Employees of Kuwait (a trade 
union), and independent opposition figures and former parliamentarians. The statement 
denounced the unlawful use of force by riot police and accused the government of 
seeking to abolish the constitution and the electoral system in Kuwait. It further described 
the government’s violent actions as an attempt to turn Kuwait into a police state: 
Security forces are storming into houses, terrorizing people in their own 
residential areas, and using smoke bombs and tear gas in houses and meeting 
houses. Many people — mostly youth — were wounded and arbitrarily arrested, 
and are constantly being tracked down. This is the authorities’ new approach, 
which is threatening to turn Kuwait into a police state where there is no freedom, 
constitutional guarantees are violated, people’s dignity is violated, and where 
tyranny and corruption prevail. 1046 
Additional comments by former parliamentarians included warnings to the 
government of the consequences of its excessive use of force. Former MP Mubarak al-
Waalan said: “We condemn the beatings that took place after the withdrawal of the 	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peaceful rally and the attack — perpetrated by the Ministry of the Interior — against 
unarmed youth following their withdrawal [referring to the Oct. 15 demonstration at 
Erada Square, where eyewitness said that riot police attacked youths as they were 
heading back to their vehicles to leave].”1047 Meanwhile, former MP Riad al-Adsani noted 
that “the government still has a chance to tackle the problem wisely before it exacerbates, 
rather than resort to violence, the consequences of which will result in the loss of all 
parties”.1048 
In response to the statement by the opposition, the Ministry of Interior “expressed 
surprise over the insistence of demonstrators and those inciting them to hold unlicensed 
and legally prohibited street marches”.1049 Referring to the ban on gatherings that was 
issued on November 2, 2012, the Ministry accused the demonstrators of ignoring the law 
and attacking security agents. The Ministry finally expressed its intention to take pre-
emptive measures against such violations “in a firm and severe manner, to prevent 
compromising the security and safety of the homeland and citizens, and to preserve 
public and private facilities and properties and the higher homeland security interests 
during this period”.1050 
Overall, the Kuwaiti government’s use of police violence on peaceful demonstrations 
has backfired; the arrests and beatings of well-known opposition members served only to 
fuel public outrage and tarnished Kuwait’s rather liberal reputation as the most politically 






progressive of the GCC states.1051 This research argues that this tactic represents a 
desperate attempt by the Kuwaiti regime to suppress discontent among its population 
during the turbulent events of the region.1052 
ii. Restricting the Freedom of Expression 
In another effort to tighten its grip on internal security, the Kuwaiti government began 
making arrests in response to tweets and other social media output. In Kuwait’s penal 
code, Article 25 provides for up to five years in prison for “objecting to the rights and 
authorities of the Emir or faulting him”; the government had made increased use of this 
provision during the Arab Spring.1053 In 2013, an HRW report disclosed that at least 29 
Kuwaitis had been charged with faulting the Emir or the government on social media 
platforms.1054 Five people charged with faulting the Emir were acquitted in February 
2013; and an appeal court overturned the conviction of three former Assembly deputies 
in July 2013 on the same charge. The court also upheld a 20-month sentence on an 
ordinary female citizen, Sarah al-Darees, for Twitter messages that ‘tarnished the Emir’s 
authority’.1055 Historically, Kuwait’s freedom of expression is a shining example of its 
liberal practices among its Gulf neighbours. Kuwait’s constitution protects the right to 
freedom of expression in Article 36: “Every person shall have the right to express and 
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propagate his opinion verbally, in writing or otherwise, in accordance with the conditions 
and procedures specified by law.”1056 
Freedom of the press, printing and publishing are also protected under Article 37 of 
the constitution. In 1996, Kuwait had also ratified the International Covenant for Civil 
and Political Rights;1057 Bahrain and Kuwait were the only two GCC members who 
ratified the treaty. Article 19 of the Covenant protects an individual’s right to freedom of 
expression, including “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”1058 These freedoms are often limited at times of 
political turbulence; indeed, the Kuwaiti government has used its authority to hamper the 
freedom of the media in the past. However, sentencing citizens based on their 
participation and actions within social media is a new practice that surprised and angered 
many Kuwaiti citizens that honour and value their constitutional freedoms. 
A new telecommunications law, the Unified Media law, restricts and regulates 
citizens’ activities in telecommunications technology, including social media. On May 
18, 2014, the National Assembly passed the Unified Media Law by an overwhelming 
majority. The law comprises 93 articles and establishes a Commission for Mass 
Communications and Information Technology (CMCIT) to oversee all technical matters 
pertaining to mobile phone services and internet providers, under the direction of the 
Ministry of Communications. The CMCIT will also be tasked with monitoring social 
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media content. The Ministry of Communications commented to reporters that the sole 
purpose of the new law was ‘regulatory’ and that it would include tasks like granting 
licences and monitoring prices, not suppressing freedoms. The “… blocking [of] websites 
or eavesdropping on phone calls would not happen without a legal order or the word of 
the public prosecutor.”1059 However, HRW found that Article 70 of the law allows 
Kuwaiti authorities to imprison people for using “any means of communication to 
threaten, insult … or harm the reputation of others”. 1060 Article 53 further allows Kuwaiti 
authorities to suspend mobile services for “national security” reasons.1061 The deputy 
director of the HRW in the Middle East and North Africa states: “This new law comes at 
a time when Kuwait is prosecuting many activists, politicians, journalists, and other 
government critics on expansive interpretations of morality and national security. It 
appears designed to give prosecuting authorities even wider legal authorization for 
violating Kuwaitis' right to free speech.” 1062 
A Kuwaiti human rights activist, Nawaf Al-Hendel, commented on the law to a news 
source: 
Kuwait is forging ahead with a law that will regulate the country's 
telecommunications and information technology, including social media, despite 
claims by human rights activists that the bill will restrict freedom of  expression. 
The law allows authorities to block websites, terminate mobile lines  for security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





reasons without a legal order, and issue warrants to search houses without a 
prior legal order.1063 
He was also concerned with the ambiguity in the wording of the stated law, stressing 
that the government must outline the conditions and guidelines under which websites are 
to be blocked. 
On October 21, 2013, the Kuwaiti Emir issued an emergency decree and authorised 
the National Unity Law. The law criminalises publishing and broadcasting content that 
could be deemed offensive to religious “sects” or groups and expands existing law by 
explicitly including social media.1064 This law further restricts freedom of expression and 
assembly. It provides for prison sentences lasting from one to seven years and a fine of a 
minimum of 3,000 dinars (approximately 8,200 Euros) for individuals convicted of 
flouting national unity, such as when media organisations are disrespectful of religious 
minorities, incite religious hatred or fail to respect the privacy of individuals. Moreover 
this law, according to the official Kuwaiti press agency “bans any call or manifestation 
intended to promote hatred or any form of discrimination”, 1065 which leaves it open to a 
broad interpretation by authorities who may use it to silence peaceful criticism of 
government policies. 
Overall, the Kuwaiti government had put these new restrictions in place in order to 
quell public dissent and raise the fears of citizens that their actions may be treated by law 
as a threat to national security. The case of a young Kuwaiti Shi’a, Hamad al-Naqi, 	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highlights the restrictions placed by these new laws in Kuwait. Al-Naqi was sentenced to 
10 years in prison in 2012 when the court found him guilty of insulting Islam and the 
Sunni monarchies of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia through his posts on Twitter.1066 The court 
“found al-Naqi guilty of insulting the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, of provoking 
sectarian tensions, of insulting the Prophet Muhammad and the Prophet’s wife and 
companions, mocking Islam, and misusing his mobile phone to disseminate the 
objectionable comments”.1067 According to his lawyer, Al-Naqi’s tweet about the Prophet 
had violated article 111 of Kuwait’s Penal Code, which decrees that the mocking of 
religion is punishable by a maximum of one year in prison. His lawyer further states that 
al-Naqi’s multiple tweets criticising the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies violated the 
National Security Law’s Article 15, which requires a minimum three-year prison 
sentence for intentionally broadcasting statements or false rumours that harm the national 
interests of the state. Al-Naqi’s case is a prime example of GCC influence in Kuwait’s 
domestic affairs: “His case highlights a growing conservative influence in Kuwait, 
including crackdowns on online dissent and the deepening cooperation among the Arab 
Gulf nations.” 1068 
Since December 2014, the Kuwaiti authorities have further charged at least five people 
with insulting Saudi Arabia or its ruling family. The Kuwaiti authorities imposed a six-
year sentence on blogger, Saleh al-Saeed, on June 12, 2015 for several tweets criticising 
Saudi Arabia. On October 2014, al-Saeed “posted 16 tweets that accused Saudi Arabia of 
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carrying out land grabs in the neutral zone between it and Kuwait to exploit the area’s oil 
reserves, and criticised the Kuwaiti authorities for failing to speak out”. 1069 According to 
his lawyer, the Kuwaiti authorities charged al-Saeed after the Saudi Embassy in Kuwait 
City complained to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs and demanded his 
prosecution. On December 30, a court convicted al-Saeed under Article 4 of the country’s 
1970 National Security Law, which makes it a criminal offence to commit a hostile act 
against a foreign country that disrupts Kuwait’s political relations with that country or 
exposes Kuwait to a risk of war. Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa 
director at HRW stated: “In the past, Kuwait stood out as a country that respected free 
speech, but the tide has turned. Kuwait now clearly would rather curry favour with its 
neighbours than uphold the rights of its own citizens.”1070 
In August 2015, a former MP, Abdulhamid Dashti, was charged with targeting Saudi 
Arabia and “becoming involved in antagonistic activities through statements and tweets 
that put Kuwait’s relations with its neighbour at risk.”1071 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
had filed two cases against Dashti after it received complaints from the Saudi Embassy in 
Kuwait in which “it expressed deep dismay over Dashti’s attitude”. 1072 According to 
reports, the public prosecutor wanted to question Dashti in the first case over the tweets 
he posted against Saudi Arabia, and in the second case, wanted answers regarding the 
anti-Saudi Arabia statements he made during a television interview. 
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In December 2014, the Kuwaiti parliament speaker, Marzoug al-Ghanim, announced 
that parliament had started legal proceedings against “those who offended the UAE 
leadership” in a TV show broadcast on the legislature’s official television channel. On the 
TV show, Mubarak al-Duwailah, a former MP, criticised the UAE and its leaders over its 
policy, which designated the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliate groups as terrorist 
organisations.1073 The Kuwaiti authorities also arrested two members of the Al-Sabah 
ruling family for tweets deemed critical of the government and supportive of the 
opposition. Sheikh Abdullah Salem Al-Sabah and Sheikh Nawaf Malek Al-Sabah were 
arrested for expressing political views on Twitter. The two young royals had written 
tweets sympathetic to the Kuwaiti opposition during its boycott of the December 1 
elections.1074 These charges against members of the ruling family and former MPs, as well 
as ordinary citizens, highlight the extent to which the government is prepared to go in 
order to suppress dissent. The new laws were established after the end of the Arab Spring 
demonstrations in December 2012; suggesting a precautionary measure by the 
government to warn its citizens that it would take a hard line in response to any further 
dissent. 
iii. Revoking Citizenship 
The Law of Nationality1075 empowers the Kuwaiti authorities to strip individuals and their 
dependents of their Kuwaiti citizenship on several grounds, including if it “involves the 	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higher interests of the state or its foreign security”, or the authorities consider that the 
individual has “promoted principles that will undermine the social or economic system of 
the country.” 1076 Furthermore, revocation decisions are not subject to any judicial or 
administrative appeals process. The practice of revoking citizenship was used for the first 
time in Kuwait as a method of repression, notably against political and human rights 
activists.1077 As a consequence of the Arab Spring, there were a total of 33 revocations 
during 2014, of which three are thought to have been for political reasons.1078 The 
withdrawal of Kuwaiti citizenship violates several principles of international human 
rights law, and constitutes a new form of reprisal against all forms of criticism of the 
government.1079 An HRW official, Joe Stork, commented on the issue: “No government 
has the right to strip away its people’s citizenship simply because it disapproves of them, 
their opinions, or their actions … This is yet another downward step in Kuwait’s assault 
on the right to free speech.”1080 
On July 21, 2014, a parliamentary decree ordered the revocation of citizenship of five 
individuals, including Ahmad Al-Shammari (his four children were also left without 
nationality).1081 Al-Shammari was one of five people whose citizenship was revoked in 
the first batch of cases, but only his case was based on undermining the social or 
economic system. He is the owner of two media outlets, the independent Al-
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Yom television station and the Al-Yom daily newspaper. In May and June, Kuwait’s 
information minister temporarily closed both outlets after they defied a prosecutor-
ordered media blackout about an investigation into an alleged plot by senior government 
officials to overthrow the government.1082 Al-Shammari claims that the government is 
utilising the revocation of citizenship as a political tool: “I think the authorities want to 
send a signal to instil fear into those who express their rights of expression. They are 
using citizenship as a political tool, not a legal status.”1083 
The second batch of revocations on September 29 included Saad Al-Ajmi, a former 
Information Minister, spokesperson for the parliamentary bloc, the Popular Action 
movement, and professor at Kuwait University.1084 His citizenship was revoked for an 
article he published in 2012 about alleged government corruption, under Article 11 of the 
Nationality law, which allows withdrawing citizenship from anyone naturalised by 
another country. Observers said the measures target naturalised Kuwaitis who have 
joined the opposition.1085 A Kuwaiti security source said Al-Ajmi was sent to Saudi 
Arabia after his documents showed he was a native Saudi national. The Kuwait 
Democratic Forum claimed that his deportation showed a “constitutionally unacceptable 
approach” by the government in targeting political activists. Al-Ajmi commented that 
stripping him of his citizenship was part of a government crackdown on political activists 
deemed by the state to be endangering its stability.1086 	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In December 2013, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon issued an authoritative report 
setting out criteria for determining the lawfulness of any country’s decision to revoke the 
citizenship of one of its nationals. The report accepted revocation as legitimate for 
“rendering of services to a foreign government or military force” or committing acts 
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State”. 1087 The report concluded, 
however, that revoking a citizen’s nationality for exercising the right to freedom of 
speech amounts to a violation of human rights guaranteed under international law. 
Following the UN report, HRW called on Kuwaiti authorities to “immediately stop 
stripping nationals of their citizenship because they exercise free speech or other 
legitimate human rights, and reinstate the citizenship of people whose citizenship has 
been withdrawn on those grounds”.1088 The statement further called on the authorities to 
amend the law concerning revocation of citizenship to ensure that the grounds are 
narrowly defined, the decision to revoke will be proportionate, and that those affected 
have the right to an independent review. An HRW official, Nadim Houry, stated: “The 
Kuwaiti authorities seem to think they can use the cover of the nationality law to target 
their critics and deter dissent … But Kuwait’s real message of official intimidation has 
rung out loud and clear.” 1089 
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c. GCC Strategy for Regime Preservation: Collaborating in a Defence Scheme 
The third tactic under the GCC strategy for regime preservation is engaging in a 
collaborative defence scheme. The demonstrations of the Arab Spring have prompted the 
Gulf monarchies to strengthen their Gulf unity and increase their attempts at GCC 
integration, mainly in areas of internal security. The Riyadh Declaration in December 
2011 provided the momentum for closer integration efforts; it called for efforts to explore 
a “single unity” that could deal with the many challenges facing the GCC states, and 
highlighted the types of action that the GCC intended to take towards achieving 
“unity”.1090 These included building a common defence system and intensifying 
cooperation between intelligence services. The idea of a joint army had already been 
tested with the intervention of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) in Bahrain in March 
2011, in light of which the declaration sought to formalise a permanent joint army to be 
used in “defence” of the Gulf states (more on the perceived technicalities of the joint 
army later). The GCC’s physical presence and involvement in Bahrain in March 2011 
through the deployment of its military arm, the PSF, highlights this aspect of regime 
preservation and reinforces this research’s argument that the Gulf monarchies have 
harnessed and made use of the collective authority of the GCC to protect their 
monarchical sovereignties and secure their domestic position and authoritarian rule 
during the Arab Spring.1091 
The Arab Spring demonstrations in 2011 were perceived as extreme security threats 
by the GCC monarchs; with Saudi Arabia leading the way, the GCC decided to take bold 	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measures in deploying its military arm into Bahrain on March 14 with the stated goal of 
maintaining order and protecting its borders. The PSF was commanded by Major General 
Mutlaq Bin Salem al-Azima, a Saudi national, and consisted of mostly Saudi troops: an 
estimated of 1,200 Saudi troops accompanied by an estimated 500 Emirati police.1092 The 
Kuwaiti government sent a naval force, largely by way of symbolic participation in the 
GCC military intervention in Bahrain.1093 The Saudi government announced that the GCC 
Council of Ministers had responded to a call for help from its Bahraini neighbour.1094 It 
was the first time the GCC has utilised collective military action to help maintain 
domestic order in a member state. GCC officials pointed out that the objectives of the 
military arm had been extended to include the protection of all member states from 
external and internal threats; thus legitimising the use of the PSF in Bahrain. 
In a meeting with the commander and senior officers of the PSF, Bahrain’s King 
Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, commended the GCC leaders for sending troops to protect 
Bahrain from harm. He further stated: “Your presence is a support and gives us 
strength.”1095 The decision behind unleashing the PSF to Bahrain was made mainly by the 
Saudi and Bahraini leaderships; however, all six Gulf monarchs approved it. According 
to Major al-Azima, “any intervention by the force must include participation from all 
GCC member states.”1096 According to political analysts and news sources, however, 
three of the six member states, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, had concerns in sending their 
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own troops as part of the PSF into Bahraini territory: they were wary of Saudi dominance 
in the domestic affairs of fellow GCC member states.1097 The Kuwaiti government 
refrained from sending ground troops into Bahrain as part of the PSF mission; parliament 
raised the issue with the prime minister, Sunni Salafi parliament members denouncing the 
government’s decision not to send troops to Bahrain. Meanwhile, Kuwaiti Shi’a had 
staged a rally to thank their government for its reservations as to sending troops to “help 
the Bahraini government repress the Bahraini people”.1098 The governments of Oman and 
Qatar had both fully backed the Al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain in its confrontation with 
civil unrest; however, neither government had sent forces to join the collaborative efforts 
of the PSF.1099 
PSF operations were limited to assisting the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) in 
protecting and securing vital locations in the country; they were stationed in certain areas 
to protect the Bahraini borders.1100 As the Bahraini Commission1101 later confirmed, the 
PSF did not participate in any operations that involved confrontations with Bahraini 
civilians, or engage in repressing or controlling demonstrators. The report further stated 
that it did not find any evidence of human rights violations committed by the PSF.1102 The 
GCC force withdrew from Bahrain in June 2011 after the Bahraini government lifted the 
state of emergency that had been imposed in March 2011; however, some UAE police 
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and possibly other GCC security forces remained.1103 Gulf as well as regional and 
international media began debating the future role of the PSF as a legitimate security 
apparatus and whether its purpose was to protect the Gulf population from harm or to 
protect the sovereignty and authority of the Gulf monarchs. Regardless of the future role 
of the PSF, its deployment to Bahrain in March 2011 marked a new era of military and 
political alliance in the Gulf region. 
Accordingly, the main motive behind the show of force and the means of intervention 
by the PSF in Bahrain was to send a strong message, in the context of recent 
developments in the Arab Spring, to any internal or external opposition movement 
willing to rise against the Gulf governments. Saudi Arabia’s part in using force in face of 
demands for political reform in Bahrain also signalled a sense of determination to the 
world that the Saudi leadership intends to protect the Bahraini monarchy, and by 
implication its own domestic, regional, and global position. It portrays a clear method of 
GCC intervention in using military means to protect a member state from internal 
turmoil, and signals its future involvement in any attempt at delegitimising the 
monarchies of any of the other GCC member states. 
The GCC monarchies further attempted to collaborate in a defence scheme by a 
reassessment of the GCC Internal Security Agreement. The Agreement was first 
proposed in 1982 by the Saudi monarchy, and remained under discussion until all GCC 
members accepted its terms. Kuwait was the last GCC member to sign the pact, in 
November 2012. The idea of the internal security pact was introduced in February 1982 
at the GCC’s first Ministerial Council meeting. An incident that occurred a couple of 	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months prior had prompted the meeting to be held in Bahrain, where a group of terrorists, 
allegedly trained by Iran, had attempted to assassinate Bahraini officials.1104 It was thus 
within the context of regional instability that the GCC Interior Ministers met to discuss a 
comprehensive internal security agreement in 1982.1105 The Bahraini incident led to the 
Saudi initiative of a collective security force, and more importantly, to consensus on the 
principle of collective security. The GCC states began to reiterate the view that stressed 
“the region’s security and stability is a collective responsibility that falls on all GCC 
countries” and that “any aggression against any GCC member is an aggression against all 
GCC members.”1106 Evidently, the incident prompted the Gulf states to sign bilateral 
agreements; Saudi Arabia signed individual pacts with Bahrain, Oman and the UAE 
within the year. Meanwhile, discussions on collaborative internal security began among 
GCC officials, and the first draft of a multilateral security agreement was reviewed at the 
GCC Summit on November 17, 1982. 
Kuwait was the only GCC country that refused to sign the multilateral security 
agreement, mainly due to its concern over the domestic political implications and the fear 
that the pact would threaten its democratic traditions. The Kuwaiti government was wary 
of Saudi Arabia’s conservative methods and feared Saudi dominance would impinge on 
the political liberties of Kuwaiti society. The most salient objection to the pact was to 
Article 12 of the draft agreement that stated: 
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Pursuit patrols belonging to any of the member countries have no right to cross 
the border of a neighbouring country, except for a distance not to exceed 20Km 
in order to arrest those being pursued. Those pursued … are to be handed over 
to the nearest post belonging to the country in whose territory the chase began, if 
they were arrested within the said distance.1107 
The intrusion of other GCC states’ security forces into Kuwaiti territory in an attempt 
to pursue suspected criminals was the main point of contradiction with Kuwait’s 
constitution. The Kuwaiti government was not willing to risk a rise in tensions with its 
parliament; hence, the Kuwaiti Interior Minister at the time declared that his government 
would not sign the security pact unless it was amended to coincide with the nation’s 
constitution. The GCC Interior Ministers revisited the security pact in 1994 with various 
amendments; however, Kuwait continued to refuse to ratify, stating that many of its 
articles “ran against its Constitution and threatened the political rights of its citizens”.1108 
However, the Arab Spring had prompted the Kuwaiti government to reassess its 
position. “[I]n a surprising change of heart, Kuwait’s Interior Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Al 
Hammood, has declared his support for the pact and said that GCC Interior Ministers had 
reasonable basis and strategic reasons to enhance cooperation through this pact to face 
current challenges in the region and ensure stability.” 1109 According to Al 
Hammood, “GCC states must find ways to combat threats like terrorism, drug smuggling 
and other organised crimes as well as cyber and economic crimes that are raising their 
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head in the region.”1110 In November 13, 2012, the interior ministers of the six members 
of the GCC signed an amended version of the Internal Security Agreement in Riyadh, 
aimed at reinforcing security cooperation and coordination between the GCC member 
countries.1111 The overall goal of the agreement is to preserve the security and stability of 
the GCC states through information-sharing and collective action.1112 The GCC Secretary-
General, Abdulatif Al-Zayani, stated “the security pact will empower each GCC country 
to take legal action, based on its own legislation against citizens of residents or organised 
groups that are linked to crime, terrorism or dissension.” 1113 He further stated that the 
political situation in the region required the GCC states to respond swiftly and take 
appropriate preventative measures to confront potential threats to their security and 
stability. 
Although the Kuwaiti government reassured the public that the amended version no 
longer conflicted with the Kuwaiti constitution, “the swift signing of the agreement along 
with the secrecy surrounding its provisions stirred a heated debate in Kuwait, with some 
warning that the country is falling in line with the rest of the Gulf on issues of internal 
security and domestic politics.”1114 The internal security pact has six chapters and 45 
articles and the draft was leaked by an online Kuwaiti newspaper, Al Sabr,1115 triggering 
discussions on social media sites, news outlets, and among members of the Kuwaiti 
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parliament.1116 The Kuwaiti public were concerned about the vague wording of the 
agreement and the perceived threat that it would impinge on their constitution. Articles 1 
and 14 of the agreement, for example, contradict each other, where the first ensures that 
countries execute the agreement in accordance to each country’s laws and constitutions, 
while the latter awards governments full powers to execute the agreement.1117 The 
question arises, how can the government execute the agreement when it is 
unconstitutional? Meanwhile, Article 2 states that member states must take measures 
against nationals or expatriates who intervene in what are considered internal matters of a 
fellow member state and take actions against them, without specifying what kind of 
measures, the definition of internal matters, or what kind of actions are to be taken.1118 
Furthermore, Article 3 of the GCC draft security agreement completely conflicted 
with Articles 36 and 37 of the Kuwaiti constitution which guarantee freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the press. It states: “[S]ignatories must take legal action … 
against the intervention of citizens or residents in the internal affairs of any of the other 
States parties.” 1119 Articles 14 and 15 of the agreement also allow the “emergency 
services”, including police, of one member state to cross the borders of another member 
up to an agreed limit, leading to the violation of Article 1 of the Kuwaiti constitution that 
ensures the principle of national sovereignty. 1120 Another violation of the Kuwaiti 
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constitution comes in Article 16 of the agreement, where it states that “signatories are 
required to extradite any persons within its territory accused or convicted by the 
authorities of any other signatory”.1121 Article 46 of the Kuwaiti constitution prohibits the 
extradition of political refugees.1122 
Other articles within the GCC draft agreement further permit the interference of 
member states in each other’s domestic affairs: Article 4 allows for member states to 
share the personal police and state security records of their citizens and residents upon the 
request of any signatory state; and Article 11 allows for the presence of one member’s 
officials at the stage of collecting evidence of crimes that occur in another member’s 
territory and are relevant to its security. Fahad Al Shelaimi, the head of the Gulf Forum 
for Security and Safety, told news sources that Kuwait had got two articles removed from 
the draft agreement before it agreed to sign.1123 One of the articles referred to the handing 
over of nationals to neighbouring GCC states, and the second article pertained to 
allowing public security forces of a member state to enter another state.1124 According to 
former Kuwaiti MP, Adel Al-Sar’awi, an article was also added following the Bahraini 
demonstrations during the Arab Spring. Article 10 states: “States Parties, collectively or 
bilaterally, [shall] provide support and assistance in case of a request by any State Party, 
in order to meet security disturbances and disasters.” 1125 He claims that when the Bahraini 
government requested assistance in an “internal” matter during the Arab Spring, Kuwait 	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declined to send its troops, citing the GCC defence agreement as being limited to 
“external” threats.1126 
Although the Kuwaiti Interior Minister, as well as the Emir himself, signed the GCC 
Internal Security Agreement in 2012, it has yet to be ratified. Under the Kuwaiti 
constitution, the ratification of such an agreement needs the approval of the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly, which is divided over the security pact. The supporters of the pact 
“value the protection it offers in a region plagued by revolt”.1127 Meanwhile, opponents of 
the pact within parliament are concerned about the ambiguity of many of the articles 
(discussed above) as well as the compatibility of the pact with the Kuwaiti constitution. A 
main concern was the authorisation of states to intervene militarily to assist GCC 
governments in quelling internal unrest, and thus increase the chance of Kuwait 
becoming a unified GCC police state. 1128 During the Arab Spring demonstrations in 
Kuwait in 2012, rumours had surfaced that the PSF might enter Kuwait to maintain 
stability.1129 
The Foreign Affairs Committee within parliament had already advised against the 
ratification of the agreement in April 2011; former MP, Hamdan Al-Azmi, was on the 
committee that rejected the ratification. He stated: 
The agreement cannot be accepted under any circumstances. There is a need for 
pressure from the parliament to explain some of its articles, particularly the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1126 Ibid. 
1127 Leiden Islam Blog. (2014). Unrest in the region: Kuwait’s security debate in the light of the Arab 
Spring and the rise of IS.  Universiteit Leiden.  
1128 Kechichian, J. (2014). The Gulf Security Pact: Another GCC dilemma. Al Jazeera. 
1129 Alsayed, W. (2013). Controversy after Kuwait sign GCC security pact. IISS Voices 
 365 
extradition of suspects and the definition of crime. There is a need for popular 
pressure to make sure the agreement is not endorsed. We cannot please some 
countries at the expense of Kuwait and its interest. 1130 
The debate carried on in the Kuwaiti media; the majority of the citizen population was 
against the pact. A human rights activist in Kuwait stated that the pact would undermine 
the dignity of the Kuwaiti people: “It is sad that while the GCC states are supporting 
uprisings in other Arab countries, they are talking of curbing freedoms and arresting their 
own people.”1131 Another statement by a Kuwaiti blogger refers to the ambiguity of the 
pact: 
The security pact…seemed to negate sovereignty of the signatures. More so, the 
pact does not take into account the varying degrees of freedom of expression and 
press within the differing Gulf countries.1132 
Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti government continued to reject these allegations; Kuwait’s 
Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Khalid stated: “Article One of the GCC security 
agreement does not clash with the Kuwaiti constitution, and there is no way that we 
endorse any law or decision that is against our constitution.”1133 
However, even an international human rights organisation advised against Kuwait’s 
ratification of the agreement, citing articles in the agreement that go against human 
rights. HRW issued a statement specifying how the GCC security pact violates articles 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Politics Rights (ICCPR). Article 17 of the 	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ICCPR states: “[N]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.” 1134 However: 
The security pact’s obligation for GCC countries to share private information 
about private citizens and residents without stating a legal basis, without a 
defined legal process to safeguard the right to privacy, and under the unchecked 
discretion of interior ministers appears to constitute “arbitrary interference” by 
authorities into the privacy rights or Gulf citizens and resident.1135 
An official in HRW, Joe Stork, further stated: “The security agreement gives Gulf 
government another legal pretext to stamp out dissent. Citizens and residents of the Gulf 
should note that their governments have agreed to share personal information at the whim 
of an interior minister.” 1136 
The GCC Internal Security Agreement was scheduled to be ratified by the Kuwaiti 
parliament in June 2014. However, due to the divisions in Kuwaiti society, the National 
Assembly postponed the vote for its ratification.1137 Lawmakers insisted that several of the 
provisions were missing clear definitions of what constituted political crimes or how 
“internal unrest” or “dissent” may be understood in various capitals as decision-makers 
mobilised their security forces to take action. Joseph Kechichian, a Gulf specialist, claims 
that these objections (by Kuwaiti parliamentarians) were also advanced “on the grounds 
that the GCC’s 2011 intervention in Bahrain was “unconstitutional” from a Kuwaiti 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1134 Human Rights Watch. (2014). GCC: Joint Security Agreement Imperils Rights. 
1135 Ibid. 
1136 Ibid. 
1137 Kholaif, D. (2014). Kuwait on alert over ISIL territorial gains in Iraq. Middle East Eye. 
 367 
perspective, even if catastrophic developments on the ground necessitated GCC 
involvement there.”1138 Hence, lawmakers instead called for the preparation of a 
comprehensive legal study of the agreement and decided to address the vote in the next 
parliamentary term. 
Ultimately, the Arab Spring demonstrations represented a crucial motivation for the 
Kuwait government to sign the security pact. The GCC internal security strategy is based 
on the pre-emptive measures that can be taken against hostile forces that seek to mobilise 
against member regimes, and securing GCC borders from smuggling activities. In the 
absence of effective political and military cooperation within the GCC, a collective 
domestic strategy of dealing with internal security issues has emerged, linking their 
interests in preserving their regimes with the political security of fellow member states. 
Hence, with the advent of the Arab Spring demonstrations, the GCC states have had to 
exert further efforts in unifying their internal security cooperation, leading to the signing 
of the GCC Internal Security Pact. The Kuwaiti leadership’s acquiescence and final 
signing of the pact after 20 years indicates a desperate attempt to maintain the status quo, 
manoeuvring its way around the Kuwaiti constitution and disregarding the political 
aspirations of the Kuwaiti people. The Kuwaiti parliament has yet to ratify the agreement; 
however, many political analysts have indicated the recent developments in the Gulf will 
influence its stance on the security pact. With the threat of Islamic State (IS) on its 
border, the Kuwaiti parliament might not be able to resist government pressure to ratify 
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the agreement – the government is continuously pushing for closer GCC internal security 
cooperation as part of a collaborative defence scheme.1139 
Furthermore, according to Saudi academic Madhawi Al-Rasheed, the signing of the 
Internal Security Pact by all six member states has “ushered a new era of Pax Saudiana 
across the Gulf”.1140 She argues that the first casualties of this controversial agreement are 
Kuwaiti activists; since January 2015, Al-Rasheed points out, at least three Kuwaiti 
opposition figures, social media activists and heads of political movements have been 
detained at the request of the Saudi authorities (the above section mentions a few of those 
detained). 
Meant to enhance security for economic development and stability of GCC 
countries, the pact has now tuned into creating cross-border controls, evacuating 
the Arab Gulf dissent and eliminating safe havens for dissidents of one country in 
another one. 1141 
She gives the example of Mohammed Al-Ajmi, a famous Twitter activist known as 
Abu Asm, who was detained simply because he tweeted a statement that was interpreted 
as disrespectful of the late Saudi King, Abdullah ibn Abdul-Aziz. Al-Rasheed states: “It 
is evident now that criticising Saudi Arabia is taboo, the violation of which definitely 
leads to perhaps several years in prison.”1142 She claims that the pact is another attempt to 
silence dissent among the Gulf countries, and that Saudi hegemony “comes with a heavy 	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burden, mainly silencing opposition and interfering in the freedoms in countries such as 
Kuwait, which is politically more vigorous and developed than ‘Big Brother, known in 
Arabic as Big Sister’”.1143 Al-Rasheed perceives the pact as a mechanism designed to 
monitor and punish political dissidents, which reflects this research’s argument in 
identifying it as a tactic under a broad GCC strategy for regime preservation. She further 
asserts that “the GCC itself may not move from cooperation to unification in the near 
future but it has certainly become yet another mechanism to silence peaceful and 
legitimate opposition across borders”. 1144 
In its attempt to further engage in a collaborative defence scheme, the GCC Supreme 
Council agreed on a joint military command and police force during the 34th GCC 
Summit that was held in Kuwait on December 10, 2013. The unified military and police 
force will be used in battling foreign and local “terrorists and extremists”, which may 
include citizens. 1145 The decision was to be taken as “part of the steps and efforts aiming 
to reinforce the security and stability of the GCC countries and to establish a common 
military system to achieve collective security”.1146 The Minister of the National Guard, 
Prince Miteb Bin Abdullah, announced in the Saudi Press Agency reports: “There will be 
a unified command of around 100,000 members, God willing. I hope it will happen soon, 
and the National Guard is ready for anything that is asked of it.”1147 The Saudi Minister 
also stressed the need for unity among the Gulf’s monarchs to demonstrate power in the 	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region, claiming that the new force will boost security, defence, and the economy of the 
member states. 
In April 2015, the GCC monarchies announced the establishment of the headquarters 
of the joint GCC police force in Abu Dhabi, where it will “work to coordinate efforts 
across the region, [and] share knowledge and information among other relevant security 
bodies”.1148 A joint GCC police force may change the course of political life in each of the 
Gulf states, especially since the main goal of the force is to secure the regimes against 
“terrorists”. The main question lies in how the GCC defines terrorism – this has proven to 
be vague and open to various interpretations under the law. The wide definition of 
terrorism allows Gulf governments to discredit government oppositions and authorise 
extreme police violence in the name of national security. Overall, Kuwait has resisted the 
interference of other Gulf monarchies in its domestic affairs since independence. 
However, the threat of the Arab Spring has somehow altered the government’s 
independent domestic policies and prompted increased cooperation efforts within the 
GCC. 
V. Case Study Alternative Analysis  
As this case study provides supporting evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Kuwait 
has utilised the GCC as a vehicle to preserve the Kuwaiti regime during the Arab Spring, 
it is important to discuss alternative explanations to events analysed in the case study.  
This research presents two alternative hypotheses (one was mentioned in the 
introduction) and puts forward supporting evidence to discredit these alternative 	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explanations. The first alternative hypothesis would be that the Kuwaiti regime is subject  
to Saudi dominance and was forced by Saudi Arabia’s determination to promote 
repression and to oppose democratic reforms within the Gulf region. It associates the 
‘GCC Strategy of Regime Preservation’ with Saudi strategy to dominate the smaller GCC 
member states and establish the Arab Spring demonstrations as a common threat to their 
survival. The second alternative hypothesis would be that the Kuwaiti regime survived 
the Arab Spring due to its relatively liberal policies – that Kuwaiti citizens enjoyed 
certain freedoms and were not compelled to demand political rights. It also suggests that 
the  Kuwaiti demonstrations were not a threat to the monarchy and did not induce the fear 
of regime change.   
The Saudi leadership’s motivation behind the proposal of a closer GCC union, 
expressed in the Riyadh Declaration at the 32nd GCC Summit in December 2011, is quite 
transparent in terms of the timing and the reason: Arab Spring demonstrations were 
spreading across the region and the leaderships of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen had 
fallen. The Saudi regime was thus wary of the impact of these events on its own 
population and began establishing a pre-emptive strategy with the aim of differentiating 
its rulership from fallen dictators and appeasing its citizens with various benefits. In its 
attempt to present the monarchical political structure as an acceptable (if not superior) 
means of governance and stabilise its own autocratic rule over its population, the Saudi 
leadership reached out to the remaining two monarchies in the region, Jordan and 
Morocco, and invited them to join their regional alliance, the GCC. Academic scholar 
Sylvia Colombo points out that the Saudis’ main motivation behind this move was to 
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create a division between government structures in the region: monarchies versus 
republics.   
The evidence supporting this theory lies in the Arab Spring demonstrations that 
occurred in Yemen in 2011, where because Yemen was a republic rather than a 
monarchy, the GCC monarchies were willing to remove President Saleh for the sake of 
regional stability.  Had it been an Arab monarchy, like Morocco or Jordan, the GCC 
would have supported the rulers themselves and their monarchical system of rule. 
Colombo’s interpretation of the GCC’s overall reaction to Yemen’s uprisings relies on 
the monarchy/republic dichotomy. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries were 
attempting to forge a new identity based on political affinity rather than just geographical 
proximity. Saudi Arabia’s extended invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC 
was, therefore, an attempt to redefine the GCC as a ‘monarchy club’, rather than a mere 
regional organisation.1149 It was also a clear sign that Saudi Arabia was being proactive in 
reasserting its position of prominence and leadership within the region and, in a way, 
leading a “counter-revolution of the Arab Spring.” 1150   
Hence, the Saudi leadership’s motivation behind the Riyadh Declaration was to a 
certain degree to facilitate a plan of action among GCC members to prevent the Arab 
Spring impacting Gulf populations. However, the objectives and goals behind the Riyadh 
Declaration were not as simple as that. The ambiguous terms used in the document are 
quintessentially GCC, reflecting the organisation’s persona – the GCC Charter itself is 
filled with ambiguity and open interpretations. This research asserts that the unspoken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1149  Colombo (2012), 9. 
1150 Jones, T. (2011) Counterrevolution in the Gulf. United States Institute of Peace. 
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elements of the document signify the inability of the six member states to come to an 
agreement. If Saudi Arabia were able to dominate the other five members of the group, 
the Riyadh Declaration would have been a more solid plan of action with clearer goals. 
Also, the signing of the document by all six member states indicates a desire to address 
the Arab Spring threat as a group, and not led by a single member state.   
This research has briefly presented the dynamics of the GCC organisation in Chapter 
One, where it asserts that the balance of power within the GCC is reliant on shared 
internal and external security threats, and the knowledge that if one monarchy falls, the 
rest will follow. Hence, Saudi Arabia’s political legitimacy and indeed survival is aligned 
with the other five GCC monarchies. This thesis thus discredits the alternative hypothesis 
of Saudi dominance and labels the strategy as a ‘GCC’ strategy because it was agreed 
upon by all six members and applied by these individual monarchies within their own 
populations, the end result being the preservation of each regime.   
The second alternative hypothesis would claim that the Kuwaiti regime’s potential for 
survival was high due to its relatively liberal policies – in comparison to other Gulf 
citizens, Kuwaiti citizens enjoyed a higher degree of freedom in terms of political 
participation and in social/religious respects. However, this thesis argues that the survival 
of the Kuwaiti regime, along with the other three GCC monarchies that experienced street 
demonstrations, relied on the reaction of the GCC governments to the unrest. It argues 
that the GCC monarchies utilised shared tactics to preserve their regimes and dismiss 
demands for political reform. The Kuwaiti monarchy survived the Arab Spring because 
of these tactics, where it was able to prevent further demonstrations from occurring and 
appease the population. The liberal aspect of its policies does not fit into the equation 
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because of the comparison with other GCC members: Saudi Arabia, for example, with its 
strict domestic policies, also survived the Arab Spring. The political structures and 
domestic policies of the GCC monarchies are key factors in their ability to preserve their 
regimes; however, they do not fully explain how or why the GCC monarchies survived 
the Arab Spring.   
Furthermore, this alternative hypothesis claims that the Kuwaiti demonstrations were 
not a threat to the monarchy and did not induce the fear of regime change. A mere 1% of 
the population participated in demonstrations, which one may argue does not constitute a 
real threat to the regime. This thesis refutes this argument by indicating in its case study 
the impact of these demonstrations on Kuwait’s domestic policies. The government 
reacted to the demonstrations by utilising tactics, most of which were used for the first 
time in the history of Kuwait. The use of police violence and arrests was a feature of all 
three sets of demonstrations in Kuwait, whereas deploying a police force in full gear had 
been a rarity in the past. Restricting freedom of expression was a tactic utilised by 
previous leaderships in Kuwait; however, arresting Twitter participants over criticising 
neighbouring Gulf monarchies and sending them to prison was hitherto unknown. And 
finally, revokation of citizenship was never a policy utilised in Kuwait, especially for 
political reasons. All these new policies and reactions indicate the severity of the threat 
generated by the Arab Spring demonstrations in the eyes of the Kuwaiti leadership.   
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this case study highlights the events of the Arab Spring in Kuwait and 
links Kuwait’s tumultuous political past with the impact of the Arab Spring and the role 
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of the GCC in its government’s response. The case study represents an example of how 
the threat of the Arab Spring reinforced an already existing logic of unity among the 
GCC member states. The Kuwaiti leadership responded to its demonstrations by 
engaging in the three GCC tactics shared by fellow GCC member states. First, it 
attempted to enhance its legitimacy by providing financial incentives to its citizens. 
Second, the Kuwaiti government took steps to heighten its internal security by the use of 
tactics of mass arrest, violence towards protestors and curbing freedom of expression. 
And third, it collaborated in a defence scheme by signing the GCC Internal Security 
Agreement in November 2012. The utilisation of these tactics indicates that the Kuwaiti 
government was threatened by the Arab Spring, and feared the complete destruction of its 
regime structure. The Kuwaiti government’s intentions in moving the GCC towards a 
closer union thus mark the intrusion of the GCC into its domestic politics and its 
willingness to override its citizens’ constitutional freedoms in order to preserve its rule. 
Overall, this research’s analysis of its case study on Kuwait, the GCC and the Arab 
Spring verifies its hypothesis that the Gulf monarchies used their alliance, the GCC, as a 
vehicle to preserve their regimes during the Arab Spring in 2011–2012. The utilisation of 
the GCC as a vehicle for regime preservation stems from the alliance’s key objective of 
sustaining the sovereignty and legitimacy of all six Gulf monarchies. The case study 
proves that the Kuwaiti leadership shared tactics in common with the GCC in suppressing 
demonstrations during the Arab Spring in order to maintain its regime. It further observes 
that the coordination and emulation of policies among the GCC monarchies  influenced 
Kuwait’s domestic policies, especially through the heightening of its security precautions. 
The Kuwaiti government began to involve the GCC in its domestic policies through its 
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cooperation in various joint programmes, such as a GCC youth strategy and a GCC 
unified police and navy force. Finally, this case study proves that by utilising tactics 
under the broad GCC strategy for regime preservation, the Kuwaiti leadership allowed 
unprecedented GCC interference in its domestic affairs, and thus engaged the regional 
alliance as a vital participant in preserving its regime during the Arab Spring. 
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Conclusion 
This research has presented a case study that examines how the threat of regime change 
during the Arab Spring prompted the Kuwaiti leadership to further engage with its 
regional alliance, the GCC, in order to survive. The case study has answered the central 
question of this research: what is the relationship between the Gulf monarchies and their 
regional organisation, the GCC, and how have the Gulf monarchies used the GCC as a 
vehicle to preserve their regimes during the Arab Spring? In addressing this question, the 
research provides an analysis of how the Gulf monarchies utilised certain tactics under a 
broad GCC strategy for regime preservation during the Arab Spring. This strategy 
consists of three main tactics employed by the monarchies to prevent organised 
demonstrations and quell government opposition: enhancing monarchical legitimacy, 
heightening internal security, and collaborating in a defence scheme. 
The Arab Spring motivated the Gulf leaderships to intensify cooperation efforts under 
their regional alliance, the GCC. However, a closer GCC union would compromise the 
sovereignty of the individual monarchies, and thus has yet to be accepted by all six 
member states. As such, the case study on Kuwait examined how an independent nation 
restructured its domestic policies to accommodate the interference of the GCC in order to 
preserve its regime and ultimately, survive the Arab Spring. The hypothesis of this 
research is that the Gulf monarchies utilised the GCC as a vehicle to preserve their 
regimes during the Arab Spring. The case study portrays how the Kuwaiti monarchy 
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allowed unprecedented interference in its domestic affairs by engaging in a closer union 
with other GCC member states. 
The research provided an in-depth analysis of Kuwait’s political history, presenting 
the trajectory of its parliamentary politics. In examining Kuwait’s tumultuous political 
history, this research traces the foundation of the Arab Spring demonstrations back to the 
roots of Kuwaiti politics, highlighting the relationship between the Kuwaiti rulers and the 
ruled. In its analysis of the Kuwaiti constitution, it further depicts the basis of the 
people’s demands during the Arab Spring. It has shown how the Kuwaiti leadership has 
utilised several mechanisms in suppressing demands for reform throughout its history, 
and argues that it has adopted a new mechanism for regime preservation by its closer 
alliance within the GCC during the Arab Spring. As a comparative analysis, this research 
also provided the details of the Arab Spring in three other Gulf monarchies: Bahrain, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. The demonstrations that occurred in these Gulf monarchies had 
similar outcomes – all three Gulf governments responded to people’s demands for reform 
with a mix of violence and concessions. The Gulf monarchies engaged in collaborative 
efforts to sustain their regimes, and also applied similar tactics within their own borders 
under a broad GCC strategy for regime preservation.  This research showcases the unity 
and mutual support of GCC member states at times of crisis, yet also indicates the 
suspicions that exist between individual members, especially with regard to the fear of 
Saudi domination shared by the smaller member states. Nevertheless, the threat of regime 
change has temporarily overshadowed the fear of Saudi domination, and has thus led the 
Gulf monarchies to engage their GCC organisation as a vital participant in preserving 
their regimes during the Arab Spring. 
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The practical and theoretical implications of the findings from the Kuwait case study 
rely on two main outcomes: first, in utilising various tactics, the Kuwaiti leadership 
managed to quell demonstrations and squash the opposition’s attempt to rally the people 
against the government. A second outcome is the indication that the GCC monarchies are 
a dynamic and pragmatic group who will continue to change their domestic and 
international policies to fit their survival needs. By utilising certain tactics, all four of the 
affected GCC leaderships have survived the Arab Spring; however, they have not 
necessarily strengthened their legitimacy among their respective populations. Several of 
the tactics outlined in the GCC Strategy of Regime Preservation are considered as 
ongoing policies in these GCC states (such as financial incentives and police violence); 
however, they are not necessarily considered sustainable. Nevertheless, the short-term 
outcome of these tactics has led to the end result of regime preservation. A key 
implication of the findings from this research is thus that the GCC monarchies will 
continue to apply various tactics, old and new, and utilise the GCC alliance as a key 
support system with the goal of preserving their regimes.  
Apart from the details provided in the Kuwaiti case study surrounding the events that 
occurred in Kuwait during the Arab Spring in 2011–2012, the main contribution that this 
thesis provides to current knowledge is the role of the GCC alliance in the survival of the 
GCC monarchies during the Arab Spring and the survival tactics highlighted within the 
GCC Strategy of Regime Preservation. A unique aspect of the case study is the 
interference of a regional alliance in the domestic policies of a state; it has indicated that 
the Arab Spring strengthened GCC unity and prompted the Gulf governments to allow 
the interference of fellow GCC members in their domestic affairs. It is important to note 
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that an independent country such as Kuwait, notorious for its neutral foreign policies and 
relatively liberal constitution, has opened up to the notion of a GCC union that may 
eliminate its neutrality and liberal policies. The research has proved that the threat of 
regime change pushed the Kuwaiti government into unprecedented GCC interaction – 
only recently it agreed to send 15 jets to support Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, in 
2015.1151 The dimension of analysing the role of a regional alliance in the survival of a 
regime during threatening circumstances may be applied in future research that focuses 
on the GCC. Does a strengthened GCC union lead to less independent domestic policies 
for the member states? Will future internal and external threats of to the GCC states 
continue to spark what Fred Lawson described as “the revival of multilateralism”? 1152 Or 
will the GCC states continue to limit cooperation in order to secure their individual 
domestic policies? 
Another key contribution to the literature is the identification of the various survival 
tactics utilised by regimes while facing internal challenges. The importance of the such 
tactics may be imported into studies that aim to explain the survival of other authoritarian 
regimes around the world in future comparative studies. This research presented the 
tactics that were highlighted in the Riyadh Declaration during the GCC summit in 
December 2011, and provided evidence of the application of these tactics by the Kuwaiti 
monarchy in its case study. Among these tactics was the coordination and emulation of 
policies among the GCC states, specifically, the GCC Youth Program and the GCC Joint 
Police and Navy Force. In April 2015, the GCC monarchies announced the establishment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1151 Al-Arabiya. (2015). UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordon deploy warplanes against Houthis.  
1152 Lawson (1999), 18. 
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of the headquarters of the joint GCC police force in Abu Dhabi, where it will “work to 
coordinate efforts across the region, [and] share knowledge and information among other 
relevant security bodies”.1153  
This research provides an opening for future research to explore the impact of the 
GCC organisation on the political trajectories of the Gulf monarchies, and the other way 
round. The distinctive nature of political leadership as between each of the Gulf 
monarchies is an important consideration when it comes to GCC cooperation efforts, and 
this research indicates that the Gulf monarchies put aside these differences due to the 
threat of regime change during the Arab Spring. As the Arab Spring came to an end, 
GCC member interactions fluctuated between an increase in cooperation efforts and an 
increase in rivalries. The opening of the joint GCC police force in Abu Dhabi was a step 
taken after the end of an eight-month rift between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, 
and fellow GCC member Qatar, over Qatar’s support for Islamic groups in the region.1154 
The three Gulf monarchies withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar and accused it of 
breaching the GCC’s security agreement by lending its support to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.1155 The feud ended with the return of the GCC ambassadors and the 
continuing of GCC cooperation efforts in the security and defence field. The ability of the 
GCC member states to reconcile their differences and resolve their disagreements 
showcases the resilience of the organisation. A main and final message that resonates 
within this research is that under the unity of the GCC, the Gulf monarchies represent a 
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I. The Gulf Region: Geography  
The ‘Persian Gulf’ refers to the body of water that lies between Iran to the east and the 
Arabian Peninsula to the west.1156 The current Gulf monarchies are the six states 
surrounding the Persian Gulf, which is an extension of the Arabian Sea, reaching all the 
way past the Gulf of Oman and through the Strait of Hormuz. They are: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The six Gulf monarchies 
are situated on the southwest peninsula of Asia, located between West Africa and Iran, 
and to the southeast of the Levant. The water boundaries include the Red Sea, extending 
from the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, separating 
Arabia from Africa. The southern peninsula has a coastline of some 2,000 km with the 
Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. To the east, the Gulf (900 km) 
starts from the mouth of the Euphrates River to the Strait of Hormuz (a narrow and 
strategically important waterway through which most of the region’s oil must pass)1157 
separating the peninsula from Asia proper. Due to this maritime delineation, the 
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collective area of the Gulf region has boundaries with only three states: Iraq, Jordan, and 
Yemen.1158 
  
Figure 2: Map of Persian Gulf Region 1159 
 
 
With an area of 2,000,000 square kilometres, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
geographically the largest country in the Gulf region.1160 The Kingdom occupies most of 
the Arabian Peninsula, with the Persian Gulf to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south 
and the Red Sea to the West. It is the only Gulf state to have land boundaries with every 
other Gulf state: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The 
Kingdom also has land boundaries with Jordan and Iraq in the north and with Yemen in 
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1160 Amin, S. H. (1984). Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf. Glasgow: Royston. 7. 
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the south. It is also the only Gulf state to extend from the Gulf to the Red Sea. Due to the 
geographical narrowness of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia is in close proximity to several 
West African and Maghreb states, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Oman 
is situated on the southeastern border of the Peninsula with access to both the Arabian 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, distinguishing it from the rest of the Gulf states. Its territory 
includes the Musandam Peninsula, a finger of land that protrudes into the Strait of 
Hormuz. It is separated from Iran by the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, making 
it the closest to the southwest Asian countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, the 
distance from Muscat to Karachi is smaller than the distance from Kuwait to Riyadh.1161 
Kuwait is a flat, triangular area on the northwest corner of the Gulf, with an area of 
17,800 square kilometres; Iraq lies to its north, Saudi Arabia to its southwest, and a 
Neutral Zone was established to its south. The Gulf sea lanes serve as a highway for 
Kuwaiti trade with neighbouring countries. At the mouth of the Gulf, the strategically 
important islands of Warba and Bubiyan are under its jurisdiction.1162 These islands are 
significant due to their location at the tip of the Persian Gulf – the only viable access to 
the Shatt Al-Arab1163 for their neighbouring country, Iraq. Bahrain is the only island state 
of the Gulf region; situated midway along the Persian Gulf it comprises of an archipelago 
of thirty-five small islands, approximately 24 km off the east coast of Saudi Arabia. The 
largest island is Bahrain itself, with its capital Manama; the second largest island, 
Muharraq, is northeast of Manama and linked to the main island by three causeways. 	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1163 The southern end of the river constitutes the border between Iraq and Iran down to the mouth of the 
river as it discharges into the Persian Gulf. 
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Qatar occupies the Peninsula of Qatar on the west coast of the Gulf; it has an area of 
about 10,000 km2. It has a 27 km border with Saudi Arabia and a short frontier with the 
UAE, and a coastline that parallels the Iranian coast on its north side.1164 The United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates situated in the southeast of the Arabian 
Peninsula on the Persian Gulf. The total area of the UAE is around 82,600 km2. It is 
surrounded by four states: Oman lies to its east, Saudi Arabia to its south, Qatar to its 
west and Iran to its north. The Emirates comprise Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, 
Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain; with Abu Dhabi as the nation’s capital. 
Collectively, the six GCC states encompass an area of almost 2.5 million km2, exceeding 
the landmass of both Iraq and Iran. 
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Timeline: The Kuwaiti Arab Spring (2010–2012) 
 
Dec. 6, 2010: GCC 31st Annual Summit in the UAE. 
 
Dec. 8, 2010:  Pro-democracy gathering at a MP’s private residence. 
 
Dec. 2010:  Emir of Kuwait grants all Kuwaiti citizens 1,000 KD and a free food grant 
for one entire year to commemorate the 20th anniversary of liberation from Iran and the 
50th anniversary of indepedence from the British. 
 
Jan. 5, 2011: Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser, survives a vote of no confidence. 
 
Feb. 19, 2011: First set of demonstrations by the Bidoon calling for citizenship rights. 
 
March 11, 2011: Bidoon demonstration. 
 
March 14, 2011: GCC Peninsula Shield enters Bahrain. 
 
June 3, 2011: Around 500 Kuwaiti citizens demonstrate at Erada Square calling for the 
resignation of the Prime Minister. 
 
Sept. 2011: Corruption scandal leaked. 
 
Sept. 21-23, 2011: Demonstrations demanding removal of prime minister. 
 
Nov. 16, 2011: Storming of Parliament building, dubbed the “Black Day” by the Emir. 
 
Dec. 4, 2011: Prime minister resigns and Emir dissolves Parliament. 
 
Dec. 25, 2011:  GCC 32nd Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  The Riyadh Declaration is 
issued, where the Saudi monarch suggests moving the GCC from a state of cooperation to 
one of union. 
 
Feb. 2, 2012: Parliamentary elections result in a pro-opposition Assembly. 
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June 20, 2012: Kuwait’s Constitutional Court rules that the December 2011 suspension 
of Parliament by the Emir was not conducted in accordance with the constitution on the 
grounds that a new cabinet had not been sworn in before the suspension was ordered.  
Hence, the Court moves to dissolve the elected February 2012 Parliament and reinstate 
the May 2009 Assembly (which consisted of a majority of pro-government members). 1165  
 
June 26, 2012: Thousands rally for pro-democratic reforms. 
 
Aug. 9, 2012:  The government refers the Electoral Law to the Constitutional Court. 
 
Sept. 24, 2012: Thousands rally at Erada Square demanding democratic reform. 
 
Sept. 25, 2012: The Constitutional Court rejects the government’s request to revise the 
Electoral Law – a rare example of the court overruling the Emir’s wishes. 1166 
 
Oct. 15, 2012:  Demonstrations resulting in clash between youth and police lead to a 
number of arrests. 
 
Oct. 19, 2012:  The Emir sets a new election date of December 1, 2012, and 
simultaneously issues an Emiri decree amending the electoral constituency law to limit 
voters to the choice of one candidate, in contrast to the previous law of four candidates 
per district.1167  This is when Mussalam Al-Barrak makes his speech. 
 
Oct. 21, 2012:  Kuwait experiences its largest demonstration at Erada Square, dubbed the 
“March of Dignity”, attended by an estimated 100,000–200,000 citizens.1168   
 
Oct. 31, 2012:  Around 200 of Al-Barrak’s supporters gather outside the Central Prison 
where he was held, calling for his release.1169   
 
Nov. 4, 2012:  Demonstrations in Mishref lead to police violence. 
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Nov. 11, 2012:  Pro-democracy demonstration held in Erada Square commemorating the 
50th anniversary of the Kuwaiti constitution.   
 
Nov. 13, 2012:  The GCC Internal Security Agreement is signed by all six member states. 
 
Nov. 30, 2012: Tens of thousands demonstrate calling for boycott of elections. 
 
Dec. 1, 2012: Parliamentary elections result in a pro-government majority due to the 
opposition boycott. 
 
Dec. 4-6, 2012: Protests against new Assembly around Kuwait city; police violence. 
 
Dec. 8, 2012: Marches throughout Kuwait city calling for dissolution of the new 
Assembly. 
 
Dec. 15, 2012: Sit-in at Erada Square calling for the dissolution of the new Assembly. 
 
Dec. 25, 2012:  GCC 33rd Summit in Bahrain; the Sakhir Declaratin is issued. 
 
June 16, 2013: the Constitutional Court rules that the Emir’s decree of a one candidate 
vote, reduced from four, was indeed constitutional, yet, it further ordered the Assembly to 
be dissolved on the basis of improper technicalities in the election decree. 1170   
 
July 27, 2013: Parliamentary elections result is a majority of pro-government MPs.  
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